THE SIXTH LECTURE

Grey River Argus, 23 March 1914, Page 2

THE SIXTH LECTURE

SCIENCE AND COMMON- SENSE. V •; " A LOGICAL' TANGLE. . '. Mr. .Balfour delivered the'sixth of the series of, Gifford Lectures on January as usual from a few notes , on the back of. an envelope, lie performed the feat of making clear his views on the external world. Me made . no. reference to the disputes of conflicting philosophical- system and gave 'only slight indications that- -he was treading on the perpetual battleground of philosophers- • J-fcs, point of view, 'was that of common sense • and or 'science. *" • " . „. The lecturer applied to the scientific view of the- external. world his clistmc .tion between the casual series involved in belief and .the ; rational, or. as he to-day preferred, to: call it, the cog 'nitive, series— -that is. a series having relation to knowledge. -\Yhat. : he as)ced, is the common-sense view ot the external world? It would be general •ly admitted that common sense never 'considers that external, objects, pieces of 1 matter, the solid globe the heavens ■- 'above, arc mental states, and that it thinks.-' of them as independent of the person who perceives- them. These objects ' affect us when We perceive Them 1 and we do- not affect them by ;perceiving them. Further he thought :— -but of this he was.nbt so certainchat when Vie look at a material object, we do not think.'that its- reality is exhausted' by the aspects of it thai •we .perceive. He .summed.up by say ing 'that, according- to comrnori sense, the -'cognitive series which 'is our belief in external things: is a direct and immediate perception ; of , objects them selves, and lie proceeded to make the point on which .liis whole argument depended. THE FOUNDATION OF SCIENCE. ' This simple and direct perception of external " objects is the foundation upon which the' .whole 'superstructure of science is built up, because the physicist and the physiologist look on the materials of trreir researches '•exactly as -you ■and I look' upon chairs and tables.?' The casual series which combines with ■'•/'the cognitive series to produce the belief in the external'world is the . business of science, and there is nothing immediate or simply or direct about it. . It is a, very elaborate process not yet thoroughly understood. Here Mr Balfour indicated the various kinds of knowledge required to give a casual explanation •of* bur perception of the sun. astronomy, solar • hysics-, optics physiology, and so forth: When; all these- elaborate investigations were completed, one arrives ay the threshold of the mind, only, to be confronted with the chasm: between brahu and ' mmd — a chasm not yet bridged^ over. One must also recollect that 0ur .... perceptions of an object are profoundly modified by as sociations, memorie,s „and other psychological" considerations.' He took the analogy of a message sent by letter post from one town, to another to illustrate how many processes had to be completed before, a message, starting from reality.- couldv reach mind. . H aving "thus" described the- contrasts between the -Casual series and the cognitive series. in . our belief;, in the external world, \Mr Balfour pointed out that the distinction, which modern science draws betw'een-.matter and the perceiving mind is a distinction "not 1 fundamentally different from the old [ distinction between primary' and se r 1 condary qualities of matter. That distinction ■ has been . carried further by 1 science, which teaches that reality is 1 nid^froro Us behind the screen of its 1 iiviii effects. We cannot perceive an " electron, ether, or the retinal image 1 ia our own retina. Science c<>n never • oa content till it gets to the unper- ■ livable, and die real world, as science pictures it r is-more and more remote • from the real world, as science pic-. ' tures it, s more and more remote from l the real world as we pcrceive H it or i are 1 capable- of perceiving it. It is : science that insists on the separation i between our sensations and perceptt ions- and the outside aus^a pnVicct ing them. Science then is in a logic al tangle. • : -The lecturer pointed out, '.again, l that what the- scientist, sees is the, I commo^isense perception of the plain i man. but whatsis actually . there is • something quite different: The posil cion of science is' something like that ; of Locke, wlw has been justly criticisi ed for developing a theory of the extremal world which never gives direct - -.-.rcess. to that world Init only to sensations and feelings produced by i it Mere Mx.Balf out; agairiinsiiied > chat 'science is' entirely dependent upon the common-sense view of direct . perception,, arid argued that is der stroys its own foundation, and ithat it i provides its own premises to be interrused with illusion .■ ' He quoted • Hume's statefrieriit in the "Dialog-ues , on Natural Theology" that we can , only arj^ue from an effect, to a cause . when. we have seen a similar cause [.. .p v roducing a similar effect. Nobody, he said, has ever seen electrons and [ ether-produein^ sensations. We Jiave liever seen the causes ,and on Hume's. principle \ve cannot found .theories ot .the causes upon the effect. . ; -„,- EXTERNAL REALITY. vi y All this does not diminish the faith which : everyone has Jn the fact of reality: Can we. he: *asked imitate Hume's serene acquiescence in having one set of doctrines, foi- the study and another for the market place, doctrines about things ;of everyday life ? It would be arrogant to speak of solvmg the difficulty ; but he thouglit. that it- -would be mitigated if we gave up the idea that r we could get our ncftion of an independent external reality as a. cbhclusion from immediat n perception. We must. start with ex.tcrhalrealitj' as an inevitable belief. We know, that cause is there and that is .independent of the perceivei, and if Ave^.are/ not to make nonsense of the whole process of learning by experience; we must begin with the. as sumption of an external material mechanism acting- übon usi and try to find out how it acts. .