ASSURANCE BY MINISTER OF WAR— British Army Will Play Vital Part In Plan For Western Union Defence

Greymouth Evening Star, 11 March 1949, Page 5

ASSURANCE BY MINISTER OF WAR— British Army Will Play Vital Part In Plan For Western Union Defence

(Recd. 9.55 a.m.) LONDON, March 10. It will be a vital part of British Army planning, and an equally vital part of British resources, to fill its allotted role in Western Union defence, both in the provision of equipment and in the arrangements for concerted emergency action, stated the Minister of War, Mr Emmanuel Shinwell, in submitting the Army estimates in the House of Commons today. He added:. “The needs of member nations are so urgent that it may be necessary to draw substantially on our own reserves.

He said the most valuable contribution to Western Union was the provision of the most up-to-date equipment for the British forces and by pushing on research and development to ensure lhe Western Union forces of every advantage of modern science and production.

Disturbed Conditions

Mr Shinwell said that in the present disturbed conditions, no lessening of commitments could bo assumed, and he could not foresee any substantial reduction in the demands the Army would have to make on the country’s man-power. He said: “Should - mobilisation be necessary, now or at any time in the immediate future, we shall have available a substantial number of men who have served in war and who arc now on the reserve. Later, when national servicemen have passed into the territorial army, we ■would have reserves of well over 500,000 always available and trained up-to-date.” Mr' Shinwell, replying to criticism of the alleged lack of divisions in the Army, said: “If the sole task of the Army was to organise itself now as an expeditionary force in divisions, I can assure the House that mathematics would produce the right answer and that the necessary equipment is, by and large, available to arm that man-power in that organisation —and a good deal more. If there is an emergency, the organisation is there to pour into existing moulds the reserves' available. “Provided we can proceed with the plans, I see no reason for alarm. We have no sinister designs or thoughts of aggression. On the contrary, we believe the country can prosper best in the framework of peace and friendship with all nations, but we cause no threat to others if we remain determined to pursue our own way of life and are resolved to employ the means to retain it.” Criticism Of System

Brigadier A. H. Head (Conservative) said that if the national service method of forming the Army continued indefinitely. Britain would have a thoroughly bad army at a very high price. The system of calling" up everybody meant taking on more national servicemen than were needed. The defence of Europe would be settled, in the event of war. in the first few months. The Army Britain was now designing could never be up to a very high standard. He-urged the stimulation of voluntary recruiting by an overall increase of 25 per cent, in the 1946 pay code and suggested that the coding of the Regular Army should be 300,000. Russian's Great Strength

Mr R. T. Paget. (Labour), expressed the hope that more American air squadrons would be stationed in Europe. He believed the Russians had 30 divisions in Germany, including probably eight armoured divisions. The Russians behind those had a mobilisation strength of 300 divisions, with the probability of an eventual strength of 550 divisions. Neither Britain nor Western Union could hope to compete with such figures —it would wreck Western Europe’s economy. The way to meet the threat and possibly prevent war was by air superiority. Western Europe also needed at least 20 really

efficient divisions of professional troops, which could, if necessary, fight a rearguard action to give the French and Belgians time to mobilise.

Mr Paget said he believed the French now had seven divisions, the Belgians possibly three and the Dutch two. He did not know what. Britain had available, but it was clear that in terms of immediately available divisions she could at the moment do very little. The main reason for this absence of divisions was that the regular troops were immobilised throughout Europe by having to train conscripts. Emphasis should be placed on the immediate preparedness of immensely efficient forces, rather than on reserves. The reserve problem was different today, because in any war there would be great American reserves.