Loss Of Burma Was Serious Reverse In Far East War

Greymouth Evening Star, 12 March 1948, Page 6

Loss Of Burma Was Serious Reverse In Far East War

LONDON, March I'l. “The loss of Burma was strategically Ihc most serious reverse of the Far East war.” says Field-Marshal Lord Wavell, in a War Office dispatch issued today on the 1941-42 operations in Burma. When the Australian Government refused his request that the 7th Division of the A.I'.F. be sent, to Burma, the last hope of holding Rangoon practically vanished, says. Lord Wavell. The. loss of Burma,deprived the Chinese of a flow of munitions to continue their long resistance, made the establishment of air bases within effective range- of Japan extremely difficult, exposed. India to serious invasion, and had a disastrous effect on British prestige in the East.

The Burma defence preparations had concerned him greatly. More might ’have been done in Burma itself toplace the country on a war footing. Political considerations, the climate, underestimation of the enemy, overestimation of the natural strength of the frontiers, and the complacency of many years of freedom from external threats, all combined'to prevent the defence problem from being taken sufficiently seriously. Lod Wavell reveals that there was never a sufficient naval force. The Air Force was outmoded and small, although skilfully and boldly handled. It was more than a match for the enemy as long as good airfields and warnings were available. The troops were always outnumbered in the field. The enemy were allowed to gain cheap initial successes through bad handling by local commanders, lack of training, and, in some -instances, lack of fighting spirit. • ’The Burma Rifles, who comprised the bull-: of the troops, were undependable. They consisted of Chins, Knrc-ns, Kachiris, and Burmese. Error of Judgment Lord Wavell admits that ho war. guilty of an error of judgment in minimising the danger to Burma. When ho was appointed Commandor-in-Chiof, south-west Pacific, in January, 1912. Burma was included against his wishes. “T admit that 1 did not at this iirno consider the threat, to Burma serious.” he says. “I over-

estimated the natural difficulties of the wooded hills on. the frontier, nor did I realise the unreliable quality of the Burma units, nor the lack of training of the British and Indian troops.” Commenting on the allegation that he had refused Marshal Ching Kai-

shek’s offer of two Chinese armies (equivalent in strength to two British divisions) ,Lord Wavell says that he accepted at once the offer'of two divisions.of the Gfh Chinese Arrny, but asked that the sth Army should bo held in reserve near Kunming and not be moved into tsurma. Marshal Chiang

Kai-shek made it a condition of the offer that the Chinese! troops shoiild have a separate line of communieations and should not be mixed with British troopsff A separate line of communication could not be provided for the Chinese sth Army, but could have been - provided for one division of the 6th Army. He was satisfied that his qualified acceptance of the offer was justified by the military situation as he saw it at the time. Obviously, also, it was desirable that Burma should he defended by Imper-

ial and -not by foreign troops. Admitting that, aS things turned out, acceptance of the offer wholeheartedly and at once would have saved much criticism in China and the United States, he did not think it would have made any difference in the end to the defence of Burma. Tribute to Americans

Lord Wavel pays a tribute to the American Volunteer Group, equipped with P4O fighter aircraft and led by Major-General C. L., Chennault. The air . defence of Burma, especially of the vital port of Rangoon, would have been'overwhelmed but for them.

Generally speaking,-the standard of A-r-my-leadership was high. 'Field-Marshal (then General) Alexander, who assumed command in B.yrrha on March 5, 1942, took over an extremely difficult situation, and a somewhat shaken and disorganised nrrhy.T His report is included in tliej dispatch. Field-Marshal Alexander says that

the technique of jungle fighting was virtually non-existent in his force. In addition, his infantry were not sufficiently well trained in modern tactics. There had been no training with tanks, which meant that armoured units did not receive the infantry support they needed. Instead the infantry came more and more to rely on the tanks to get them out of a tight corner. ..

Rangoon was about to fall when Field-Marshal Alexander took command. He had to. fight a delaying and withdrawing action, with numerically inferior forces. Tlis.-report tells in simple language something of his difficulties in fighting over sandy tracks through fever jungles, crossing thickly wooded high mountains and badly bridged Swollen rivers, contending with hostile Burraatis, carrying his wounded with him, and helping thousands of refugees, many of them panicky. Also there were wholesale desertions of Burmans from Ihe‘ Burma Rifles. When the campaign ende'd only two battalions of this division remained —one composed of Chins and the other wholly Indian. Field-Marshal Alexander highly praised his British and Indian troops —the 17th Indian Division and the Ist Burma Division. They have fought for five tnonths without a rest.