“MORTIFYING BLOW”

Greymouth Evening Star, 16 February 1942, Page 5

“MORTIFYING BLOW”

BRITISH PRESS COMMENT PROFOUND SHOCK TO COUNTRY LONDON, February 14. “The Times,” in a leading article on the Channel battle, says: “Nothing more mortifying to the pride of our sea power has happened in home waters since the seventeenth century. That the blow should have been sustained when our resources at sea are strained as never before, is doubly lamentable. The safe passage of the enemy ships leaves the Royal Air Force mourning a distressingly long list of gallant airmen, and a number of painful questions formulating themselves in the public mind.” The “Daily Mail” says: “Britain has been flouted within sight of her own White Cliffs. The English Channel is mare nostrum. The Straits of Dover are our front gate. That a powerful enemy naval force was able to steam in broad daylight through these narrow waters has come as a profound shock to the country. The question on everyone’s lips is: why have the Germans, who are not a seafaring nation, succeeded in this kind of operation, at which we so recently failed off Malaya? The answer lies in two words—air power. Air support also explains why trie German Admiralty preferred to chance the Channel passage instead of sending the ships round the north of Scotland, as we expected. Why the warships were able to leave Brest is less explicable. The effectiveness of our “bombing policy is bound to be called into question. This audacious enterprise is a great success for Germany and will add considerably to her prestige. She will also derive, more solid benefits because the concentratio nof her fleet has caused us great embarrassment. The Japanese prevented a junction of the British and American navies, but we have failed in a similar endeavour because we have failed to develop air power.” The “Daily Express” sums up in a leader which combines criticism with an appeal to reasoned judgment. “The people are shocked,” it says, “by the daring scuttle home of the German warships in Brest. The sore loss of many tine airmen weighs heavily, but let us be balanced about this incident and not go rolling heads in the sand before knowing all the facts. The escape of the ships is most serious in its implications by showing again how the air weapon has completely altered old conceptions of sea-power. The people will say that the many bombings of these ships in Brest were futile. 'True ,trie ships were not destroyed, and that demonstrates what a gamble there is in target bombing. But the ships were immobilised by the Royal Air Force through the most critical months of the Battle of the Atlantic. It is also fair to argue that the Germans would have sent them out into the Atlantic battle if they could have been properly repaired at Brest.”

TACTICAL LESSONS. LONDON, February 14. The New York “Herald-Tribune” says: “The tactical lessons of the Channel battle are no less important than the event itself. If the vulnerability of battleships to aircraft has been amply demonstrated in this war, the success of the German, dash proves that a considerable amount of protection can be afforded by fighteraeroplanes, even in so dangerous an area as the English Channel. This is of vital importance in the Pacific battle. It explains on the one hand why Japan has moved freely on the sea when under air protection, and why the united nations can confidently expect to turn the tables when their air might comes into action.” GERMAN VERSION GIVEN SLIGHT DAMAGE ADMITTED LONDON, February 16. A German broadcast account of the Channel action, stated to have been compiled from official reports, says: “The warships left harbour shortly after the air-raid on Wednesday evening, after receiving orders to pass through the Straits of Dover and to be ready for operations elsewhere. “Except for the loss of a patrolboat and damage to a torpedo-boat, the German Navy suffered no damage. There were only a few casualties among escort crews as a result of low-level attacks. “The escorts frustrated an attack bv torpedo-boats, two of which were sunk. The remainder pursued as far as the Goodwin Sands. “The Prinz Eugen sank one destroyer and set fife to another. The German warships outmanoeuvred a coastal shelling attack, and also avoided all torpedoes. There was magnificent collaboration between the shins and the air force in warding off* air attacks. The escorts alone destroyed 10 British aeroplanes. The warships are now ready for new tasks.” 2 , A German war reporter s account of the action stated that before the warships sailed an order of the day was issued by their commander: •‘The Fuehrer expects every man to do his duty. - ’ The reports adds: “At this time yesterday we were in the brunt of the battle. Now, although anchored in Heligoland Bay, our nerves are still so tense that we are hardly able to grasp the greatness of our success.” Rear-Admiral Luetzow, broadcasting from Berlin, said: “British propaganda blames the weather for the German penetration of the Channel, but this is untrue. The’weather was excellent until noon, when the ships had passed the Straits of Dover. Visibility then became bad, favouring the attackers. . “British public opinion is rightly shocked by this event. This war has imposed on the British Navy a great number of heavy tasks which it is not in a position to fulfil satisfactorily. The United States is now able to toss back the British reproach about being caught asleep.” The Berlin radio says that 600 aeroplanes took part in the battle, which was the biggest since the Battle of Britain. The Berlin correspondent of the Stockholm newspaper “Nya DagligtAllehanda,” says that a German military spokesman boasted that the Royal Air Force had for months bombed only dummy ships in Brest. The Germans had extensively used dummy vessels .to conceal the whereabouts of their warships. The correspondent adds that the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen left Brest long ago for other French ports. POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS

(Rec. 11.20) LONDON, Feb. 15. Assuming that the German warshins were not damaged, their future tasks, according to authoritative British naval opinion, may include, firstly to invite a general fleet action in the North Atlantic: secondly, to increase surface raiding, making it necessary to escort convoys with battleships; thirdly, to attempt to assault Kronstadt, Leningrad’s fortress, from the sea; fourthly, to create a base on the Norwegian coast, possibly at Narvik, and attack convoys going to Russia.