DISPUTANTS TO NEGOTIATE

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXXIII, Issue 21935, 1 February 1946, Page 3

DISPUTANTS TO NEGOTIATE

RUSSIA, PERSIA

COUNCIL’S RULING

SETTLEMENT MOVE

CLASHES IN DEBATE

LONDON. Jan. 30,

The United Nations’ Security Council unanimously adopted a British resolution approving of negotiations between Russia and Persia to settle the dispute and requiring the results to be reported to the council with the council retaining the right to request information at. any time during the progress of negotiations. The decision was reached after nearly four and a half hours’ debate. Addressing the council, the Persian delegate, M. Taquizadeh, said: “The dispute cannot and must not be dismissed. Under no circumstances must it go out of the hands of the council. It must be pursued. We won’t refuse to go on with direct negotiations if the council recommends this way to be tried.”

Charges and Denials

The negotiations should be carried on under the aegis of the council, to which progress should be reported and the result brought back in a reasonable time. „ . Recounting the history of the Notes exchanged between Persia and the Soviet Union, M. Taquizadeh recalled the Persian Government's action in sending an expeditionary force to Azerbaijan after the outbreak of the rebellion and the Note to the Soviet Government listing interferences in the internal affairs of Persia and asking for freedom of movement of the force which, nevertheless, was halted by the Soviet military forces 80 miles from Teheran. , The Persian Government, on November 22 and 23, sent two Notes asking for the cessation of intervention. The Soviet Government replied on November 26 denying interferences, and said that similar interferences would not be M Taquizadeh referred to the suggestion that the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Persia should go to Moscow but all this unavailed, was ignored and, in the end. no direct negotiations for the settlement of the dispute occurred at all. He argued that the Note from Persia requesting that her forces be allowed to proceed and the Notes from the Soviet Union rejecting this issue could not be called direct negotiations. The Russian delegate, M. Vyshinsky, replying, said he was unable to follow M. Taquizdeh. Persia admitted that negotiations have taken place but said that they were not direct negotiations. M. Vyshinsky denied this and contended that indirect negotiations meant the presence of an intermediary, but there was no intermediary in the RussoPersian negotiations. The second point was whether the negotiations brought any result. “We denied the cnarges made against us after which tlie Persian Government denied our denial and refused to accept it. that Persia had expressed her intention not to ask for a further investigation and said she would not again refer to the matter. This enabled the Soviet Government to consider that Persia was satisfied with the results of the November negotiations.” M. Vyshinsky, referring to Russia’s objection to the Persian desire to reinforce her troops in northern Persia, said that Russia believed there were sufficient Persian regular police there to restore order in the situation arising from the native population’s wish to obtain some sort of national autonomy within the Persian framework which might have occurred in any democratic country.

Obliged To Stop Bloodshed

M. Vyshinsky said the presence of additional forces might have led to complications and Russia, under the Teheran agreement, was obliged to prevent any bloodshed in this territory on absolutely insufficient grounds. He said the Foreign Ministers’ conference in Moscow did not discuss the Persian question as a result ol a decision taken on the eve of the conference. For this reason it was, of course, unnecessary to send for the Persian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, who only wanted to put their case before the three Foreign Ministers. "The Persian delegation's declaration that it does not object to further direct negotiations fully meets our views, but the Persian delegation wishes that the Security Council should somehow control the negotiations,” he said. ”1 say that if the Soviet is to remain under the control of the Security Council, f emphatically deny such responsibility. “Russia is willing to enter into bilateral negotiations but to place the Russian Goverment under the control of the council is not in conformity with the dignity of the Russian Government, the dignitv of member nations or even the council itself. Mr. Bevin said that the treaty under which the Allies were empowered to maintain forces in Persia undertook to leave the sovereignty, administration and movement of security forces and police to the sole judgment of the Persian Government.

Responsibility of Persia

“I am a litflo perturbed to hear M. Vyshinsky say that the Soviet decided that the number of police in Azerbaijan ,is sufficient to keen order because this is the responsibility of the Persian Government and no one else,” he declared. Britain felt a great sense of gratitude that, at a very dire moment when the war was at its worst. Persia placed its territory, citizens and communications at the Allies’ disposal. Britain, therefore. felt a very strong obligation to hand back the territory intact and withdraw the Allied forces without interference with Persian sovereignty. There was a conflict of opinion as to whether Persian sovereignty had been infringed.

“M. Vyshinsky has admitted that the Persians were prevented from taking the steps that they deemed necessary

to protect their nationals. Well, what is there to negotiate about?” he asked.

