The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES” GISBORNE, MONDAY, NOV. 24, 1941. THE DESERT CAMPAIGN

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVIII, Issue 20621, 24 November 1941, Page 4

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES” GISBORNE, MONDAY, NOV. 24, 1941. THE DESERT CAMPAIGN

The reports released during the week-end have not gone any great distance towards clarifying the situation in the Western Desert, but all the news that is available suggests that the operations are developing satisfactorily for the Allied forces. The primary difficulty in attempting to appraise the position, of course, is the absence of knowledge of General Cunningham’s plans. Since it is important to keep the enemy guessing, the public must be kept guessing also. Some indication of the intentions of the attacking force, however, is beginning to emerge. It would seem that the main enemy force was located between Tobruk and Bardia. Instead of challenging this force by a direct advance along the coast, the main Allied drive apparently has been from Jarabub, nearly 150 miles inland, towards Tobruk and possibly also towards El Agueila, south of Benghazi. The first objective was to link up with the garrison which has so grimly held on to Tobruk. This would mean that the main Axis armoured divisions would be contained in a triangle from which they would either have to fight their way out or else surrender. In the main this aim seems to have been achieved. It is not reported that contact has actually been made with Tobruk, but the two forces are sufficiently close to be able seriously to hinder any retreat by the enemy.

In this movement, General Cunning, ham has adopted the Germans' own pincers tactics. The intention is to force the enemy to battle by preventing his retirement. This presupposes confidence in the superior strength of the Allied forces. The encircling movement, of course, is only one aspect. Another is shown by the steady advance of the New Zealanders along the coast. They have not only recaptured Fort Capuzzo, which has so often changed hands since the Italians entered the war, but have also occupied Bardia, apparently without much opposition, and continued the drive to the west. In the meantime, the Royal Navy is maintaining a constant patrol of the coastal side of the triangle and the Royal Air Force is relentlessly harassing the enemy. The Axis forces, therefore, are being pressed on three sides. There is no escape for them unless they can break through. This means that the battle must be joined, which is the aim of the Allies, for, as has been pointed out in London, the chief desideratum is not the annexation of barren desert territory but the annihilation of the enemy forces. The strength of the enemy should not be under-estimated, and it may be taken for granted that, in his present desperate situation, he will make every possible effort to prevent the Allied plans from succeeding.

The early reports of progress are at least encouraging. In the first two days of the great tank battle the advantage definitely lay with the Allies. The report that half the enemy tanks had been destroyed may have been a little optimistic, but it is apparent that the enemy losses were a great deal heavier than our own. More than that, the Allies are in a position where they can be reinforced and supplied without serious difficulty whereas the enemy is contained in an ever-diminishing area from which all supplies are cut off. The most encouraging feature of the campaign, perhaps, is that for the first time in this war, the British and Imperial troops are facing the Germans on something like equal terms. In Greece and Crete they fought under tremendous disadvantages, but nevertheless gave a stirring account of themselves. In this engagement, they are well equipped with modern British and American tanks, they have ample air support, and there is always the navy in the background. They also have the advantage of the initiative and, to a lesser extent, perhaps, the element of surprise. It may take a few days for the position to become clarified, but it seems incredible that the campaign can be protracted over a period of weeks. The issue should soon be decided, and the outcome can be awaited with confidence.

The operations in the Tobruk area are, of course, only one facet of the Libyan campaign. Naturally, immediate attention is focussed on this theatre, but it is probable that equal importance will attach later to developments in other directions. It has been suggested that the tactics towards Tobruk are being repeated on a larger scale further inland and that another Allied wedge will be driven across the desert to El Agueila with the object of cutting Axis communications with Tripoli. If this succeeds, it should play a vital part in deciding the fate of Libya and, indeed, of the whole of North Africa. As Mr. Churchill has said, the desert army may add a page to history that will rank with Blenheim and Waterloo. Clearly, he realises just how much hinges on this campaign and has made no secret of the importance which attaches to it. It is equally clear that the Axis leaders are also seized of the significance of this new development The renewed drive in Russia is probably not unrelated to the operations in the desert, for the Germans know how vital it is to them that they should strive to avoid being involved on two widely-separated fronts. Unless they can successfully conclude operations on one of the fronts they will inevitably lace grave problems in the near future.