TRIAL OF BOY

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXXII, Issue 21777, 28 July 1945, Page 3

TRIAL OF BOY

VERDICT OF JURY REALLY ACQUITTAL APPEAL COURT DECISION (P.A.) WELLINGTON. July 23. The Court of Appeal yesterday afternoon delivered its judgment, on a case stated by the trial judge in the trial of a boy aged 13 years. Noel Ingram Brooks, for the murder of his mother and his brother. Clarence Brooks, near Greytown, in March last. Questions for the Court, of Appeal concerned the right of the Crown to call medical evidence on the question I of insanity when the defence of insanity was not raised bv the accused’s I counsel, and also questions ns to the validity of the trial judge’s direction to the jury and as to the meaning of the jury's verdict. The Chief Justice, Sir Michael M.vers. said the Crown had to show affirmatively if it could that the accused knew that the Act charged against him was wrong, and. added that it was no part of the duty of ihe prosecution— itVdeed il was contrary 1.0 its duty, contrary to practice, and in his opinion contrary to law —to seek to prove insanity, which was clearly a defence and no portion of the Crown's case. It was proper, however, for the Crown to call medical evidence to show that the accused knew the act was wrong. Direction To Jury He continued that in his opinion the direction to the jury by the learned trial judge was erroneous when it was stated that the Crown said that the accused should be acquitted on the ground of insanity. Medical evidence’ brought by the Crown was not for that*purpose, but to put the whole of the conflicting medical evidence before the jury. In respect of the section of the Crimes Act providing that no person over the age of seven and under 14 years shall be convicted unless the court or jury are of opinion that he knew what he had done was wrong, the Chief Justice continued that the jury should have been told the ingredients of the offence in the case of a child under 14 and what the Crown bad to prove, and they should have been told that unless they were satisfied by the evidence that in committing the offence the accused knew that he was doing wrong, it was their duty to acquit. In his opinion the verdict should be construed as one of acquittal. If the authorities considered either that the accused was insane within the meaning of the criminal law. or that he was a mental defective within the meaning of the Mental Defectives Act. 1911, though his defect may fall short of criminal insanity, appropriate steps doubtless could be taken for the protection of both’ the accused and society. Mr. Justice Callan and Mr. Justice Kennedy agreed that the verdict should be construed as one of acquittal and that, it was not necessary to formulate detailed answers to the questions asked in the case stated. Mr. Justice Finlay dissented from the majority of the court.