Invasion Plans: Navy Publishes German Documents

Greymouth Evening Star, 16 September 1947, Page 8

Invasion Plans: Navy Publishes German Documents

LONDON, September 15. Secret German naval documents published by the Admiralty revea that although the German Naval Staff drew, up tentative plans for an invasion of Britain as far back as November, 1939, Grand-Admiral Raeder regarded the operation, when it was finally ordered by Hitler, with the greatest misgivings. A long dispute developed between Raeder and the German Army Command over the form of the invasion, and finally had to be settled by Hitler’s direct intervention. Raeder, conscious of Germany s naval inferiority, argued that adequate naval protection could be given only if a German invasion fleet crossed the Channel by day on a narrow front. The Army Command demanded a night crossing on a broad front between Folkestone and Selsey Bill, with a feint in the direction of Newcastle on the north-east coast. Eventually, after a complete deadlock, a compromise was reached. But in the meantime exaggerated German intelligence estimates of the strength of the British defences, the losses inflicted on the Luftwaffe by the Royal Air Force, and the successful British air and naval attacks on the Channel invasion ports apparently reinforced Hitler’s growing conviction that an invasion would prove too costly. The invasion was not immediately called off, but ostensible preparations were continued for some time in an attempt to hoodwink the British and' apparently with the intention of making an attempt if favourable conditions presented themselves. By this time, however, Hitler had decided to attack Russia, and gradually the German invasion forces were redistributed in preparation for the eastern campaign.

September 15, 1940. D-Day for the German invasion armies was to have been September] 5, 1940. Landings were to have taken ] place in four main areas —between : Folkestone and “Dungeness, Dunge-1 ness and Cliff’s End, Bexhill and Beachy Head, and Brighton and Selsey Bill—with the object of establishing a line from Southampton to the mouth of the Thames. A force of 13 divisions (260,000 men) was to be landed, with sufficient artillery for) their protection. The dropping of] parachute troops was also discussed. I The dispute between the German I Army and Navy leaders was still proceeding when the Luftwaffe launched its softening attack on Britain early in August. Colonel-General Halder, Chief of the Army General Staff, declared at one m'eeting that he “might as well put the troops through a sausage machine” as land them on a narrow front, and Admiral Schneiwind, Chief of the Naval Staff, retorted that if the Army demanded] naval protection over a wide front it would be “suicidal.” The inadequacy of the German intelligence reports plainly had an important bearing oil the invasion plans. One German agent in Britain reported early in September that very, strongly disguised defences existed between Tunbridge Wells arid Beachey Head and in the area of Hastings, while other German intelligence reports assessed the number of divisions available for defence at 39, of which

20 were’- believed to be fully operational. Both estimates were much exaggerated, and they confirmed that the German Secret Service was largely hoaxed by various British subterfuges.

Failure Of Luftwaffe

Raeder, in several notes on his'conversations with Hitler during Sep-

tember, complained that in spite of the Luftwaffe’s claims to have established air superiority over the- British fighters, Royal Air Force bombers were inflicting heavy damage on barge concentrations. Raedei - emphasised that a prerequisite for success from the naval point of view was that all British air interference with the invasion fleet should be eliminated; and he pointed out with some acerbity that this had not been done. Raeder further pointed out that Germany could not afford to fail in an invasion attempt once it was launched. Not only would losses be very great, but the gain in British prestige would more than offset any losses inflicted on the defenders. He urged that the attacks on the civilian population of London should be intensified, as he considered that this might “induce an attitude in the enemy which would make invasion unnecessary.” Hitler, however, refused to agree to this and reesrved his decision about such attacks as “a final means of pressure and reprisal.”

On September 19, with German air losses still mounting, the Royal Air Force still unsubdued, and the German invasion ports still subject to constant attack by the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy, Hitler ordered part of the invasion fleet to disperse to reduce losses. From this time no serious attempt was made to revive the German plans for invasion.