FINAL SUBMISSIONS TO BOARD OF INQUIRY BY COUNSEL

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXXV, Issue 22819, 14 December 1948, Page 6

FINAL SUBMISSIONS TO BOARD OF INQUIRY BY COUNSEL

RUAPEHU DISASTER

(P A.) WELLINGTON, Dec. 13. A submission that the Kaka was fully efficient and equipped, that its crew were competent and experienced, and that the aircraft made a normal flight northward from Paraparaumu as far as the Wanganui homer, was made by Mr. D. W. Virtue, for the National Airways Corporation, when the final day of the inquiry into the Ruapehu disaster on October 23 began.

Mr. Virtue said the corporation joined iti expressing regret at the loss of so many valuable lives, including one of its most experienced commanders and the second officer.

Mr. Virtue said that when the Kaka began its flight it had the necessary certificates of airworthiness and had behaved satisfactorily on the southward trip. No recent log entries pointed to anything which might have caused'it to be so far off its course. The inspector of aircraft accidents had fairly said that the Kaka was fully airworthy wheri it left Palmerston North for the last time The crew was fully qualified by the Air requirements and the corporation s standards.

Commander’s Qualifications

Commander Hare had been check tested only three days before and promoted in his route grading. He had received a complete instruments course, including navigation He had made eight survey trips on the route before the service began and five return trips after the service started. The second officer was fully competent to take over in an emergency. The evidence showed that the Kaka was properlv loaded and dispatched at Palmerston North. Some mention had been made of the fact that the aircraft was running late, but that was not a factor in the inquiry. A delay _of 15 minutes was not unusual. All aircraft that day were late. Any time made up by the Kaka was gained on the ground, not by any imprudent flying. Any suggestion that Commander Hare was anxious to get back to Auckland because a paper found in the plane showed that he was rostered to leave for Norfolk Island next morning was fantastic. He was not so rostered, but had considered an exchange of duties with another pilot who was due to makp the Norfolk Island trip. The corporation did not approve of the exchange and the paper found in the plane was no more than an aftermath of a suggestion which had not been pursued. Mr. Virtue said the absence of a completed flight plan did not contribute to the accident The essential features of flight plans were primarily for use by the air control authorities in preventing collisions in the air. Own Drift Calculations . Mr. Virtue said that only in respect of the drift allowance might a flight plan be of some navigational assistance, but the evidence of other pilots was that they made their own drift calcu lations. Moreover, a computer found in the wreckage showed that the Kaka’s crew had made their own drift reckoning on the southward trip and would probably do the same going north. It was unlikely that Commander Hare was influenced by the wrong entry of drift on the flight plan at Paraparaumu as port instead of starboard. The evidence made it doubtful if he even saw that entry. Commander Hare had a weather briefing at Whenuapai and knew the weather on the route from his own experience on the southward run. He had on board all the necessary information to calculate the drift and there was no additional weather data which the forecaster at Paraparaumu could hve given him. Commander Hare’s failure to pick up the flight plan at Palmerston North showed that he intended to use the forecast drift.

Mr. Virtue said the absence of signals from the plane after leaving the Wanganui homer did not indicate that it was in difficulties or that the radio was faulty for that was a normal period of silence. The aricraft was at normal height on a normal route and the occupants, from the evidence in the wreck, were conducting themselves normally at the time of the crash.

Mr. Virtue said it would be impossible to determine precisely what set the plane so far off course. The Air Department’s navigation expert, Mr. Hudson, said he found it hard to believe that both the commander and the co-pilot fell into the same error of applying drift calculations wrongly. The board would have to consider, therefore, the possibility that the winds that afternoon differed greatly from those in the forecast used by Commander Hare, consequently putting the plane well off course.

Weather Forecast

The chief aviation meteorologist, Mr. Dyer, gave evidence that the winds in the area were likely to change considerably after 2 p.m., backing from 320 to 270 degrees at 6000 feet and increasing to 40 or 50 knots, compared with which the forecast used by Commander Hare indicated a slight backing to 310 degrees and a decrease to 30 knots.

“I submit that the winds encountered may have been the stronger and very much more westerly winds which Mr. Dyer estimated would occur in the area about 5 p.m. that day. There is no evidence that the more violent and westerly winds did not arrive some hours earlier than anticipated. The possibility that winds dead on the beam of much greater intensity than anticipated were experienced cannot be ruled out. Such winds would have nullified Commander Hare’s calculations.”

