MOVING ON JAPAN

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXIX, Issue 20907, 6 October 1942, Page 3

MOVING ON JAPAN

AMERICAN PRONGS ALEUTIANS-SOLOMONS HINT OF NEW THRUSTS (By Telegraph —Press Assn.—Copyright.) 10.30 a.m.) NEW YORK, Oct. 5. s The military occupation of the Andreanof Islands marks the beginning of active preparations to expel jthe Japanese invaders from the Aleutians group, states the New York Times in an editorial. The threat that the Japanese might march, island by island, to the continent may be dismissed. The enemy is under a sharp warning to defend 'himself against an American offensive- The occupation of the Andreanofs alters the strategic situation in the north Pacific almost as greatly as our conquests in the Solomons have altered the situation in the south-west Pacific. We are now moving on Japan from two directions and the northern flank is the shortest. The ' Aleutians offer a military highway to Japan. It is only 1640 • miles from Dutch Harbour to Paramushiru, the great Japanese naval base at the northern end of the Kurile Islands. We have now advanced within 125 miles of Kiska, which is the half-way point. Our experience in the Solomons warns us that the reduction of Kiska will-be neither easy nor quick. The news that we are already operating from airfields in the Andreanofs explains the increased tempo of the receftt attacks on Kiska, but aerial attacks will not dislodge the enemy They will soften him UP and disorganise defence , against a final amphibious assault. The Andreanofs are a bridgehead for that assault. Although neither the Japanese nor the United Nations have been able to build up offensive superiority in the south-west Pacific capable of decisive 7 results, the situation is not likely to degenerate into a long-drawn-cut stalemate. Advance of Allies Forecast This is the opinion of Major Fielding Eliot published in the New York Herald-Tribune. Both sides have shown their ability to fight and willingness to take risks. One or other will advance again soon. The indications are that it will be our side, _ for example, General MacArthur’s reported torpedo-plane attack on Japanese shipping, probably hitting three light cruisers and .two merchantmen. General MacArthur’s torpedo planes were either land-based, which is a new departure, or else his small naval force has been reinforced by an accretion, including a carrier. The persistent air attacks on the Japanese bases in the western Solomons also seem to suggest a coming offensive. If the Allied forces in New Guinea can push the Japanese back north of the mountain and begin threatening Kokoda, it would be a suitable moment for our forces in the Solomons to advance towards Bougainville and Santa Ysabel Islands. The. Japanese, menaced at their outposts in both the south-west Pacific and the Aleutians, must decide 'where to concentrate and what to do. If they withdraw from the Aleutians the Japanese must expect an immediate attack on their positions in the Kurile Islands, which will bring pressure against the northern islands of Japan itself. If they decide to make a great effort to drive us from the Solomons, the Japanese must do so very quickly before we seize more of their present bases, especially before we succeed in,- outflanking them by driving them from eastern New Guinea. Unexpected Strategic Effect Although the campaign in the south-west Pacific seems infinitesimal compared with the clash of hosts in southern Russia, it might be made almost as decisive as the latter, declares the Herald-Tribune in an editorial, since the south-west Pacific has strategic possibilities out of proportion to the number engaged. “While it would be a grave mistake to regard the Pacific campaign as a substitute for the body blow which must soorer or later be delivered against Herr Hitler in Europe, it would be an equally grave mistake to regard the Pacific purely as defensive holding, operations,” says the paper. The defensive actions in the Coral Sea, Midway and the Solomons apparently had an unforeseen positive ' strategic effect. They probably saved India. An attack against India would require the use of the Bay of Bengal under cover of sea-power, but the Japanese Navy has not appeared in the Bay of Bengal since its heavy losses of carriers and cruisers in the Pacific. “It can be said, though with less confidence, that the Pacific operations have prevented a Japanese attack on Siberia,” remarks the Herald - Tribune. “Meanwhile the threat which Port Moresby and Guadalcanar together represent to the Japanese bases and communications in the East Indies evoked a powerful Japanese counter - attack, which was repulsed with heavy losses. Japan either no. longer possesses or is no longer willing to risk aviation for simultaneous operations in the Solomons and New Guinea. If our commanders rpgard all this in a purely defensive spirit, the Japanese will undoubtedly return, but if we are really denting Japanese air and shipping strengths, there are offensive possibilities which, pressed vigorously could seriously upset the whole balance in East Asia.” Struggle in Solomons Guerrilla sea warfare between Japanese warships and American planes and shore batteries is a constant factor in the military situation in the Solomons, writes the New York Times’ correspondent on Guadalcanar, Mr. Tillman Durdin. During the day American bombers and fighters dominate the sea for hundreds of miles around. At night fast Japanese cruisers and destroyers dare to' move in close to the island, striking swiftly and sneaking away. Sometimes they land troops on Guadalcanar under cover of shellfire. Sometimes, submarines do the shelling, focussing their guns rather aimlessly. The Marines refer to the Japanese submarines lurking offshore as Oscar, holding them generally in contempt. “Oscar’s” chum is “Louie the Louse,” a single-float seaplane that sometimes braves a quick flight over the Marine positions at dusk. "Oscar” and "Louie" probably work together, exchanging information. It is probably “Louie” which releases yellow flares illumin-. ating the shore-side gloom for the Japanese surface raiders.