MESOPOTAMIAN CAMPAIGN.

Gisborne Times, Volume XLVIII, Issue 4597, 28 June 1917, Page 5

MESOPOTAMIAN CAMPAIGN.

ANOTHER HiSTORIC V/AR

DOCUMENT;

STORY OF THE EARLIER -FAILURES.

PLAIN TALK IN COMMISSION’S REPORT. Australiar and N.Z. Cable Association. (Received June 23, 12.10 a.m.) LONDON. June 27. The report of the Mesopotamian Commission, constituting another historic war document, is issued as a Blue Book of IBS pages. It deals comprehensively with the operations through various stages of the advance to Bagdad and incidental happenings. It examines lengthily the questions which have given rise to public criticism.

The main report embodying the findings, conclusions and recommendations is signed by all Commissioners except Commoner Commander Wedgwood, who presented a dissentient report. The Commissioners find that the expedition was justifiable as a military enterprise, but the division of responsibility between the India office and the Indian Government was unworkable. The scope of the expeditions and tiie objective were never sufficiently defined in advance criticisms. The commander-in-chief or his representatives failed to make periodical visits.

The Mesopotamia advance on Bagdad on October, 1915, was an offensive movement based cn political and military miscalculations. It was attempted with tired and insufficient forces and inadequate preparation resulted in the Kut disaster.

The weightiest share of the responsibility. for the untoward advance lies with Sir John Nixon, whose confidence and optimism were the main cause.

The decision as to others responsible in order of sequence are: Viceroy Hardinge, commander-in-chief, Major Beauchamp Duff, military secretary to the India Office, General Barrow, Mjr. Austen Chamberlain, the War Committee, and Cabinet. The Commission point out- that the last two were' responsible as the political heads who cannot secure complete immunity through adopting from expert subordinates wrong advice. The general armament and equipment were quite insufficient to meet the needs of the whole system. The commissariat was badly organised during the period of the Indian Government’s responsibility, though there was no general breakdown. Similar authorities bestowed meagre attention and ill-liberal treatment to the expeditions _in regard to its wants during 1914-5. The supply of reinforcements was insufficient in connection u ith the advance on Bagdad and the Kut relief operations. ■ . . The Indian militaires insufficiently realised from the first- the paramount importance of river and railway transport- in Mesopotamia, and their responsibility was grave. General Nixon was responsible tor recommending the 1915 advances withi insufficient transport and equipment. , ~ii The transport shortage at- the beginning of 1916 rendered the Kutrelief operations fatal. . . Dealing with the medical provision the Commissioners declare this insufficient from the beginning, and ultimately resulted in a lamentable breakdown after the battles oi lJio-b and most lamentable and severe sur-

fer iiig. The Commission, in apportioning the blame on the Indian Government tor inefficiency of management m the Mesopotamia campaign, recognise their anxieties in other quarters. The Commissioners deem re that notwithstanding the period of reverses the success of the campaign as a whole has been remarkable and assert that in many parts of the world wherein the Allies are engaged « more substantial results and soling victories have been achieved tuan in °final conclusion seriously censures the Indian Government for lack of knowledge and foresight shown in the inadequacy of the preparations Ind lack of readiness to recognise and supply the deficiencies.