The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES.” GISBORNE, SATURDAY, AUGUST 1940 RUSSIA AND JAPAN

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVII, Issue 20316, 3 August 1940, Page 6

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES.” GISBORNE, SATURDAY, AUGUST 1940 RUSSIA AND JAPAN

It was nothing more than a coincidence that both Russia and Japan should -yestercSiy have issued statements of foreign policy but it requires little knowledge of contemporary history to realise the effect of the ' decisions of these two nations upon one another. For this as well as for other reasons the two official pronouncements will be studied with interest. It is hardly correct, perhaps, to call M. Molotov's address a statement of policy, because there does not appear to be a single word in it to indicate what Russia's intentions are; and even if there was the sincerity of what was said would be open to grave doubt. It seems hardly possible to realise that a bare twelve months ago the Soviet was ostensibly an ardent advocate of peace and non-aggression. To-day. all her sympathies and all her alliances are with the aggressors and in a period of less than a year she lias herself invaded no fewer than six countries. Thom who had been lioping for a change of heart will derive little consolation from M. Molotov's speech, because, even though he did not indicate the future policy of the Soviet, ho did make it clear that his Government was still completely antagonistic to the democracies and in full accord witli the conduct and the aims of the dictatorships. In other words, Russia has reaffirmed her alignment with the Aggressors. Soviet apologists had insisted that Russia’/, objective was not really to

assist Germany at all but that it was designed to prevent a spread of the conflict. M. Molotov flatly contradicts them for he again points out that the pact with Germany assured Germany of security in eastern Europe—and, therefore, made it possible for her to

I carry out her aggression to the west. By the same token, Russia was given protection in the west and enabled to carry out tier aggression to the north and south. The pact with Germany, according to M Mftlotov, is to be further developed and Russian relations with the other burglar, Italy, are “full of possibilities." On the other hand, there is, he says, little chance of improving relations with Britain and lie was unable to say anything good about Russian relations with the United I States. So far as Russia has a policy, therefore, she is with the aggressors j against the democracies. There are indications, also, that her own aggression is not ended, for Ivl. Molotov finds it necessary to issue a warning to Finland and is prepared to believe German assertions that Turkey is engaged in anti-Soviet action. It seems likely that these two countries are marked down for the next display of Russian wrath. IVI. Molotov professes not to understand Japan’s policy, but he makes it clear that Russian sympathies ire with China. What, then, of Japan’s policy? So far as the official statements issued in Tokio are concerned there is little to which objection can be taken. The aim is a new order in greater East Asia, having for its foundation the solidarity of Japan. Manchukuo, and China. If this new order were to be brought about peacefully, and by mutual consent there would be good reason to welcome it, but the difficulty is that Japan is determined to force her will on the other countries concerned. At least Japan has a policy and there is far less objection to it than to the manner in which she seeks to implement it. Where .suspicions are aroused are by Mr. Matsuoka’s in-

formal comment that Japan’s final aim is the establishment of a stability zone embracing also Indo-China and the East Indies. A leading Japanese newspaper carries the issue further by suggesting that the South Seas. also, are closely related to the sphere of Japanese influence. The important point, however, is that the official statements confine Japanese ambitions to China and Manchukuo and exclude any reference to the alliance with Germany and Italy. It may reasonably be inferred that Japan has no intention of aiding the Axis Powers and it is not too much to believe that she desires to avoid any further friction with Britain and the United States, with whom her real interests are so closely associated. The importance of Russo-Japanese relations cannot be too strongly emphasised. M. Molotov's highest eulogies are reserved for the “free Chinese republics," but there is little doubt that the Soviet would abandon China, as she has abandoned other free republics, and give Japan a free hand if only Japan would bribe her heavily enough, as did Germany. The Japanese Prime Minister, however, stated that it was intended to effect a posi-

tivc revision of its foreign policy on an independent stand. Tne phrase “independent stand” is important because it suggests, not only that there will be no bargaining with Russia, but also that the alliance with the Axis Powers, to which there is no reference, will be terminated. Whatever subtlety there might be about the Japanese they are too realistic to play the double-crossing game of Germany and Russia. Japan entered the Axis because of a sincere desire to join an anti-Communist bloc and however much Russia might be ready to buy her over Japanese convictions are too strong to permit of any capitulation except under the strongest pressure. That Russia would "sell out” on her Chinese friends, even as she did on others, need not be doubled, but if Japan really intends to pursue an independent foreign policy there will be no room for treating with the Soviet and the prospects of peace in the Far East will be immeasurably improved.