NEGLIGENCE ALLEGED

Greymouth Evening Star, 24 June 1937, Page 2

NEGLIGENCE ALLEGED

CAR AND CYCLE COLLISION. [per press association.] WELLINGTON, June 23. The Appeal Court to-day heard a case arising from an unsuccessful attempt by Peter Percy Hurlstone, of Auckland, a gardener, to set aside a judgment entered in pursuance of the jury’s verdict in a motor collision case in favour of Harold Oscar Steadman, also of Auckland, a collarmaker. Hurlstone began the action in the Auckland Supreme Court, claiming £552/1/6 special damages and £ 2500 general damages suffered by him through a collision between his motorcycle and respondent’s motor-car, alleged to have been caused' by the negligence of the respondent s agent, Joiu?Heffernan. Hurlstone’s injuries included a fractured right leg and ankle. The jury found that there had been contributory negligence on both sides and judgment was entered for the respondent. Hurlstone applied for a new trial on the ground that new evidence was available, but the application was refused. He then issued a. writ against Steadman asking that the verdict and judgment be set aside, and alleging that Heffernan pushed the car back from a concrete strip to t]£e bitumen, which constituted the main issue at the first hearing. Hurlstone alleged that Heffernan afterwards represented to two constables that the position of the car on the bitumen was the point of impact, this action being fraudulent. As a. second ground, it was alleged that Heffernan and the respondent’s wife, who was in the car at the time, committed perjury about the position of the car.

Mr Justice Callan, who heard' the latter action, entered judgment for the respondent on the second ground and non-suited the appellant on the first The appellant now appealed from this decision.

• For the respondent, Mr I. J. Goldstine contended that the motor-car involved in the collision had not been preyed to belong to the respondent and' accordingly that the driver, Heffernan, had not been shown to be his agent. It was submitted that the act which niakes the driver of a vehicle the statutory agent of the owner does not. extend to the common law principle of agency beyond the time or the point at which the accident occurs, which gives rise to the action fdr damages.

Speaking of the ground of perjury, counsel said there was no allegation in the appellant’s pleadings that the driver or the passenger, Mrs Steadman, were agents of the respondent when they gave evidence at the trial, nor had the relationship of principal and agent in this respect been proved. Judgment was reserved.