The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES." GISBORNE, THURSDAY. FEB. 29, 1940. THE WAR AT SEA

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVII, Issue 20184, 29 February 1940, Page 4

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES." GISBORNE, THURSDAY. FEB. 29, 1940. THE WAR AT SEA

Once again the public is indebted to Mr. Churchill for a survey which places the effects of the war at sea in a correct perspective. Since interest in this aspect of the war is necessarily focused mainly on shipping losses, and since most of the shipping now using the seas is trading on behalf of the Allies, there is a natural tendency for the somewhat sensational results to be magnified. Under normal circumstances losses can be balanced with gains, or at least compared with them, but since Germany now has virtually no merchant shipping to lose the war at sea becomes more or less one-sided. In these circumstances, the only way to get a reasonable picture is to compare the number of losses with the number of ships which successfully run the enemy blockade, and if this is done it is apparent that the Allies have every reason to congratulate themselves. It is true that there have been recurring losses among merchant ships but they have not been anything like sufficient to seriously disturb the trade of the Allies. So far as Britain is concerned, the all-important fact is that in the first six months of the war the loss of shipping tonnage is less than half that of one month in 1917 when the U-boat campaign was at its height and when conditions were comparable to those which existed from the start of the present conflict. This point alone serves to answer any suggestion that the German blockade is succeeding.

The most effective answer to Germany has been the establishment of the convoy system. Mr. Churchill was able to disclose that since the beginning of the war more than 10,000 ships, British and neutral, had been escorted to their destinations, while the losses in convoy amounted to only 21 ships, or still the excellent figure of one in 500. Just how extensive this convoy system has grown is indicated by the fact that for the week ended February 21 no fewer than 225 neutral ships had been convoyed without loss. This point is of further interest because it indicates the faith of neutral countries in the convoys and their disregard of German threats against the use of them. It is not too much to hope that the wisdom of smaller States accepting the very real protection of the Allies will be recognised in a much wider sphere. Mr. Churchill described as one of the most extraordinary things he had ever known the way in which German illegalities, atrocities, and brutalities were accepted by neutrals as an ordinary condition of the war, and he commented that they made more fuss over his criticism than over the loss of hundreds of their ships and the murder of more than 1000 of their seamen. The experience in the shipping war, more perhaps than anything else, should convince these countries that their best interests lie in identifying themselves with the Allies and assisting them in the attainment of their aims.

Looking at the other side of the sea war, Mr. Churchill was able to make out a strong case in support of the work of the British navy. It is no reflection on the navy that these merchant shipping losses have occurred; rather is it a wonderful tribute to it that the losses have not been a great deal heavier. The protection of the sea routes is the first task of the navy in this war and that work extends to almost every part of the globe. Its operations are not purely defensive, however, for it is clear that they have launched attacks whenever the opportunity offered. The most striking results have been in the destruction of enemy submarines. Mr. Churchill estimated that 35 submarines had been destroyed up to the end of 1939 and it seems certain that another 10 or 12 have been sunk this year. It is important to remember that Admiralty calculations are based only on U-boats that are known to have been sunk and it is not improbable that actual losses would be as much as 50 per cent greater. It is significant that Germany was only able to claim two of the three submarine losses which Britain admitted. Certain it is that on the most generous estimates Germany, even allowing for replacements, has little more than half the submarine fleet with which she entered the war and only about one-fifth of the number which she had in 1917. On top of this there are now far more advanced methods of combating

U-boats so that this method of attack does not constitute the menace it was in the last war. The chief objective of the war at sea is the crippling of trade and this fact should always be borne in mind. Germany’s maritime trade virtually ceased to exist on the declaration of war because what vessels were abroad were relentlessly hunted and could not continue their normal trade. In nearly every case, as soon as they have put to sea they have either been captured or have scuttled themselves. Twenty-five of these ships, aggregating nearly 100,000 tons, have helped to compensate the Allies for their own losses and a further 28 vessels totalling more than 150,000 tons have been scuttled. Germany’s known losses, therefore, total 53 ships of 250,000 tons and this loss, in proportion, is infinitely greater than the combined losses of Allied and neutral shipping. On the other hand, despite the admittedly heavy losses, the sea-borne trade of the Allies has continued almost without interruption, a fact which is testified to by the disclosure that British overseas trade since the outbreak of war has shown little diminution compared with the peace-time average and the further point made by Mr. Churchill that more enemy cargoes had been captured than Britain had lost. On balance, therefore, from whatever angle the position is studied, the war at sea so far has been preponderantly in favour of the Allies and although further attacks and further losses must be expected there is no reason to look to the future with other than confidence.