LIBYAN failure

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXIX, Issue 20825, 2 July 1942, Page 3

LIBYAN failure

MINISTER'S VIEW TACTICS AND GUNS I PROBLEMS EXPLAINED (By Telegraph—Press Assn.— Copyright.) (Noon.) LONDON, July 1. The Minister of Production, Captain Oliver Lyttelton, making the first speech on behalf of the Government, in the debate in the House of Commons, pointed out the inconsistency of the previous speeches against the Government. Sir John Wardlaw-Milne had maintained that Mr. Churchill interfered too much with the direction of the war, while Admiral Sir Roger Keyes thought he had not been given sufficient powers over his professional advisers. Captain Lyttelton discussed, firstly, equipment, especially tanks, guns, and anti-tank guns; and secondly, battle tactics. In October, 1939, we had one so-called armoured division with 200 light tanks. We had in Britain at the time of Dunkirk only 200 such light tanks and 50 infantry tanks. Clearly, therefore, it was necessary to concentrate on producing weapons, against invasion without waiting for Lesting new types, though everyone knew that we had to develop for the future a tank more heavily gunned and armoured; otherwise we should have gone under. However, a start was made with -the development of ne.w manufacturing, capacity , to produce new types, although they had no background of proved mechanical experience. Six-Pounders Oustanding Captain Lyttelton said that in September, 1940, the War Office placed the first order for a six-pounder gun. The development and production of the six-pounder had been an outstanding industrial achievement and appreciable deliveries were made between 13 and 14 months after the first order. Production had risen continuously and was now running at. several hundred a month, the current figure being above 300. On June 1 over 850 of these guns, with field mountings, had been allocated to the Middle East and large numbers had arrived, but only a small proportion were in Libya at the outset of the present campaign. Captain Lyttelton pointed out the time taken in the development by a trickle of production, by quantity of production, and then by delivery to troops over 12,000 miles of waterway. Neither the Government, the General Staff, nor the Ministry of Supply had been content to develop merely a sixpounder. “I think it would be true to say that the six-pounder would give equality with the equivalent weapons of the enemy,” he said, “but we must surpass them. As an anti-tank gun it is inferior to the 88 m.m. used by the enemy, although the 88 m.m. is less mobile.” The idea that except for a small number of six-pounders we had no similar weapons to the 88 m.m. which had been so skilfully employed in the present battle would be wholly wrong. Enough Guns Available “We actually have in the Middle East enough guns for three regiments of 4.5 in., and these have a great range and are capable of taking on the 88 m.m., but cannot be considered antitank weapons in the normal case. Twenty-five pounders, although not designed as anti-tank guns, proved particularly effective against tanks. The same applies to the 88 m.m. originally put into the field as an antiaircraft weapon. “Apart altogether from the twopounder, six-pounder, and 25-pounder, we are developing specialised anti-tank weapons far more powerful than the six-pounder. The main production is expected to start very shortly.” Captain Lyttelton then spoke of tank production in the period following the collapse of France, the Government bearing in mind the need for serviceable tanks. “The Churchill tank, which was put into production from the drawing board, is an excellent fighting vehicle, but it will not have the reliability which could be obtained if further time had been possible'in its development,” he said. Numerous defects in first production which once threatened that failure might have to be faced had now been largely eliminated. The present tank was of the very greatest possible value, although no doubt a higher rate of replacement and reserves would have to be provided. These tanks were now being armd with a six-pounder and production was growing. The General Grants or Mark 111 with a 75 m.m. gun, matched the best tanks General Rommel employed, while the Mark IV, now in largescale production in the United States, was a still more effective weapon. In spite of losses in the recent battle, in which they proved their worth, General Auckinleck still had substantial numbers of General Grants in service. Tactical Mistakes Examining the causes of the Libyan setback, Captain Lyttelton said that, most important, were tactical mistakes. Gur operations south of Benghazi prqyed to be too enterprising in the then situation. Secondly, it was the unsuitability of our Crusader tanks under desert conditions. Thirdly, was the superior armament in range and weapons of the German tank. This factor he placed third because it must be remembered that the Germans were reduced to small numbers and it must be remembered that the two-pounders had a much higher rate of fire than, the heavier German tank gun. The present campaign had been fought with a considerable, but insufficient, number of General Grants with cruiser tanks mounting a twopounder and, at the beginning, with a small number of six-pounder antitank guns on field mountings. There were many more later. The 25pounder had proved a deadly antitank gun. There had not been any general criticism of our air machine, nor was it alleged that our equipment was inferior to the enemy’s, except in the lack of dive-bombers. It would would be a mistake to suppose that the air staff had ever discarded divebombers. In .1940 we were desperately short of aircraft and needed less specialised types even more than we needed dive - bombers. Now the situation had changed. With efficient fighters and bombers we had air supremacy in more than one theatre, and with this ascendancy we expected to turn dive-bombers to good account and were sure we could employ them effectively at sea. Dive-bombers had already reached one theatre and others were on the way. Still more would be delivered from the United States in the next few weeks. Lack of priorities had not led to slowness in deliveries.