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“MOSCOW” RESULTS

MR. BYRNES’ REVIEW

MACARTHUR’S POSITION

WASHINGTON, December 31.

When he urged a meeting of the Foreign Ministers in accordance with the Yalta understanding, he knew there was a risk of another impasse such as had occurred in London, but although discussions might not ultimately lead to agreements they contributed to the reconciliation of differences. This statement was made by the United States Secretary of State (Mr. Byrnes) in a broadcast. “The Soviet took the stand in London that the peace treaties should be made only by the principal Powers which signed the respective armistices,” he said. “The other delegations held the view that all States actively participating in the war should participate in the peace. It was the London discussions that had helped greatly towards the Moscow agreement on peace machinery. That agreement “meets our insistence that all States shall participate in the peace, and recognises the responsible role of the larger Powers in the peace-making.” Mr. Byrnes described the machinery agreed upon for drawing up treaties as “not ideal, but a departure from the ideal standard more in form than in substance.” He said: “The proposals of the larger Powers are subjected to the judgment and public criticism of all the participating nations. These nations must formally and publicly make their recommendations, and although the larger Powers are not bound by these recommendations, they must agree in order to draw up the treaties. The United States would not agree to a final treaty which arbitrarily rejected such recommendations.” The test of a successful peace was not in the form of its making but in whether it commended itself to the nations concerned by its justice and wisdom, and also commanded the support of those nations whose unity was essential to the preservation of peace. The method agreed upon in Moscow gave ample scope for the achievement of these essentials.

BALKAN STATES.

Discussing the former German satellite States, Mr. Byrnes said: “Since the London conference we have found it possible to recognise Austria and Hungary, where free elections have occurred. There is still wide divergence in our points of view on the Rumanian and Bulgarian Governments. In those countries democratic institutions have not functioned according to the traditions familiar to us. The Soviet contends that the Governments of those countries are satisfactory and that conditions do not warrant concerted action under the Yalta understanding. Concerted action is possible only by common agreement. “Until now America’s objections to the exclusion of important democratic groups from those Governments, and to the oppressive way in which Government powers are exercised, have been little heeded by those Governments or the Soviet. It must be recognised that the Soviet has a very real interest in the character of the Governments of these States, which are neighbours of the Soviet and were involved in the war against the Soviet. It was therefore to be expected that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from these countries may depend on the Soviet’s confidence in the peaceful character of these Governments. I urged on Mr. Stalin and Mr. Molotov that it was in their interest, as well as ours, that the peoples and Governments of these countries should be peacefully disposed to the Soviet. I stressed our desire to work with the Soviet, and not against it, in making these Governments representative, and for the first time since Yalta the Soviet has agreed to co-operate with us to this end.

“A tripartite commission is proceeding immediately to Rumania to advise the King on the broadening of representation in the Rumanian Government. We sought this in London, but were unable to secure agreement. The British and American Governments have agreed that they will recognise the Rumanian Government as soon as they are satisfied that the Government has been broadened to include two truly representative members of two important political parties now unrepresented, and assurances have been given regarding free elections and freedom of speech, Press, religion, and association. The Bulgarian situation is complicated by the fact that the Soviet regards Bulgaria’s election as a free election and America does not; but the Soviet has undertaken to advise the Bulgarian Government to include two members representative of two important political parties now excluded. The British and American Governments will recognise the Bulgarian Government as soon as this is done. The agreements on Rumania and Bulgaria do not go as far as I should like, but I am hopeful that they will result in a substantial improvement of the democratic character of these governments. FAR EAST “America has worked for conditions in the Far East that will make for a lasting peace. Co-opera-tion with our Allies is an essential part of that policy. Although the United States sustained the major burden of crushing Japanese military power, we always considered the war against Japan as part of the war against the Axis. From the outset we 'planned to make the control of Japan an Allied responsibility. As early as August 20, 1945, America invited the Soviet, Britain, and China to join in carrying out the objectives of the Potsdam declaration and the surrender terms for Japan. The Far Eastern Advisory Commission was _ established in October, but Britain had reservations regarding the control machinery in Tokio before joining in the work of the Advisory Commission. The three governments at Moscow, with China’s concurrence, agreed on a Far Eastern Commission consisting of the Soviet, Britain, China, France, India, the United States, the Netherlands East Indies, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the Philippines, to formulate principles governing the control of Japan. The three governments also agreed, with the concurrence of China, on the establishment of an Allied Council for Japan composed of r .®P 1 ’ es 9, tives of the Soviet, the British Coinmonwealth, China, and the United States under the chairmanship of the Supreme Commander, which will advise and consult with him in carrying out the surrender terms. If disagreement arises in the council on the implementation of the Far Eastern Commission’s decisions on matters affecting the control of Japan as set out in the surrender terms, fundamental changes in constitutional

structure, or the Japanese Government as a whole, the Supreme Commander will withhold action pending clarification by the Far Eastern Commission.

