RUSSIAN PROBLEMS

Greymouth Evening Star, 12 October 1939, Page 13

RUSSIAN PROBLEMS

THE TWO SOVIET FLANKS. That Russia is by no means easy about the military situation is evident from the pressure being attempted on Estonia and Finland (wi-ote the military correspondent of the Sydney Morning Herald on September 28). Now that the Russians have the whole of north-eastern Poland, they can prevent a direct German thrust from that direction. But this indirectly creates a new position, for it accentuates the danger of a German attack through the three small Baltic States. Lithuania is, to all intents and purposes, a military protectorate of Germany, while the adjacent States of Latvia and Estonia are pitiably weak in their armaments. The standing army of Latvia is only 24,000 men, that of Estonia 11,200; and while a national levee en masse would bring these numbers up to 200,000 and 90,000 respectively, these larger formations would only be lightly armed guerilla units. They would be incapable of making a stand against either the Germans or the Russians, especially since geographical conditions would not aid them in any way. These small countries form a perfect military corridor.

If Russia chooses to extend her new Polish possessions northwards to tlnBaltic, there is no military force strong enough to prevent her; and the temptation must be great, because such a step would remove the menace of an | attack on Leningrad, which is only 72 miles from the Estonian frontier. Leningrad is even closer to the Finnish frontier —only 23 miles away. Further, if Germany seized the Aaland Islands, in an attempt to bring Sweden to heel in the matter of iron ore exports. Russia would be shut off from the Baltic and open to military pressure at her most vulnerable point. These considerations of Baltic strategy must be in Russian minds, because they open a singularly easy way in which Germany, if she felt frustrated in Poland, could raise a coun-ter-menace against Russia to the north. It would be idle for Russia to prosper from Germany’s military difficulties in Poland if the Germans could retaliate in a zone still more important to Leningrad. On the former Russo-Polish frontier Stalin still has his “eastern Maginot Line” as a protection, but he is entirely exposed to a flank attack from the Baltic. The immediacy of this threat is the measure of the present danger to Estonia and Finland, and it is easy to see the reasons that are impelling Russia to get in first and once again present the Germans with a fait accompli. Unless the Germans and the Russians entirely trust each other, the Russians are not yet out of the wood. Without going to war with them, the Germans might easily bottle up the newly-enlarged Soviet fleet, in the Gulf of Finland and might present a threat to Leningrad itself. Whether the Germans would risk this at the moment is a different question; the point is that such a development >s possible. Its immediacy depends entirely on the terms on which Germans and Russians negotiated last week at

Brest-Litovsk. If the Russians cracked the whip over the heads of the Germans,'such a stroke of counter-stra-Itegy in the northern Baltic becomes a matter’ of urgent politics; and this explains the recent Russian pressure on Finland and on Estonia.

ROUMANIAN WEAKNESS. ( On Russia’s southern borders the £ military position is as clouded as in c the north. There are reports of the 1 massing of Soviet troops on the Ron- f manian frontier, and the Roumanians,, in addition to experimenting with air- s raid precautions in the frontier pro- i vince of Bessarabia, are said to be pre- s paring lines of defence there. i Any sustained military resistance on < the part of the Roumanians in this region is impossible. The Russians , command the bridgeheads and the f new strategic railways; and the en- j tire Roumanian army could not pre- j vent them from seizing the trunk line , that runs along the frontier, not more than 10 miles within Roumanian ter- , ritory. Communications in Russia are ‘ not usually good; but Stalin has built them up in this southern region, especially since the creation of what was called “the special military district” in Kieff in August of last year. To make assurance doubly sure, a new military district of Kharkoff was 1 formed as a reserve or reinforcement i to the Kieff “special district”; and it ( was estimated early this year that a quarter of Russia’s army and moye i jthan a sixth of her tanks and aero- c i planes were concentrated in this ] zone, ready to attack either South t Poland or plunge across the Dniester j against Bessarabia. 1 The former isolated military district of the Ukraine has thus been trans- j formed into one of Russia’s two spear- r points for any aggression. When j Stalin urged the hastening of the new railways and the great auto roads ( from Moscow in this direction, he did . not mention Bessarabia; he referred ... solelv to Russia’s left flank in the ‘ south and the need for protecting tlm ‘ oilfields in Baku and beyond. This is an important military point. ’ Russia can hold the Black Sea. only if * Turkey closes the Straits (hence the J present visit of the Turkish Foreign Minister to Moscow), and only if the 1 land-approach from the Roumanian 1 and Bulgarian frontiers is covered. ’ The western shore of the Black Sea, whether in enemy or neutral hands, is a constant threat to Russia and her ■ vital oilfields; so that it is easy to see why Soviet concentratioins in the Keiff i military district are concerned with i far wider interests than redeeming the f lost province of Bessarabia from Ron- < mania. 1 To be secure, Russia, must close the : exposed gap on her north-western ! and south-western flanks. She must safeguard her Baltic position and her 1 Black Sea position. If she conceives ( ' it her need to build up a wall between herself and Europe, the occupation of eastern Poland has by no means completed that wall. Indeed, it has only brought Russia too far westwards from her previous frontier fortifications to bo altogether safe, even with) . the defence of the Pripet marshes to 1 i fall back upon. In brief, new problems are arising

in eastern Europe every day ; and the [nest important of them will not be solved by the mere alignment of a common Russo-German frontier in the heart of Poland. On the contrary, the fixation of such a line will immediately bring the wider military problems into clearer relief, and these will change with every alteration of Germany’s attitude towards the neutral States, whether in Scandinavia or in the Balkans. Even if the Russians want to go no farther, their future role is by no means fixed. The military sequels of the partition of Poland have not emerged as yet. Development is possible in many directions, but whatever happens, it is clear that the military position in Wester’.'. Europe will be intimately affected.