NEXT SIX MONTHS

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXIX, Issue 20901, 29 September 1942, Page 5

NEXT SIX MONTHS

CRUCIALJN PACIFIC JAPANESE~STRATEGY ALLIED STRENGTH GROWS (By Telegraph-Press Assn—Copyright.) (Special Australian Correspondent.) (2.40 p.m.) SYDNEY, Sept. 28. While many Australian war commentators continue to express the belief that the Japanese occupation of Port Moresby would be a prelude to immediate invasion attempts against the mainland, the same view is not held by most American correspondents in the south Pacific. Mr. Martin Agronsky, the New York Daily Mirror correspondent, who has just returned to America from Australia, lists Port Moresby, New Caledonia and New Zealand as the order of conquest in Japan’s south Pacific strategy. “Although General MacArthur forestalled the Japanese invasion of Australia,” says Mr. Agronsky, “the enemy believes that he can accomplish the same purpose by sitting astride the United States-Australia supply line. “Japan has. not lost the initiative in this theatre,”' says Mr. Agronsky. Fast cargo vessels, capable of speeds up to 25 knots, have been the secret ofl Japan’s success. These vessels, 'which were long prepared to do war transport work, enabled Japan to move large numbers of men to press home quickly the advantages gained by the first invaders.” Discussing the recent successes by the Allied air forces in the south Pacific, Mr. Agronsky declares them to have been due to “the superior quality of our fliers and tactics, tout we cannot match Japan’s Zero fighter. Our fliers are still waiting for higher altitude ships to put them on the same level as the Zeros.” Allies’ Power of Resistance

“Although the next six months will bo crucial ones in this theatre, with Japan endeavouring, as the first move, to dislodge the American occupants from the lower Solomons, protecting the south Pacific supply line and menacing both Japan’s naval system concentrated on Truk and her hold on other islands. American commentators here feel that the United Nations are now better prepared to withstand ar.d counter the enemy’s aggressive thrusts than at any previous time in the Pacific war.

“The thin margin of sea power,” in this theatre, has been declared by Admiral Chester Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet, to be with the United Nations. Before an invasion of New Zealand would be possible Japan would have to annihilate the American Fleet—which, with the passage of time becomes far increasingly remote. Even enemy full-scale moves against nearer objectives, Port Moresby or New Caledonia, must involve a major naval clash which the enemy seems anxious to postpone—although such a battle is regarded here as inevitable. Retention of Air Superiority With the improved flow of reinforcements, it is now grossly pessimistic to believe that the south Pacific air supremacy—won despite the admitted superior feature oi the Japanese Zero—can be wrested frbm the Allies unless Japan ii 3 prepared to throw in aircraft without regard for losses. i Renewed Japanese efforts in this theatre—which are admitted by Toldo to be intended to check the increasing aggressiveness of the United Nations—present grave dangers to Australia and New Zealand, but they also present opportunities for coming to grips with the enemy under favourable terms.

Moderate Australian opinion is a reflection of this view. It is epitomised by the Sydney Morning Herald’s correspondent who writes: “It is too soon to say that the tide has turped, but last week’s developments, both in the Solomons and New Guinea, have certainly not led to any further deterioratiori in the Allied position. There can be no wider strategical security until the Japanese movement south is put into reverse and until the neuclear base of Rabaiil is reduced. For the present, each phase in the battle for the islands must be viewed as an element lit "hutch the wider struggle, with the most dangerous days still ahead.”