HARVEST FACTOR

Greymouth Evening Star, 7 September 1939, Page 12

HARVEST FACTOR

ITS IMPORTANCE IN WAR That no Government take steps which might lead to war until it is sure that at least one year’s supply of food is in its granaries is still almost an axiom with many European military theorists, despite many exceptions and some logical proof that it, is no longer valid. The principal reason for the belief that wars can come only after the harvest is that withdrawal of men from agriculture into the army would cripple or at least slow down the process of getting in the crops. The fact that many wars have started before all the crops were in—some when the harvest had scarcely been begun—-‘■in-dicates that the harvest time is only one of the many factors conditioning the outbreak of war. Conscription on a large scale dates from the end of the eighteenth century, when it was introduced by France. In 1794 Ring Frederic William .11, of Prussia objected to conscription op the ground that it would ruin agriculture. ■Napoleon, however, taught the military leaders of his day that with large conscript armies short wars might be fought. On the basis of the Napoleonic campaigns Karl von Clausewitz, the great German theorist, expounded his belief in a war mobilising all the strength of a people and fought to a speedy decision. Clausewitz’s principles were adopted first by Prussia; they proved so successful in the Austro-Prussian war of 1866 and in the Franco-Prussian war four years later that they were taken up by virtually every great military Power.

But down to the World War it was widely held that “total” war, on the Clausewitz model, could be fought only between harvests. In fact, conscription itself has lieen defined .as the “military expression of an agricultural democracy.” It was believed that the drain on man-power entailed by universal military ‘service might be accomplished only in a country whose population could be withdrawn from civil life without the economic structures being wrecked. Colonel N. Jdaqde, a British writer on Military subjects./ said in 1912: “Compulsory service exactly suits the need of a .State .mainly agricultural, provided that yvarlike operations are conducted .between harvests and carried qut .with such rapidity that a final decision is rapidly attained.”

It has been said in opposition to the “between harvests” theory, that the World War began before all the crops were in. . Germany ordinarily has all her cereal crops harvested by September 1; her root ,crops—beets, potatoes, etc. —are not all in the bins before November T. Yet ,b ( y September 1, 1914, Germany had already been at war a mo,nth. It is true, however, that when mobilisation came.on August 1 much of the. German harvest was alreadyj in; moreover since the generals were imbued with Clausewitz’s theory of a short, decisive campaign, few believed that the armies would not be ,b.ack in the fields for the jSpri’ng .ploughing. The, .World K Wftr did much to disturb ,the harvests” theory, only did it indicate that.an industrial country could be geared to war. but it .slipwed agriculture could be conducted despite ..conscription. In Russia, according to “Russian Agriculture During the War,” a study published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 10,960,000 peasants were withdrawn from the land for military This constituted about 40 per' cent, of the able-bodied peasantry; in some provinces as many as 55 per cent, of the agricultural workers were pressed into the service.

Nevertheless, according to this study, there was little effect on productivity for the first two years of war. Previously the waste of labour in Russian farming had been estimated at from 50 to 80 per cent.; by increased efficiency, the remaining workers were able to take up theslack.

What losses there were in production were made up by the prohibition of the manufacture of vodka, which released much grain for food purposes and also increased agricultural efficiency. Exports, too, which had accounted for a large part, of the Russian crop, were cut in half in 1914; lost nine-tenths in the next year, and had virtually vanished by 1917. Therefore, the study concludes, the shortage of labour was not the reason for the acute lack of food, which Russia experienced in the later years of the war. Instead, the study attributes the famine to failure of the Government to organise production, and particularly to a breakdown of the transportation and distribution systems.

Germany, with her well-drilled populace and excellent transport facilities, to-day has little to fear from this source. But the food production of the Reich is much closer to the margin of safety—even beyond it in certain commodities —than was Russia’s. The carry-over from last year's cereal crop in Germany was estimated in April at 10.000,000 tons, a little less than half the annual peace-time requirements. Germany has also been buying heavily in foreign markets and counts on being able to continue to do so in Central Europe. Germany, however, already is suffering from a labour shortage, estimated by her own authorities at 1,000,00.0 workers. This has had serious repercussions in agriculture. For the harvesting of the crops in East Purssia 30,000 students were mobilised. Furthermore, the consumption—and waste—of food products in war time is always far higher than in peace, no matter how stringent the attempts at regulation. Consequently estimates of the extent to which German reserves of grain will stretch in war, based on peace-time consumption are erroneous. And Germany will be unable .to increase the efficiency of her fields in the same extent that Russia did? since the Reich’s agriculture is running at close to top production.