The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES” GISBORNE, FRIDAY, JULY 9, 1943. AIR SUPREMACY

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXX, Issue 21142, 9 July 1943, Page 2

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES” GISBORNE, FRIDAY, JULY 9, 1943. AIR SUPREMACY

Victory in war is. in somo measure, a survival of the fittest. Fitness extends over an enormous range—from the men and their equipment in the field, the factories and the workers who produce the munitions of war. the humble toilers in the Fields, and the men and machines and ships which bridge the gap between the rear and front lines. It all becomes a question of staying power, of capacity to out-work and out-fight the enemy. In a large degree it is a matter of production, for all the armies in the world are useless unless they are adequately provided with the weapons of war. In this respect, as much as in others, the Allies entered the war severely handicapped. The enemy, having prepared for years, largely pinned his faith on his airpower and counted on this weapon, above all others, to win the war. It is in this sphere, however, that the Allies have most: effectively demonstrated their fitness and capacity. Not only have they survived the enemy's onslaughts, but in the past year or two they have proved that they are the fittest on this particular production front. In the early days of the war every battle had to be fought against the air supremacy of the other side, but to-day the; tables have been turned and in every theatre it is the Allies who have unquestioned control of the skies.

In some quarters there may, perhaps, be excessive optimism regarding the situation in the air. One commentator has suggested that by the end of the summer the Luftwaffe will be down and out. This may bo true. On the other hand, it might be just as much wishful thinking as the opinion expressed at the beginning of the war that Germany’s supplies of oil would he exhausted within twelve months. Whether the wastage of German aircraft is heavier than the production of new machines must remain a matter of conjecture, but it would be foolish to assume that the war in the air can be won by the collapse of the enemy rather than by the preponderant weight of the Allied forces. If reliance is placed solely on the latter factor, however, the outlook is encouraging and optimism is justified by experience. Recent American estimates place the total Axis output of aircraft at little more than 4000 machines a month. . There has been nothing to suggest that losses have been at the same rate. On the other hand, the United States alone is producing over 7000 machines a month, and to this number has to be added ihe output of British and Russian factories. Without taking the question of wastage into account, therefore, there is good ground lor the claim that the Allied output is three times that of the enemy.

Il" wastage is an important factor, again the advantage lies with the Allies since their proportion of losses is much less than that of the Axis; and this notwithstanding the fact that, In the main, it is the Allied air forces which are taking the initiative. Assuming an equal loss ratio, however, Ihe production figures indicate that it is only a matter of time before the enemy will be defeated in the air by sheer weight of numbers. It will be another instance of the survival of the fittest. Already in some theatres the Axis has been virtually driven out of the skies and in every theatre his air forces are operating at a disadvantage. The North African campaign was the first and most striking illustration .of the turning of the tables in the air. Here the Allies were able to make full use of the concentration of aircraft they had built up and their superiority increased as the campaign progressed. The result of this is shown by the fact that in the recent attacks on Italian islands opposition from the air has been reduced to negligible proportions. There may be some temporary reinforcement of the Axis through the diversion of machines from other fronts, which in turn are weakened, but there has been, and can b?. no effective challenge to Allied superiority.

What has already happened in the Mediterranean theatre is already happening elsewhere. In Russia, where the Germans owed their early gains largely to their air-power, it is now the Russians who are taking the initiative and it is possible that already they have achieved superiority. In the Pacific it is the same story. Again the enemy owed his early successes very largely to his superiority in the air. but that is clearly a thing of the past. With their air-power in this theatre the Allies have been able io take the offensive and to drive the Japanese from their advanced bases. More than that, they have been able to carry the attack far afield and to present such strength as to make it impracticable, if not impossible, for the Japanese navy to venture in strength into southern waters. In this development in the air there is proof of Allied fitness--of ability to outfight, out-produce, and out-last the enemy. To say, therefore, that in the air—which may yet prove to be the decisive element in this war—the odds are now overwhelmingly in favour of the Allies is no exaggeration. It may be, indeed, that Allied air supremacy is now sufficient, to enable it to be used in offensive operations in all theatres on such a scale as to ensure for the Allies victories comparable to those secured by the enemy in the early days of the war when the advantage in the air rested with him.