“The proposals offered by America regarding Japan made it clear that we intend to co-operate with our Allies. We expect their co-operation but at the same time our agreement safeguards the efficient administration established under General MacArthur. It assures that General MacArthur’s authority will not be obstructed by the inability of the Far Eastern Commission to agree on policies or by the inability of the Allied Council to agree upon methods of carrying them out. “The administration of Korea has been a trying problem since the Japanese surrender. The continuation of the geographical divisions for the purposes of the military occupation of Korea is unsatisfactory. Under the* Moscow agreement the two military commands will form a joint SovietAmerican Commission to solve immediate economic and administrative problems, and will make ' recommendations for the formation of a Korean Provisional Democratic Government. The commission will also make proposals for a four-Power trusteeship to prepare Korea for independence within five years. “It was agreed in Moscow that cessation of civil strife and broad participation throughout the National Government by democratic elements was necessary by a unified, peaceful democratic China, and the three Governments reaffirmed their adherence to a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of China.

“At the request of the Soviet, a British and American proposal for the establishment by the United Nations of a commission on atomic energy and related matters was placed at the end of the agenda. Discussions were limited to this proposal. We did not discuss technical or scientific matters, nor were we asked by the Soviet about the new weapon.”

PERSIAN DEADLOCK

MR BEVIN DISAPPOINTED

LONDON, January 1. The diplomatic correspondent of “The Times” says: “It is revealed that Mr Bevin received a bitter disappointment in his 'p ersona l negotiations with Mr Stalin over a solution of the Persian problem. Mr Bevm suggested to Mr Stalin that a commission representing Britain, America, and Russia should be sent to Persia to submit a scheme to the Persian Government for the establishment of a number of councils throughout Persia, including Azerbaijan, by which it was hoped that minority languages and other problems would be settled. Mr Stalin s response was at first favourable. The Russians even put forward amendments which were incorporated in the scheme. The Russians, however, at the last moment turned down the plan.” The correspondent adds: The Russians cannot be unaware how Mr Bevin personally feels about the refusal.” „ . f In Washington the Secretary of State (Mr Byrnes) has announced that all American troops have been evacuated from Persia. The British and Soviet troops were scheduled to be withdrawn by March 2. Regret that Persia was not to be admitted to the Peace Conference was expressed by the Persian Prime Minister (Hakami) and the Foreign Secretary (Najm) in a joint stateNo official communication on the Moscow Conference had been received in Persia, but it appeared that no decision had been made to evacuate the foreign troops immediately, said the statement. “If the Big Three think they can discuss and take decisions on Persia independently of I our attitude, it will be negative. Persia is an independent sovereign country allied to Britain and Russia, who have undertaken not to adopt an attitude prejudicial to the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and political independence of Persia. Representatives of Persia should be present at the Peace Conference whenever matters relating to Persia are discussed.

AMBASSADOR’S MESSAGE

(Recd. Noon). LONDON, January 1. Sir Reader Bullard, British Ambassador to Persia, who arrived at Teheran to-day, is believed to be the bearer of an important message to tne Persian Government after the Moscow talks, says Reuter’s Teheran correspondent. Authoritative circles forecast important developments including a possible reshuffle of the entire Persian Government.

MR. FRASER AT CHEQUERS.

(Official News Service.)

LONDON, December 31. Mr Fraser was invited to join Mr. Attlee and Mr. Bevin yesterday m a long discussion at Chequers, the British Premier’s country home, on the work and achievements of the recent Moscow conference of the Foreign Ministers of Britain, Russia, and the United States. Messrs. Attlee, Beym and Fraser spent three hours together in the afternoon when the Foreign Secretary arrived at Chequers to give his Prime Minister a lull, first-hand account of the Moscow talks. Earlier Mr. Fraser had a discussion there with the Dominions Secretary, Lord Addison. He motored back to London this morning after spending the night as Mr. Attlee’s guest. The “Daily Herald,” in an editorial, warmly welcomes Mr. Fraser to London as New Zealand’s principal delegate to the forthcoming session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. It says: “At San Francisco Mr. Fraser played a notable part in the shaping of the new organisation. His was the voice of true internationalism and, although he spoke only for a small country, his influence was large. Indeed, New Zealand, under a Labour Government, has a notable record in foreign affairs. At Geneva, time and again when the Great Powers were abdicating from their responsibilities, New Zealand’s representatives found themselves in the minority protesting against the sabotage of the ideals of the Covenant. In the coming meeting we trust that Mr. Fraser will find himself in the majority. The principles for which the Government of New Zealand has stood and for which the people of New Zealand have fought so valiantly and selflessly in the past, are principles which can make a better world.”

BRITAIN’S STATUS

DETERIORATION ALLEGED.

