ABSENCE OF LEADERSHIP CRITICISED

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXXV, Issue 22728, 28 August 1948, Page 6

ABSENCE OF LEADERSHIP CRITICISED

(P.A.) WELLINGTON, Aug. 28. After a lengthy review of the evidance Ballantyne’s Fire Inquiry Commission says it had no reason to doubt either the ability or courage of members of the Christchurch Fire Brigade, They would have been willing to take all the risks firemen know are involved in fire-fighting, and if they had had leadership which pointed out to them their various tasks, would have acquitted themselves well. “Without leadership all the weaknesses that characterise lack of organisation in fire-fighting, as in other difficult attacks of a different kind, were likely to be present. “The absence of sufficient well-train-ed officers resulted in a lack of organisation and absence of plan and direction to fight a major fire.” Responsibility Not Apportioned The report does not attempt to apportion responsibility for non-evacuation between Baliantyne’s and the Fire Brigade. Eoth had a responsibility to see that the occupants were safe. “The principals and executive officers of Ballantyne's, despite some scattered partial efforts and directions, failed to shoulder their responsibility of leadership in a way their staff was entitled to expect and rely upon. "Before -the brigade arrived Ballantyne’s staff could have been evacuated or prepared for evacuation and the officer in charge of the Fire Brigade may have assumed that steps had been taken.

“With a fire in a large building where there was normally a large staff it should have been apparent to the officer that an inquiry must be made that satis fled him that complete evacuation had taken place, or else steps taken to see that evacuation had in fact taken place,” the report says. “in coming t.o the conclusion we have that the management of Ballantyne's did noAafter the outbreak of the fire show control or direction sufficient to say that they took all steps reasonably possible to ensure the safety of the staff, and that they were responsible for not having previously instituted fire prevention measures, wo do not forget that Roger Ballantyne may have been lulled into a sense of false security when Burrows, the officer in charge of the Fire Brigade, failed to ask him whether the stall had been evacuated, and failed to give any direction at all on this point. Lack of Instructions “But Roger Ballantyne, if he were so aiiected did not himself take a great part or himself give any directions in regard to evacuation, which should have been given previous to the arrival of the Fire Brigade. “The Ballanlynes seem to have thought that the fire risk was negligible. The staff were not instructed wnere to go, or what to do in the event of fire. No preventive measures were taken and the executive officers who could have been expected to take control had to imorovisc the necessary control. “As a whole, the steps taken after allowing for the difficult situation caused bv lack of antecedent prevention measures, cannot on the eviaence ot the executive officers be regarded as satisfactory. Urgent personal action to sc<* to the evacuation of the staff on the upper floors was required and, in our opinion, was lacking. “It may well have been that the evocative officers acted within the compass of average intelligence in circumstances as they saw them, in which case the answer is that there should be provided an alarm system with a total coverage of the premises and stall practices in evacuation drill so that piomptitud’e will be automatically forthcoming, di\ orced as far as possible from tne human factor.

Plight of Trapped Girls

“For instance, when it was known that the girls in the millinery workroom were trapped, no member of Ballanntyne’s made it his duly immediately to inform the Fire Brigade that steps should be taken to rescue them by way of the fire escape. We must, therefore ,say that in our opinion all steps reasonably possible in the circumstances then obtaining were not taken to warn the staff and members of the public on the premises of the existence and seriousness of the fire. "Alt reasonably possible steps were not taken to provide for their safety and escape, and without some warning apparatus which had been put in pmct.ice from time to time so that the staff should realise the significance of a warning, it became difficult, at least without a system of training, to inform the staff in the crisis that arose, that a fire was on the premises, that danger was imminent and that the evacuation of all must bo made immediately. “The commission finds that the girls in the millinery room cannot be deemed part authors of the disaster that overcame them because, in the circumstances, the girls were untrained and

untaught as to the means of egress and were not in a position to decide as to the seriousness ox the fire as to whether they were safe where thev were, as to whether they should go or stay.

“They were entitled to expect control and definite leadership, and the mere giving of a direction in such hurried circumstances which may not even have been heard by all, and which rlid not in terms advise them that unless they moved with the greatest possible speed they would lese their lives, was net sufficient.

“Blame for non-action on their part cannot be imputed to them, nor can they in any sense be described as part authors of their own loss of life because of failure to save themselves. “There is no evidence that the fire was occasioned by the carelessness of any employee. There is evidence that Bnllantyne's strictly enforced the rule against smoking, and there is no evidence to support any suggestion that the fire might have originated from such a cause. Unable To Meet Crisis “There was no general order after the fire was discovered that all should be ready to evacuate. The omission to prepare a co-ordinated scheme, of warning or evacuation found the heads of the firm unable to meet the crises that arose, and without foresight and preparation it seems likely that the difficulties of sudden, rapid and efficient improvisation would in like eases be beyond the scopce of most principals. “The action of the directors in failing to maintain in proper order an automatic vigilant alarm system at one time installed in Pratt's buildings is inexplicable after they had been warned by the firm which installed it that unless it were properly maintained, they would have to remove it and eventually did so. “A curious blindness to the fire risk could alone explain the failure of the directors to install some warning device.

"If a sprinkler system had been in existence the fire would probably have been put out in the cellar itself or at least contained there. Could Hardly Be Expected

“Without evacuation drill, without warning devices, without advice to the employees on steps to be taken in the event of a fire, without an automatic connection with the Fire Brigade and with employees, many of them young women, numbering 458, orderly movement. even communication between various departments, can hardly have been expected and contradictory instructions. some to stay, some to evacuate, took the place of efficient order and movement. “There is evidence that one of the staff in a position of some authority advised the female employees to report back to their departments on the upper floors.

“There is evidence that some employees were so ignorant of the lay-out of the premises that they were unaware of alternative methods of exit from one department to another.’’