The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES” GISBORNE, TUESDAY, AUGUST 18, 1942. RUSSIAN REVERSES

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXIX, Issue 20865, 18 August 1942, Page 2

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES” GISBORNE, TUESDAY, AUGUST 18, 1942. RUSSIAN REVERSES

The news that the Germans have occupied the first of the Caucasian oil centres and that they have made some advance towards Stalingrad is not pleasant. It is not more, however, than has been expected and if these were to prove the last of the territorial losses in southern Russia there would be good reason for satisfaction. Actually the loss of the Maikop oilfields is probably less serious than any advance in the bend of the Don River, although the fact that it brings the Germans within reach of Russian oil is apt to vest it with a certain significance. The Germans, however, are not likely to obtain oil from the Maikop welis for a good many months to come, for the Russians have taken effective measures to render them unusable. It is to be expected now that the Germans will push on to Grozny, where there are somewhat larger oilfields, but here, too, the “scorched earth” policy will no doubt be applied. The combined output cl oil from these two centres is probably not much more than 5,000,000 tons a year, or only one-fiflh of that obtainable from the Baku area, so that even if it were available it wotild only provide less than one-third of Germany's requirements. Even this limited quantity will not be obtainable for at least six months and probably a year.

The fact that the Germans have driven so rapidly into the Caucasus suggests that the acquisition of oil has become a vital factor to them. The tactics they have followed at least show that they' are more concerned with securing possession of oif areas than with denying oil to the Russians. Had they concentrated on driving across to the Caspian, instead of pushing south, they could have severed the Russian lines of communication from Baku to the north and denied the Russian armies access to all their important oilfields, but, in the meantime, this route is left open and the Russians can go on despatching supplies to the north. It would be surprising if the Russians had not already accumulated stocks to last them for more than a year. On the other hand, ever since the war started the Germans have b.een largely relying on stocks which must by now have been seriously depleted and .they will have had the strongest incentive to secure new sources of supply, whatever the cost and whatever the effect on their general strategy. The fact that the Russians have not offered strenuous resistance to the Germans'in the Caucasus may be taken, as an indication that they do not attach supreme importance to this advance and that they prefer to concentrate their defence: in more vital areas.

More disquieting than the events in the .Caucasus is .the news, not yet very definite, of German gains in the Don eibow. It is here .that Marshal Timoshenko has made one of the most determined and most brilliant stands of the whole war. His armies have been attacked in the centre, the north and the south and have had to withstand the full forces of a concentrated Axis onslaught. Up to the present it would seem that the enemy has not been able to cross the Don in the north or the centre, but in the south he has been able to move his forces along the east bank of the river with the object of encircling the Russians and converging on Stalingrad. This key city is no doubt the immediate main objective, since once a junction was made with the Volga at that point it would not be an extremely difficult matter for him to secure the whole of the territory between the Lower Volga and the Caucasus. This is the chief danger which threatens at the moment and it is to be feared that it may become more pressing. The loss of Stalingrad would be a severe, but not disastrous, blow. In the meantime, it is not lost but its position seems to be analagous to that of Leningrad and Moscow during last year’s German advance. If, like those other cities, it can be held, it will be a serious blow to the enemy. The immediate situation is far more serious and ominous than the longrange one, which tends to be obscured by the momentary perils. Assuming, for sake of argument, that Stalingrad does and that Germany secures a firm hold on all the territory to the south, what would be the position then? The enemy certainly would have gained a great deal of extremely valuable territory and would 'have driven a spearhead right across to the Caspian Sea. To the north, however, standing on the flank of this extended arm, are the main Russian armies holding firmly a line running from Leningrad in the north down through Rjev and Voron'ej, to Stalingrad—vast armies which, despite their reverses, have been kept largely intact and must present an enormous striking force. They have not been inactive by any means, but their strength has no.t' been sapped to the same extent as that of the enemy.. The potential position, then, is that if resistance can be maintained for a little longer the advent of winter will find the invaders exhausted by the strain of their advance and the Russians relatively stronger, perhaps, than they have been at any stage since the campaign was launched. There is still, of course, the weakness of the Russian production front, but this should be compensated for, in a very large measure by the ever-increasing production effort of the Allies.