The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED GISBORNE, MONDAY, AUGUST 17, 1942. THE SOLOMONS BATTLE

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXIX, Issue 20864, 17 August 1942, Page 2

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED GISBORNE, MONDAY, AUGUST 17, 1942. THE SOLOMONS BATTLE

The absence of specific or detailed news from the .Solomons area, where operations so vital to the Pacific conflict are in progress, while naturally disheartening, need not be regarded as disturbing. It is possible that the reports that successful landings had been made encouraged hopes fpr early and decisive results' and led to a tendency to overlook pr minimise the difficulties involved. The undertaking will necessarily be hazardous anjd probably protracted. In their months of occupation'of these "islands the Japanese have not been idle. They have good reason to realise the Strategic importance of Qfeip conquests and they are hot likely to leave any s.tone unturned in order to hold their gains. They must have known, too, that the Allies, so so.pn as they were in position to do'” so, would launch a counter-attack- So it is that the landing forces must 'have encountered strong and determined opposition. The nature of the islands would militate against the rapid overthrow of the enemy who would have to be forced back yard’by yard until he was finally overthrown. The final Issue will doubtless depend upon the relative strength of 'the opposing forces and the extent to which they can be reinforced gnd supported from sea and air. In the meantime, the issue must remain in- dpphi.

Such news as has been released, however, does not suggest that the immediate situation is anything but favourable to the Allies. The last official comment frpmWasjiington was that of Colonel Knox, who .described the position as being “very good.” This is laconic in the extreme, but, coming from such a source, it is expressive. Tfie Secretary of the Navy, recognising ' his responsibility and knowing the importance which would be attached to his words, is hot likely to have spoken lightly or to have displayed an optimism that was not warranted by the fabts- Frpm Australia, a lime more information is available and this, too, is encouraging. The Allied landings have been extended to at least four islands and probably a fifth and jt is reported that the landing forces .haye occupied one of the Japanese aerodromes op Guadglcanar, If it is possible to'make use of even, one aerodrome in tbe : Solomons it will make all the difference to the cam-' paign, since, apart from carriers, the nearest air base, that at Port Moresby, ;; 850 miles away. Japan is better situated to the extent that Rabaul is 300 miles nearer, but she is handicapped by the fact that Rabaul Itself is under constant attack and, being more remote from the main bases, cannot be so readily reinforced and supplied.

So far, attention has beg/i directed chiefly to the land in this campaign. They'pre undoubtedly of immediate importance, but if ft longer view is itaken pf the situation it Will be realised that t)ie sblomons battle may develop into a decisive encounter for sea supremacy in the Pacific. There have been only vague references to a great naVal engagement which is proceeding, bPt this engagement may not only decide' the fate of the Solomons but may also have a far-reaching influence on all future | operations in the Pacific. It has been suggested that Japan is moving her main fleet into this theatre sincl this may well be the case, because the stakes involved would certainly justify such a course. This opens up extremely wide' issues which cannot be jpdged in advance. It must be assumed, however, that this possibility was taken fully into account by the Allied command when' the whole operation was planned. In the event of the Solomons not being taken by

sto/m at the initial attack, it was j obvious that Japan would attempt tc counter the Allies by a concentration of naval force. The all-important question, then, is whether the United States fleet, supplerhented by such Allied ships as are available, would be strong enough to engage in a full-' scale naval battle with the Japanese navy. The picture that needs to be drawn, therefore, is not only one of land forces fighting for control of the Solomons Islands but one on a much wider canvas in which Allied and Japanese naval forces and supply ships are converging on the islands from % r arious parts of the Pacific. It must include, also, the air bases in possession of either side with some conception of their respective ability to secure air superiority over the battle area. Which side can muster the larger force of warships and Which is best able to give its fleet protection from the air? The answer to the first question is unknown—-a great deal depends upon the extent to which the Japanese navy has been weakened by the losses already inflicted upon it and the disposition of its ships at the time the attack was launched. Having planned the attack, the Allies would certainly have disposed their fleet accordingly and the chances are that the odds at present are in their favour. Japanese air strength would, in some measure, be governed by the number of carriers available, but, this factor apart, the Allies should have the advantage in this respect also. The very uncertainty of the situation emphasises the need for caution in attempting to sum lip the possibilities, but if the battle assumes the scale which seems probable, then, instead of being merely the battle of the' Solomons, it_ may develop in the battle of the Pacific.