The Gisborne Times. PUBLISHED DAILY. MONDAY, SEPTEMBER. 2, 1918.

Gisborne Times, Volume XLIX, Issue 4963, 2 September 1918, Page 4

The Gisborne Times. PUBLISHED DAILY. MONDAY, SEPTEMBER. 2, 1918.

“By the strength of their souls they have done this.” So writes Philip Gibbs with reference to the brilliant work of the troops which, during the past few weeks, have added so many additional golden pages to the military record of our Empire. It is this wonderful spirit —this will to conquer, which pervades the whole of the Allied troops —that is, under the capable guidance of Focli, crushing the Huns’ much-vaunted armies to-day. Focli, great philosopher as well as great strategist, can wish for no better help on the part of the armies under his control. That which he has taught in his works he is illustrating with such complete success on the field of battle to-day. In one of his works Focli asks in what consists the combination of qualities whicn ensures victory. Is it in the losses which we inflict upon The enemy? Or is it in more and better guns, in the superiority of the materials of war? Foch says the battle is won by none of these things. “Ninety thousand conquered men retire before ninety thousand conquering men only because they have had enough, because they no longer believe in victory, because they are demoralised, at the/ end of their moral resistance.” ’ For General Foch it is a question of “moral” alone. He quotes with approval the memorable saying of Joseph de Maistre: “A battle lost is a battle which the army believes to be lost, for a battle cannot be lost materially.” Therefore, it is morally that it is lost. But then it is also morally that it is gained, and we can prolong 'the aphorism thus: “A battle gained is a battle in which the army refuses to admit itself beaten.” “To conquer is to advance,” said Frederick, and Joseph de Maistre, accepting

Foch: Strategist and Philosopher.

the statement, asks, "But who is he who advances? It is he whose con- . science and countenance makes the ; other side retreat.’' And Foch gives it mathematical expression: “War equals department of moral force. Victory equals moral superiority in the conqueror; moral depression in the conquered. BattM equals the struggle of two wills.” An army to he victorious must therefore have “moral” superior to that of its adversary—it must have the will to conquer—or •< the High Command must impart it. He quotes Napoleon to his purpose: “It was not/the Roman legions which conquered Gaul,” wrote Napoleon, “but Caesar. It was 'not the Carthagenian j soldiers who made Rome tremble, but Hannibal. It was not the Macedonian phalanx which penetrated I India, but Alexander. It was not the French army which reached the Woser and the Inn, but Jurenne. It was not the Prussian soldiers who defended their country for seven years against the three most foi midable Powers in Europe; it was Fred- i crick the Great,” Thus (according . to Foch’s doctrine), no army can hope j to conquer without force of soul m j the commander. Or, as Foch sums it up, “No victory is possible without a vigorous command, greedy of responsibilities and ready for botn enterprises, possessing and inspiring in all the energy and resolution to go to the very end, without personal action rendered in good will, without judgment, without freedom of spirit (in the midst of danger)—gifts natural in the highly-endowed man, m the general born, advantages acquired by work and reflection in the ordinary man.” But here Foch speaks the necessary word of warning. A good general does not fight for the sake of fighting. “If the will to conquer is necessary to engage a battle with any chance of success, the Generalissimo is criminal to engage or accept it without the superior will which gives to all direction and impulsion. And if the battle is imposed upon bint by inevitable circumstances, be must decide to fight ’ and to conquer all the same. ' And since it is essential to demoralise . the enemy, how, asks General loch, shall this be achieved? A passage from Xenophone, whom he constantly cites with respect, helps to solve the problem. “Whatever is,” says the Greek writer, “the less clearly it is foreseen, the more it causes pleasure or fear.” Nowhere is this more plainly evident than in war, where surprise strikes with terror evc-n those who are by far the stronger — i strikes them with that cold terror which descends upon the stoutest | heart, freezes it. and persuades it I that it is vanquished. Foch’s contention. it would further seem, is \ that as an army is an animate and organised being a supreme blow of 1 unexpected vigor need not be directed on the whole of an enemy s army; to succeed what is necessary is a

series of manoeuvres, involving the throwing of masses of well-equipped and well-led troops imbued with the will to conquer upon chosen point*. In concluding a most interesting article in Blackwood’s Magazine on Foch’s philosophy as applied to war. Chas. Whibley adds:—“Such is the man into whose wise hands the destinies of Europe and the world have been placed: and we know that, when the moment comes to strike the final blow, to plan the surprise which shall strike terror into a demoralised foe. he will triumphantly deliver with all simplicity and vigor the decisive attack.”