The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES.” GISBORNE, MONDAY, FEB. 24, 1941. THE AXIS AND JAPAN

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVIII, Issue 20488, 24 February 1941, Page 4

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES.” GISBORNE, MONDAY, FEB. 24, 1941. THE AXIS AND JAPAN

While Germany endeavours to make up her mind where to launch her next offensive—and she cannot delay action much longer—there are growing indications of differences of opinion between her and the other signatories of the tripartite pact. Germany’s indecision last week may have been due to hesitation on the part of the High Command or it may have been deliberately designed to increase the tension. A more probable explanation is that she is waiting until Japan shows some signs of yielding to pressure to create a diversion in the Far East. In the meantime, the position of the Axis-continues to deteriorate. There is little doubt that Germany last week had made full plans for moving her forces into Bulgaria, but for some reason she changed her mind. At the end of the week the Berlin press was emphasising that the war could only be won in the west and indulging in extravagant boasts of the ordeal which Britain would be called upon to face. This vacillation, as has been said, might be deliberate, but the old saying, “He who hesitates is lost,” might well be borne in mind in the present circumstances. Germany is undoubtedly looking for a greater measure of assistance from her partners, and all the indications are that she will look in vain.

Signor Mussolini has broken his long silence only to admit to his people that the Italians have been roundly defeated in every phase' of battle. He attempts to console them by assurances that Germany is still stronger than Britain and by declaring, in effect, that Germany will come to Italy’s rescue. This must be poor consolation indeed. At the same time there, are other signs that Italy is grasping at every straw that may provide a way out of her dilemma. During the week, the Japanese Foreign Minister made- peace overtures to Britain. This, of course, is now denied, but Mr. Matsuoka cannot deny that he stated that Japan, in her desire for peace, was “willing to mediate anywhere else in the world.” That is his own corrected quotation. Nor can he deny .that he sent a memorandum couched in similar terms to the British Secretary of War. The significant feature of this development is that before Mr. Matsuoka, at German insistence, issued a denial, the Rome radio was giving the most cordial reception to what it described as Japan's splendid gesture in the interests of peace. Italy made no secret of the fact that,she welcomed peace overtures. Japan is, equally desirous of peace and it is left to Germany alone to continue the pretence that the Axis is really anxious and ready to continue the war.

This situation has an important bearing on the war as a whole. It offers the most logical explanation of German hesitancy and indecision. With Italy already virtually defeated, Hitler is compelled to try and persuade his other partner to make a move. For a time it looked as if Japan would yield to pressure, but latterly the heaviest pressure has come from the other side in the interests of peace. The somewhat sensational statements issued in Australia served a dual purpose. In the first place, they stimulated Australia to greater effort

and warned her of: the existence of a new crisis, but a secondary influence was to caution Japan of the danger she was courting. The Australian warnings were accompanied by prompt action and there is no question that the concentration of land, air, and naval forces based on Singapore was far more impressive on Japan than all the diplomatic approaches which Berlin was capable of making. The result was that Japan immediately disavowed hostile intentions. In effect, she repudiated the obligations she had assumed to the Axis. Then she went a step further. Her Foreign Minister communicated with the British Secretary of War and publicly announced Japan’s desire to mediate anywhere in the world in order to help to restore normal conditions.

Japan has every reason for her cautious attitude. Apart from the evidence she has been given of Allied preparedness, there are various other influences which are calculated to restrain her. Nine years cf war in China has imposed a serious strain on her resources and she probably realises that China is only waiting until Japanese attention is diverted in order to launch a strong offensive. Nor can she be unmindful of China’s ally, Russia, sitting back and watching developments and waiting an opportunity to strike wherever and whenever she is likely to benefit. In another direction is the United States with its huge navy ready for any eventuality and, still more important, with its public ready to support any action to restrain Japanese aggression anywhere in the South Seas. Japan s economic difficulties are already serious. An outbreak of war in the Pacific would result in her being promptly and effectively blockaded and she could continue hostilities only for a very limited time. These are the considerations which are unquestionably influencing Japan. In the aggregate they are so strong that for her to go to war would be to commit suicide, and it is not likely that Japan will commit suicide merely to assist Germany in carrying on the war in Europe in which Japan has no real concern.