ASSESSMENT OF RUSSIAN GRAND STRATEGY

Greymouth Evening Star, 4 October 1949, Page 5

ASSESSMENT OF RUSSIAN GRAND STRATEGY

[N.Z.P.A. SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT]

LONDON, October 3.—“ There are sound reasons, quite apart from Russian professions, for believing that vigorous preparations for an aggressive war form no part of Soviet grand strategy,” says the Economist, reviewing the effects of the Russian atomic bomb announcement. “The Russian system, based upon a vast under-developed, under-popula-ted empire, does not need that outlet of war. In any case, even if the Russian ideology were as essentially aggressive as that of the Nazis, strategic conditions in Europe have undergone a revolutionary change. Even Hitler might have hesitated to launch the war had he known that aggression in Europe would have brought the United States into it from the start. Only if the Americans were to retreat into isolation would Russia be exposed to any really big temptation to expand by force. “Not Best Instrument “It does not need this arms race to bring home to the Kremlin Ameiica’s determination to remain concerned with Europe’s defence. It entails no more than steadfast American participation in the Atlantic Pace. “The decisive reasons, however, for believing that the Russians do not seek an aggressive war and are not preparing for it lies in their almost certain belief that war is not the best instrument of Soviet ambitions. _ “The last two years have given Russia danger signals enough of the risks of direct Soviet intervention in Europe. The revolt of Marshal Tito and the Allied victory in the Berlin airlift are only the two most outstanding examples of the damaging failure of the Soviet in its conduct ol foreign affairs. “But at the same time Communism has achieved its most fateful triumph since 1917 in the Communist conquest of China. Communism is a better iifctrument than war for achieving Russian objectives. “The Western Powers are thus faced with a situation that is both better and worse than their preoccupation with the atom bomb sugges s. It is better because the likelihood of a direct Soviet threat to peace is remote.. It is worse because the challenge offered by the Soviet is more widespread, more insidious, and more difficult to meet than any move that can be countered by the drop." ping of a bomb. Sustained Co-operation “None of the problems created by this situation can be solved in the chort run. Each demands the sustained co-operation of' the Western Powers for as many years as any responsible statesman can foresee. But so far they have not even taken the preliminary step of determining that at whatever cost of sovereignty and pre-conceived economic thinking they will work together and turn what today is little more than a hesitant military alliance into a lasting partnership. ' , , ; “A decision to undertake together the long campaign against Communism has still to be reached. Until it is, the nations of the West will be ! pursuing expedients, not policies, ' and the fundamental problem—their survival —will remain unsolved.”