The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES” DISHORNS THURSDAY, JULY 22, 1943. AXIS LEADERS MEET

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXX, Issue 21153, 22 July 1943, Page 2

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES” DISHORNS THURSDAY, JULY 22, 1943. AXIS LEADERS MEET

The meeting between Hitler and Mussolini provides at once a commentary and a contrast. The Axis leaders used to meet as a prelude to the development of events of their own designing. On this occasion they have met to discuss the trend of events that are operating against them and to try and devise means of meeting the position. Their earlier meetings were generally followed by a fanfare of trumpets, by declarations of their complete unity, and by grim threats and warnings about, what they intended to accomplish in the near future. This time, these things are all absent. In their place is a note of sombre foreboding without a single word of hope for their peoples or even an attempt at confidence. The conference was a striking contrast to those held by Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt at Casablanca and Washington. Even more remarkable is the fact that, just at the moment when their peoples were in need of •reassurance, neither Hitler nor Mussolini has had a word to say. Again there is the contrast between the attitude of Mr. Churchill in the days of Britain’s grave danger or that of President Roosevelt when the United Stales was so treacherously attacked. These difference are of something more than temperament; they can only betoken loss of confidence and hope. That the Axis leaders have good cause for concern, if not for despair, is apparent from even the most superficial examination of the war situation. There is not one theatre or one direction in which events are moving in their favour. It. is significant that the official German commentary refers to the “military situation created by the desperate attacks of the overwhelming Russian forces against the defensive European front.” The reference to the “defensive” front should be noted. There can be little doubt that Russia is Hitler’s chief preoccupation at the moment. Only a fortnight ago, his forces had launched an offensive against the Russians, but now they are in retreat. What can Hitler or his Axis partners and satellites do about it? No doubt Germany desires, even if she cannot demand, a greater measure of assistance against these overwhelming forces. Italj', however, far from being able to go to Germany’s aid, has been compelled to withdraw her troops from the Russian and Balkans fronts and is desperately in need of assistance herself. Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria—the latter not even at war with Russia—can give no help and, indeed, if reports are correct, are considerably perplexed to know how to deal with internal problems which will increase as the plight of the Axis becomes more acute.

And what of Mussolini’s problems? The Berlin report speaks oi the “sober, factual, and illusionless examination of the situation in which the developments in the Mediterranean area probably were the chief topic,” “Illusionless” is an appropriate adjective, because neither Hitler nor Mussolini can any longer be under any illusions as to the danger which the Allied conquest of the Mediterranean poses for (■hem. It is not merely Italian territory that is at stake in> this great Allied invasion, but that of Germany and the rest of Europe as well. If the advance is to be halted, or even checked, it is apparent that Germany will have to provide the forces with which to do it —and Germany has not sufficient forces for her own needs. What did transpire at this meeting must be a matter of conjecture, but it is a reasonable guess that Mussolini “passed the buck”—threw upon Hitler the onus of defending Italy as the only alternative to an Italian surrender. There can be no question that the partnership—never more than one of convenience on both sides —is an unhappy one and that the utmost difficulty will bo experienced in sustaining it. As was pointed out yesknown. Hitler must now consider whether he has more to gain or lose by continuing the uneasy and unsatisfactory alliance. The pressure from the two fronts in Europe and the difficulty of deciding on which to concentrate defensive measures may be the major Axis problem, but it is not the only one. Both Germany and Italy arc being subjected to relentless bombing by ever-growing Allied air forces and they are impotent to prevent it. Italy probably feels that Germany has retained an unfair share of the antiaircraft defences and this may have provided another grievance for discussion with Hitler. Another factor disturbing to the Axis is the failure of the submarine campaign upon which Germany built such great hopes. By this means Britain was to be blockaded and Allied transport generally crippled. Britain, however, has more than survived the blockade apd instead of Allied transport being crippled it has been possible to move hundreds of thousands of troops and enormous quantities of supplies and equipment across the Atlantic and right into Mussolini’s backdoor. Again, Mussolini would have good cause to complain of his partner’s failure to redeem his glib promises. These are some aspects of the dilemma which the Axis leaders met to discuss and overcome. What measures they can take remains to be seen, but it can be said now that there seems to be good justification for the lack of confidence which they betray.