GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN.

Gisborne Times, Volume LX, Issue 9797, 6 May 1924, Page 3

GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN.

THROUGH TURKISH EYES.

A SUPPRESSED STUDY.

Some time after the close of the Great War it was decided that the Historical Section of the General Staff. Constantinople, should publish a series of historical studies on Turkish operations in the Various campaigns. The original intention seems to have been that the volumes should ba seven in number, and the first volume was in fact published in 1922, but for some reason or other the other volumes do not seem to have over been issued. Even the first volume was withdrawn from circulation, and the Turkish authorities aio very chary of admitting that such a work was ever in existence. Fortunately a copy of this first, volume fell into the hands of the Constantinople correspondent of The Times, who forwardod the following interesting extracts to that paper.

THE FIRST PHASE. The author of the official “history,” criticising the respective' operations of the assailants and of the defenders during the first phase of the. campaign, wrote: — “After it had become certain that Turkey would join the Central Powers the forcing of the Straits, which blocked the safest and shortest line of communication between the Russian armies and the Western Powers, became of supreme value to these powers politically and strategically. It is known for certain from papers published by the Entente Powers that, before the attack on the Dardanelles, this important question had been examined aud discussed in detail by a committee of naval and military exports, and it had been decided that positive results could only be obtained by exerting pressure simultaneously by land and sea. In the face of this decision it was naturally a mistake to begin the operation only with naval forces and to suppose that the Dardanelles, a natural canal 70 kilometres long and at the widest places six to seven kilometres broad, and a tolerably well-prepared and fortified passage into the bargain, could be rushed with the trifling loss of three to five ships. It was a further mistake not to carry out. this undertaking as a surprise raid directly after the declaration of war. During the long period of 108 days which was permitted to pass from the outbreak of war to the date of the first naval attempt it would be been quite possible to concentrate and transport the necessary land forces ; if the operation had been carried out in this manner there would have been a good chance of rushing the Straits at a lesser cost. Actually up to February 25 only two divisions were available for the land defence on both sides of the Straits, and of these only one was posted on tire peninsula, divided up along the coast in weak observation bodies. It may, therefore, be surmised that before that date it would have been feasible to effect a landing at any point on tire peninsula, and the capture of the Straits by land would have been comparatively easy.” THE PRICE OF SUCCESS. The description of the subsequent Allied attempts to force the Dardanelles by land is so detailed and techni ra'l as to make it ixnsuitable for general reproduction, but it is interesting to compare the Turkish estimate of the “price of success” with those given in the various Allied books on the campaign:— “The Dardanelles campaign lasted exactly 324 days, counting from the first bombardment on February x 9, 1915, and 259 days counting from the actual landing. It resulted in an unparalleled victory for the Turkish arms, for the flower of our army and the greater part of our forces participated in this the most sanguinary episode of the Great War, which produced the most eloquent and comprehensive evidence of the aptitude i./f war which we have inherited from our forefathers. From the first landing operation the strength of the troops on this front was gradually reinforced j until at the hogibbing of October it ; amounted, tjo 2.1 infantry divisions— ! i.e., more than 310,000 men. The j total Turkish losses on this front j have not yet been absolutely deter- ! mined. Nevertheless the following ! figures, which have been taken from the most trustworthy sources available, approximate closely to the truth —Killed, 55,127 ; wounded, 100,177; missing, 10,067; died of disease in the Dardanelles, 21,498; total, 18b,869. If the 61,440 sick and convalescent cases evacuated during the campaign from the front be added to the above, we get a total figure of 251,309 for our losses on the Dardanelles front, which cannot he far from the truth. As regards the losses of the Entente Powers on this front, including killed, wounded, prisoners, and missing, tho British figure is 216,000 and the French 115,000, making a total of 331,000.”

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS. The pamphlet ends up with a number of general comments on the campaign which arc still of considerable interest and value : “The small size of the force detailed for tho naval operations against the Dardanelles shows that the assailants had unaccountably under-estimated defensive strongth of the Turks, and had misjudged the numbers and the effort which would he required to force the Straits. Further, the fact that the naval action was confined to only one attempt—that of March 18-19—especially deserves reflection. To shrink from incurring insignificant losses is not the way to win big stakes; it is most probabls that the objective could have been achieved by naval action alone if the attempt had been made wiki more energy and ' repeated -several times. To win big stakes one must not shrink from deliberately running great risks or even from risking all at a crisis. The Allies were in a position to increase considerably tho land force of 90,000 allocated to the Dardanelles operation. In spite of the aid of tho fleet this force detailed for tho first landing was not sufficient t> attack tho almost equal Turkish force of six infantry divisions and one cavalry brigade (84,000) which at that time was holding both sides of tho Straits. One of the principal reasons for the failure of tho repeated and bloody attacks delivered with great courage and pertinacity by the Allies was the complete absence at first, -and the deficiency later, cf heavy land guns. The attackers tiied to make good this important deficiency by means of the ships’ guns, hut these with their fiat trajectories and only able to use H.E. shell, could not achieve very effective j results against concealed infantry positions. ... i In the face of tho imperfect ami deficient means of defence at tho disposal of tho Turks it is remarkable that the attackers were undly cautious and eager to avoid casualties. Not only did this-excessive caut-on. make all the offensives fruitless, hut i.-. increased the defenders’ powers of resistance and encouraged them to ut dortake counter offensives. TTo assailants were unable to maintain the spirited charges with which they began, ancl their efforts gradually died off. The attacks at Ari Burnu. Kanli Sirt, and Anafarta between August 6 .and 10 ware feeble and hesitating as compared with thoso launched in the early days. Moreover, yko iL'on tin tied at' foot of next column.)