Thank you for correcting the text in this article. Your corrections improve Papers Past searches for everyone. See the latest corrections.

This article contains searchable text which was automatically generated and may contain errors. Join the community and correct any errors you spot to help us improve Papers Past.

Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image

Colville’s Blunder.

THE DEFENCE OFFERED.

In defence of General Colville, the following gives an idea of what can be said in his

favor:—

In May last, Colvile was instructed to reach Heilbron via Bindley with 4000 Highlanders and 1000 Scouts on the 29th of the month. Particular stress was laid on the necessity to bo at his destination by the 29th, and the General immediately came to the conclusion that his brigade was to take part in a general advane to the Vaal river on or about that date. The Imperial Yeomanry, or rather a portion of them, were to join him en route, but after starting he received word that they were so late that they would be unable to overtake him, and would join him later on via Kroonstad. The roads were bad, the country thick with Boers, and Coivile’s troops, worn out with constant fighting, arrived a day late at Bindley, to find that town, much to their surprise, strongly held by the Boers. They had been looking forward to pleasant welcome, but instead had to fight a pitched battle before they could enter. Next morning they went on, and when within one day’s march of Heilbron, the force was overtaken by an orderly with a message from the Colonel in command of 500 of the Yeomanry, that he was blocked outside Lindley, and had been compelled to retreat three miles on Kroonstad-road, had only one day’s provisions, and that he needed assistance to get away without heavy loss. Colvile replied that he had imperative instructions to be at Heilbron on 29th, and had only one days’ provisions left himself, and that not only would it make him late at Heilbron to come to the Yeomanry’s rescue, but make it possible for the Boers to starve the 5000 men into surrender. Also, he said that as the Yeomanry had retired three miles they could no doubt make good their escape with less loss and danger than if his brigade returned to their assistance. The Yeomanry were captured, and altough Colvile reached Heilbron on the date instructed, and drove the Boers out of the town, and generally did good work, a loud demand went up for his blood for having abandoned the Yeomanry. The General was sent home and requested to resign his position in the army, but has refused to do so. He says that the whole trouble is that the Yeomanry—De Wet’s Own—were all “ society ” soldiers, many of them millionaires, and, had they been a portion of a common line-regiment, he would probably have been court-martialled had he gone to their assistance in defiance of his orders. He did not believe in social distinctions on the battlefield, and considered that the safety of 4000 Highlanders and 1000 Scouts was much more important than that of 500 amateur soldiers. When Colvile got to Heilbron, he saw some more of the Headquarters-staff’s fine work. He had been officially informed that he would find Heilbron in occupation of Gen. Hamilton, and full of supplies. Instead of which he found no supplies and only 120 sick and wounded troops living on the charity of the inhabitants; but he received information that a convoy of 60 waggons, guarded by 90 men, would be dispatched shortly. He replied promptly that the country was infested with Boers, that 90 men were not sufficient guard, and that a force of cavalry with guns was absolutely necessary. His advice was unheeded, and 4000 Boers had a good time on the contents of those 60 waggons, while Coivile’s troops went short. He wired for instructions, and received from the Military Secretary orders that he should remain where he was. Some days later he received another message from the Military Secretary that he was to take no notice of the former wire, but act on one sent by the Chief-of-Staff same day. The Chie£-of-Staff’s wire never came to hand till six months later, when it was handed to him with a lot of undelivered telegrams, and the brigade just fooled about Heilbron and ate its head off, and was finally taken to Pretoria after all the fighting was over. Now they want to sack Colvile because of all these things. Colvile says, “ Sack the man who was responsible for the bungle, and not the victim of it. ” And it looks as though Colvile was- right.

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/GIST19010304.2.13

Bibliographic details

Gisborne Times, Volume V, Issue 53, 4 March 1901, Page 2

Word Count
728

Colville’s Blunder. Gisborne Times, Volume V, Issue 53, 4 March 1901, Page 2

Colville’s Blunder. Gisborne Times, Volume V, Issue 53, 4 March 1901, Page 2

Help

Log in or create a Papers Past website account

Use your Papers Past website account to correct newspaper text.

By creating and using this account you agree to our terms of use.

Log in with RealMe®

If you’ve used a RealMe login somewhere else, you can use it here too. If you don’t already have a username and password, just click Log in and you can choose to create one.


Log in again to continue your work

Your session has expired.

Log in again with RealMe®


Alert