The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES” GISBORNE, MONDAY, JUNE 29, 1942. THE RUSSIAN FRONT

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXIX, Issue 20822, 29 June 1942, Page 2

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES” GISBORNE, MONDAY, JUNE 29, 1942. THE RUSSIAN FRONT

Both at Sebastopol and in the Kharkov region the Germans appear to have made some progress against the Russians in the past week. This, of course, is the reverse of welcome news, but the extent of the progress that has been made must be even more mortifying to the Germans than it is disquieting to the Russians. These developments must be viewed in their correct perspective and in relation to the position of the war as a whole. In the first place, the Crimea—of which Sebastopol is the last remaining stronghold—and Kharkov are only two sectors of a Russian front which expends from the Arctic to the Black Sea. Secondly, even this vast Russian front is only a fraction of the whole front upon which the Germans are engaged. At any time and in any place it is possible to draw a pessimistic picture by focussing attention on the scene of reverses. ' Conversely, it is possible to be excessively optimistic by ignoring the reverses and looking only at the bright spots. It is necessary, not only to preserve a balance between the two tendencies, but also to measure the scale and extent of the gains or setbacks against other factors and to endeavour to assess in what way thpy affect the general progress of the war. If this is done it will be realised that the present situation in Russia is far from alarming. Throughout its history, Sebastopol has been famous foie the stubborn resistance of' it's defenders, but at no time in the past ftps if achieved such prodigies of valour as. in recent’ weeks. It has been subjected tp g bombardment that has been described as mors ferocious and terrific than anything which any other stronghold has been called upon to endure and j it has been almost completely cut off from outside assistance. In these circumstances it is a marvel that it has stood for so long and if it does fall, as seems inevitable, it would be entirely wrong to regard if as a loss; rather should an attempt be made to measure the gain that has been made by its protracted resistance. To some extent this is already indicated by what little is known of the developments around Kharkov. Tbn days ago, the Germans succeeded in establishing a bridgehead on the east bank cjf the Donetz reiver. This should have been the prelude to a substantial and fairly rapid advance, but the gains tljat have been made are comparatively trifling. It is not unreasonable to suggest that the explanation of the failure to improve on the initial success’ largely lies in the fact that a large part of the German Army is still tied up in the Crimea and -that other parts of it are held down by Russian pressure in the north.

This diversion of German strength is a vital factor in the whole war, and one of these days history may tell just how much even the campaign in Libya has contributed to the defence of Russia. It has now been made abundantly clear that the Axis diverted its best troops and equipment for the operations in Libya and < the most recent 1 estimates are that one-third of the strength of the Luftwaffe is in the Mediterranean area, held down there to' "General Rommel directly in' fife field and, indirectly, by protecting his copyoys in the Mediterranean and attacking the island fortress of Malta. It does not require a vivid imagination to appreciate the difference these forces would have made had they been, released for operations against the Russians at this critical juncture. Similarly, had Sebastopol fallen wee.ks ago, as the Germans' expected, the forces from there could have been thrown into the Kharkov front and,' perhaps, made ot possible for the Germans to launch their offensive towards Rostov. As it is, much of the force employed against Sebastopol will never be used again. In the meantime, time, Which' is so vital to the invaders, is fleeting. The contribution of places like Sebastopol towards the outcome of the war lies far less in their fate than .in what occurs before their fate overtakes them. The main thing that stands out in regard to the Russian front is its comparative stability. It is true that this static indecisive warfare is disheartening—but it must be? far more disheartening to the Germans than to the Allies. It is they who have definite objectives which they must achieve as the alternative to failure and, studying the Russian front as a whole, they are further from those objectives than they were at the height of their advance last year. Then, they were in Rostov and knocking at the gates of Moscow and Leningrad. Then, as now, they were besieging Sebastopol and had advanced beyond Rherkov. In the past eight or nine months they have made no progress at all. Viewing this position, what must be the feeling of those who planned to overthrow Russia with a surprise attack

and a sudden campaign? After all, it is their plans that have gone wrong and their ambitions which seem further from realisation than they did three months after the invasion was launched. On the other hand, the Russians, knowing what they have withstood in the past, have good reason for confidence in their ability to withstand further attacks in the future. It may be that other reverses are in store on this front —it will be surprising if they are not —but with the knowledge of the vast strength that is steadily accumulating for Russia’s aid there need be no anxiety as to the ultimate result.