Greymouth Evening Star. WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 1942. DARLAN v. DE GAULLE.”

Greymouth Evening Star, 18 November 1942, Page 4

Greymouth Evening Star. WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 1942. DARLAN v. DE GAULLE.”

JT is no new experience in this war to revise judgment, or attitude, concerning prominent personalities, some “villains” being recast as heroes, and some hitherto acclaimed being relegated to oblivion, or worse. Admiral Darlan is one of those whose stock, after being at a premium on the Allies’ market, slumped badly following his anti-British deeds and words after the French collapse. To-day, it is rising again, chiefly through U.S.A, support, with Britain’s reluctant* co-operation. Chief protest comes from General De Gaulle, who is suspicious of Darlan’s conversion, and is hostile to any compromise ■with former Vichy Ministers.

The Darlan pill is somewhat bitter to swallow. He has done more than any other Frenchman, Laval and Petain included, to add to Britain’s difficulties since the French-German armistice was so dishonourably signed. But for his influence to the contrary, it is probable that the French Fleet would have joined the Allies at the time of the national army collapse, and the value of such co-operation would have been immense. Instead, Britain had to defend herself against possible attack by her former ally, and was forced to take extreme measures at Oran, and elsewhere. No wonder that British Press and other circles are critical of the new policy that welcomes Darlan and concedes him supreme place in French North African administration. General De Gaulle promptly protested against the decision, partly perhaps on personal grounds, as his own leadership of the Fighting French is endangered. He may base his case on the fact that from the fall of France, he has been loyal to the

Allied cause, and been the backbone of 1 lie Fighting French. He naturally resents being thrust aside by Darlan, just when the Allies’ cause is prospering, and when Laval had proved two strong for Darlan in France, itself. On the other hand, it must be admitted that De Gaulle has failed to attract the French forces, and that his following has throughout been limited. Britain has done her best to cooperate with him, but following the Dakai fiasco, for which De Gaulle was responsible, she has faced the fact that the French do not desire to be led by De Gaulle. Britain cannot enforce on the French a leader they will not follow. Little blame will rest on her if De Gaulle now has to take a secondary place. As for U.S.A, policy, this has always been cautious where De Gaulle was concerned. Recognition of the Fighting French as a Government was refused, ( Vichy, which included Darlan, being regarded as the voied of France. It is easy, therefore, for U.S.A, now to accept Darlan as the official head of the French North African administration, especially as this was part of the bargain enabling a more or less unopposed occupation by Anglo-U.S.A. forces of French North Africa. Who would care to say that the price was too high, or that there was anything dishonest about the transaction? A temporary compromise has been effected of great value to the Allies’ cause, and to that, ultimately, of the French people, who will have the power of decision, in ' due' course, regarding their leaders.