Mr. Virtue said' the farmer who sighted the plane just east of the Wanganui • homer estimated that the ground wind was then 40 miles an hour compared with a forecast surface wind of 18 to 20 knots. If this witness is reliable and the surface winds were stronger than forecast, the winds at 6000 feet might similarly have reached a speed which Mr. Dyer did not expect to attain until about 5 p.m. Every Provision For Safety

Mr. Virtue said that having regard to what was now known about the wind, there should be no specific finding about one or other pilot. He said the corporation’s operations procedure made every possible provision for safety, and the procedure was satisfactory. The training and checking of pilots were not perfunctory but exacting, and pilots were required to be familiar with the routes they flew. While flight cancellations were lefl to the pilot concerned, he could consuli the operations office if in real doubt Route operating schedules were as full as could possibly be and had full navigational information to reduce calculations in the air to a minimum. He did not think that the operation instructions issued to pilots could be more comprehensive. The calculation of drift by the standby pilot was unnecessary, and it might well be recommended that it be discontinued. Pilots made their own computations, and did so frequently in the air.

The evidence of expert witnesses supported the view that there should be an extra radio homer in the centre of the island, said Mr. Virtue in conclusion. “It Is submitted in the light of all the evidence that there can be only one answer to the question of what put the aircraft on the mountain, and that answer is faulty navigation and as navigation is a primary responsibility of the pilot in command the fault must primarily be his,” said Mr W. 11. Cunningham, counsel for the Air Department, in his final submissions. All experienced pilots who gave evidence agreed as to the necessity of weather briefing, said'Mr. Cunningham. The corporation by its own procedure

by which the reserve or standby pilot prepared instrument flight plans for scheduled flights apparently recognised the wisdom of making navigational calculations.

Pilot Pressed For Time

Detailed evidence covering the actions of the pilot on that flight, both at Paraparaumu and Palmerston North, seemed to point to hifn being pressed for time and to show that he had very little time to give to what was his primary responsibility, working out his navigational calculations for the northward flight. An obvious requirement was a careful study of the weather forecasts and the directions and strengths of the winds likely to be encountered In the light of the subsequent fatal outcome of the amount of attention Commander Hare gave the weather before the northward flight was not without some significance.

He spent exactly one minute in the weather office. He did not examine the synoptic chart and merely got a copy ’of the latest forecasts to take away.

So far as the instrument flight plan was concerned, the board might well think in view of obvious errors in these plans that the reserve pilot was not qualified sufficiently in navigation matters to be entrusted with the responsible task of making those calculations. Again, the arrangements about telephoning the flight plan broke down and the pilot himself did not appear to have asked for it.

"Whatever the position under the regulations is it must be conceded that a pilot who undertakes with passengers a flight under instrument flight rules should have a carefully weighed and considered flight plan in difficult weather conditions,” Mr. Cunningham said. Relied on Own Estimation

"The fact that the pilot left Palmerston North without having worked out any flight plan and without a copy of one worked out for him did not prevent him and the co-pilot setting to work and remedying the defect, but the evidence pointed to the pilot having relied on his own estimation as to the course he should fly without working it out on a computer and recording it.”

The weather throughout the day between Palmerston North and Hamilton was unpleasant with much cloud and rain, but other aircraft maintained their schedule and the weather did not prevent the route from being flown safely, provided adequate navigational precautions were taken.

‘‘lt is submitted that the evidence regarding the preparation of instrument flight plans as carried out on this particular day and the apparent lack of interest of the pilot himself in making any navigational calculations for an instrument flight in known bad weather conditions where cloud was likely to be encountered, demonstrates that on this day at least that the preplanning procedure and weather briefing were haphazard, namely, something to be done provided the pilot had time to attend to it- “ This is an operational matter in which control might well be tightened or some supervision imposed in the interests of safety by the corporation. The perfunctory signing of forms sometimes in blank is no efficient guarantee that a pilot has done his job for the flight. Airways Overworked?

“National Airways is a State service which is rapidly expanding and which has the confident patronage of the travelling public. The happenings connected with the Kaka could indicate that the resources of the corporation in skilled pilots and fully trained operational staff are perhaps being stretched beyond safe limits to cope with the traffic offering.” / Regarding navigation, he said the corporation undertook that particular service with a full knowledge of the limitations of the existing aids and, while it must be conceded that an additional aid to be built near Taumarunui would be useful, its absence did not fundamentally affect this particular accident. Mr. Cunningham recommended that the existing system of instrument flight planning be examined, with particular attention to the procedure necessary to ensure that all flights contemplated under instrument conditions were accurately planned, and that no aircraft should depart under instrument flight rules unless a pilot was in possession of such a flight plan. Consideration should be given to the early provision of radio facilities in the Taumarunui area, a standard pattern of logbook for magnetic compasses should be introduced, definite operating periods between overhauls should be laid down for gyroscopic instruments, and greater care should be taken in the maintenance of logbooks, inspection records and flight and radio logs. Mr. Cunningham said the meteorological evidence was that the winds actually experienced were unlikely to have varied by more than 10 degrees or 10 knots from those forecast. This completed the hearing.