(N.Z.P.A. Special Correspondent.)

LONDON, December 31.

Second thoughts on the Moscow conference indicate that cautious reserve is maintained, if it has not hardened. In some quarters the conference is [seen as a Russian-American compromise in which Russia got the better of the bargain and from yvhich

. Britain has been left out. There is ’some tendency to think that America has safeguarded herself in the Far East while to. a certain extent abandoning her interests in Europe io Russia’s benefit. It is observed that in none of the specifically Russian-Bri-tish disputes has Britain got anything in return for the surrender of the British-American attitude on Eastern Europe. While America has a settlement in Eastern Asia, the Russians have not agreed to a consolidation of Western Europe to match their now achieved eastern consolidation. Russia is also agitating for a share in the - control of the Ruhr and has stepped up her political offensive against Persia and Turkey. “Student of Europe,” in the “Observer,” comments: “It is perhaps not unduly pessimistic to see in the Mostcow conference the first open sign of a further narrowing down of the circle of real Great Powers from three ■to two. ' Britain is still, to judge from the results of this important meeting, just strong enough to hang on permanently, unlike France, to the exclusive inner circle of the biggest Powers. She no longer seems to carry sufficient weight inside that circle to get her way or even to make others meet her half-way on any fundamental question of international controversy. Neither the reason, nor the remedy of this state of affairs is far to seek. Britain is a m'edium-sized-nation State, compared with the American and Russian continents, and the additional strength which she derives from her association with the Commonwealth is amply offset by the United States’ association with Latin America and Russia’s with Eastern Europe. In the accepted game of hard power bargaining such as is being played among the Big Three she is a predestined loser. i “Her fundamental mistake, made by Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden in 1942 and 1943, was to accept that game and her place.in it without first fortifying herself by close and intimate association with her Western European neighbours, especially France. France and Britain, acting as one, could still pull their full weight as one of the real modern big Powers and restore to their councils that equilibrium which is indispensable in the interests of peace and thus ultimately in the interests of the other Powers themselves. A France and Britain divided and quarrelling will inevitably go on to share diplomatic defeats, rebuffs, and humiliations. First priority in British foreign policy should therefore, contrary to the commonplace, be not her relations with America and Russia but her relations with’France—and the consolidation of Western Europe which would result from real and permanent FrancoBritish unity. Once this is achieved the Big Three meetings, in which Western Europe would for the first time be a really equal partner, would of themselves yield more satisfactory results. But diplomacy alone will not achieve it, unless public opinion both here and in France wakes up to the dangers of the present anomalous position and to the responsibilities which France and Britain still carry for the future of Europe and for the peace of the world ”

FRENCH DISSATISFACTION.

From Paris it is reported that the latent conflict between General de Gaulle and the Foreign Minister (M. Bidault) has come to the surface over the French attitude to the Moscow conference. While M. Bidault has urged acceptance of the position of [France “such as it is,” he has also supported acceptance of those propositions of the three-Power communique r which exclude France as a signatory to the peace treaties with Germany’s former Eastern European allies, with whom France has never been at war. M. Bidault’s thesis was sharply repudiated by General de Gaulle, who is [quoted as saying: “We live in ignor'ance as to the role allotted to Fiance iin the general settlement of Europe. We cannot agree that a political reconstruction of the Continent can be made without France’s active collaboration. We do not expressly demand to put our signature under the Balkan peace treaties, but we should still ■at least participate in their preparation. Nothing must be done in Europe without France.” The Russians are reported to be growing more enthusiastic about the conference. The warmest comment comes from “Moscow News,” which calls the conference “a landmark in international collaboration for peace.” It says: “Without collaboration by the three Powers, it is impossible to build a stable and lasting peace. Our enemies’ hopes to split the camp of the great freedom-loving Powers are dashed to the ground.”

ITALIAN REGRET

(Rec. 11 a.m.) LONDON, January 1. The Italian Government issued a communique expressing disappointment at the failure of the Moscow Conference to give special consideration to Italy in the draft of the peace treaty, says Reuter’s Rome correspondent. The communique states: “The Italian Press clearly emphasised the fear that the Moscow conversations would ignore the special position recognised for Italy at the Potsdam conference, in view of Italy’s 18 months co-belligerency, which places her above other enemy States.” The communique denies foreign Press reports suggesting Italy is disappointed because she is not allowed by the Allies to carry out direct negotiations with Jugoslavia. It is stated that Britain, the United States and Russia encouraged and facilitated moves to reopen relations between Italy and Jugoslavia.

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/GEST19460102.2.27

Bibliographic details

Greymouth Evening Star, 2 January 1946, Page 5

Word Count
2,848

“MOSCOW” RESULTS Greymouth Evening Star, 2 January 1946, Page 5

“MOSCOW” RESULTS Greymouth Evening Star, 2 January 1946, Page 5

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