Greymouth Evening Star. FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1942. LAVAL’S "PROMOTION.”

Greymouth Evening Star, 20 November 1942, Page 4

Greymouth Evening Star. FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1942. LAVAL’S "PROMOTION.”

appointment by Petain as dictator of France makes no real difference in the situation, as in practice, Laval has been in “command,” by the grace of the Nazis, for many months. The latest decree by the Marshal adds to the pathos of his own position, and will be another blow to what respect is retained for him by French army and service leaders. From the Allies’ viewpoint, it is beneficial for the fact to be again demonstrated that Petain counts for little, and the Nazi puppet, Laval, will speak for France. The disgust this must arouse in most French people may take active shape, despite the armed backing by the Axis of Laval’s position.

French administration must be in a rotten condition, indeed, to permit one with Laval’s record»to reach the highest post in the land. Born of poor parents, he early showed a capacity for study and diligence. In politics, he first joined the Extreme Left, and was almost a Communist, but as he prospered he veered to the Right. He displayed an entire lack of principle to attain wealth and self-advance-ment, and one who knew him well, recently summed him up as follows: —“Persuasive without eloquence, convincing without logic, moving at times but never moved, scornful of the sacrifices and rewards of friendship, but practising hearty good-fellowship as an art and a profession, inclined to compromise, but stubborn in details, conciliatory in firmness and firm in conciliation, peasant by birth, worker by opinion, bourgeois by ambition —such was Pierre Laval ... Ju brief, a political animal.”

To lead France to recovery -would be a tremendous task even for a Napoleon. Laval is certainly not of the type to inspire enthusiasm and devotion among his compatriots. His authority will rest on Axis force, which buttress will be removed if Laval does not produce the results expected. He has rivals within the camp, each eager to act as the Nazis dictate. Led by such men, no cause can prosper, and France’s only hope of resurrection is in an Allies’ triumph. There appears to have been a check in Tunisia, following the spectacular progress in Morocco and Algeria, but the Allies’ leaders probably expected this. It is a pity that the French did not offer more oilposition to the Axis seizure of Bizerta and Tunis. This lack of zeal will add to the Allies’ task of securing full control of the Mediterranean, and suggests that enthusiasm for the Allies is not yet overwhelming in French North African ranks. Hitler realises the importance of the possession of Bizerta and the coast bases, generally, and will reinforce Axis troops there to the greatest possible extent. It would be too much to expect that the initial easy gains by Ihe Allies in French North Africa must be continuous. Hard fighting is ahead, on land, sea and in the air. Confidence is justified in the Allies’ Forces’ ability to secure the victory.