Treaty Infringed

“If they were stopped, the treaty was infringed. I do not think there is any answer to that because the treaty is perfectly clear.” Persia's case was that the tripartite treaty should be strictly preserved and that the Persian officials and security forces should be allowed to do their duty.

“I would like to ask the Soviet Government, in the friendliest fashion: Is that denied to the Persian Government?”

Mr. Bevin said that if Britain had been charged with breaches of the treaty, he would not have regarded it as a question of dignity if the Security Council had inquired into it. Russia had referred to the dangers to the Baku oilfields, but he could not imagine the Persian Army attacking the Russian Army for the Baku oilfields. "This thing looked to Britain very much like the beginnings of aggression.” he declared. “I am quite certain that if this is eliminated, it will benefit the peace of the world. lam quite willing for the negotiations to take place, but as a party to the treaty I would ask Russia to agree to leave it on the agenda as a subject for public discussion.” Mr. Bevin expressed the opinion, that powerful countries like Britain, America and Russia should welcome assistance from the council in disputes with small Powers. Great Powers’ Duties

“We must feel a sense of gratitude to Persia. Yet she has to negotiate with an army ot how many thousands of men on her territory? . It is not for the great Powers to sit in judgment on the smaller Powers and conduct their internal affairs. Therefore, the task should proceed with the dispute remaining on the agenda.” Mr. ,E. Stettinius (United States), said he did not believe in keeping the matter on the agenda while the negotiations were proceeding which would not be compatable with the Charter or the dignity of the council members, but the council could not divest itself of the responsibility and should ask the parties to negotiate until a mutually satisfactory conclusion, in accordance with justice, was reported to the council. , ... M. Georges Birault (France), said he favoured dealing with the problem by direct negotiation with the council s approval and support. M. van Kleffens (Holland) moved that the council express its confidence that Russia and Persia would reach a just solution within a reasonable time, that they should be requested to inform the council ’when an agreement is reached and that the negotiations should be undertaken without prejudice to the council’s right to assume consideration of the matter before it was informed of the result of the negotiations. M. van Kleffens pointed out that the motion did not prejudice the council s right to resume consideration if desirable or necessary. Mr. Bevin then moved: Having heard the statements by the representatives of Russia and Persia, and taking cognisance of the documents presented by the Russian and Persian delegations and those referred, to in the course of debate, and considering that both parties have affirmed their readiness to seek a solution of the matter at issue by negotiation, and that such negotiations should be resumed in the near future, the council requests the parties to inform the council of any results achieved in such negotiations. The council, meanwhile, retains the right to request at any time information on the progress of the negotiations.” Mr. Stettinius supported this. M. van Kleffens indicated his readiness to withdraw his resolution. M. Modzelewski (Poland) submitted a new resolution providing merely for a :eport to the council on the result of the negotiations M. Vyshinsky said that if the council adopted Mr. Bevin’s proposal it would mean that under the Charter's Article 37, the council could keep the dispute on the agenda only if there wa s a danger to peace and' security. There was no such dispute. The RussianPersian declaration left no legal ground on which the council could implement Article 37. They should content themselves with bilateral negotiations and information to the council about them. The council should only deal with it if there were no results.

Vynshinsky Alleges Distrust

“We do not want war with Persia and Persia does not want war with us,” said M. Vyshinsky. "Therefore, Mr. Bevin's proposition does not correspond with the case. It is only a manifestation of distrust—that same distrust which has always in the past prevented true and cordial co-opera-tion between the United Nations. To eliminate that distrust is the first duty of this organisation

‘I absolutely object to the retention of the proposal that this dispute should continue on the agenda. If there are no results from negotiations—though I am convinced there will be results —the matter might be reported to the Security Council who will then be entitled to ask how the parties to the dispute had discharged the responsibilities thev had undertaken.” Mr. Bevin said it was not a question of distrust or anything of the kind; it was a question of trying to keep UNO s Charter.

It seemed that the council, by referring the dispute for bilateral negotiations. did not discharge that duty but merely adopted a procedure and, until results were achieved and reported to tiie council the dispute- under the Charter remained with the council. “Round To See It Through”

“I do not know what answer the world would give if. after settling the procedure, we washed our hands of it except for getting periodic reports,” he said "We, under Article 36, are duty bound to see it through.” Mr. Bevin’s resolution was finally adopted unanimously with the deletion of the final phrase, “in the meantime the matter to remain on the agenda."