LUDENDORFF’S OFFENSIVE

Greymouth Evening Star, 22 June 1937, Page 3

LUDENDORFF’S OFFENSIVE

VICTORY LED ’PO DEFEAT . The new volume of the “Official History of the Great War” begins on March 27. 1918, six days after the opening of the German offensive against the Fifth Army under General Gough, and ends on April 30, with the failure of the Germans to exploit their success in capturing Mount Kenimel. It does not, therefore, complete the story of Ludendorff’s great offensive, but it carries it to a point at which we now see that it was impossible that it should succeed. At the time it was not. so obvious, and many anxious days were to pass', but in fact, at is now evident. Ludendorff was merely piling up his penaltiesby continuing (writes Herbert Sideboiham, in the London “Sunday Times.”).

The period covered by this volume is perhaps the most difficult, in the whole war. and the account of the retreat of the Fifth Army must have cost the official historian great pains to piece together, and at the end of it he is conscious of having represented as iin orderly and controlled operation what was. in fact, a welter of confusion. Yet the account, imperfect Us it is, goes far to explain what has hitherto been one of the great paradoxes of the war, namely, what we regarded at the time as our worst and most dangerous defeat was also tin.! grave of the German hopes of victory.

The tactics of the offensive had been elaborated with very great skill, but their very elaboration prevented the enemy from driving any one of them home, and forced him to give up the offensive when it seemed on the point of success and try on some other sector, only to meet with even less success. The German losses were as heavy as ours, if not heavier, and the ollicial historian thinks, too, that his devastation of the country during his retreat from the Somme at The beginning of the year increased his ditliculties of supply when he came Io advance over it.

I POPULAR MISCONCEPTIONS y w- : 01 The official narrative corrects a number of popular misconceptions about this offensive. It was directed against the extreme British right, not with the idea of separating the British armies from the l-Tench, but in order to hold the Eieiicii from combine 1q mir assistance. The whole ob- | jecl of tlm attack was to overwhelm [the British armies. Nor. in tlm ollicial I historian’s opinion, was the assistance I of the ITeitch what did most io preI v< nt the break-through, I’och gave I'-reat moral encouragement. bin Hhroug.li no fault of his own comparaI lively little physical support. The ; E reach reserves, in fact, so tar from loading off the German thrust, were I usually made the opposite side of the ■ corridor of advance, al the end of j which-was Amiens. Nor was the Brinish rctiaat by any means a rout. This volume opens by chronicling a struggle on the Avre six days after ,1110 disaster of March 21 which was : com pa ra ble in its tenacity with Le I (’ale,in on i he ret real from Mons, i * ’onlusoil as the retreat was. it was | m't a rout, and it was the (lorinan I *es.-., s am: our continued resistance i Io what looked at the lime like an - irresistible enemy that convinced

many high German officers that the war was as good as lost. The spirit of the German rank and file was still good: only later in the year did the conviction of those in high command percolate down to them, with the result that the tables were turned and we were able to do what the Germans found impossible. This volume disposes of a number of legends, as, for example, a hastily improvised force of engineers and railwaymen under Carey, or even the Australians that saved Amiens; or. after the Lys offensive, that the French saved the situation after Kemmel had been lost. The advance towards Amiens had already run down almost to a standstill, as the veracious Australian official history shows, before the Australians were in the front, line. No less illuminating is the -account of the Lys offensive in which the Portugueses front broke, and perhaps because the facts are easier to disentangle here, the narrative becomes perceptibly more animated in Flanders than it was further south. In the fighting from March 21 to April 30, the British casualties were 9,704 officers and 230,089 other ranks; the German casualties for the same period were between 329,000 to 332,000 — figures which tell their own tale.

LESSONS BOR THE EUTURE So important are the events in this volume that, the ollicial historian has seen (it to include a general chapter of "Reflections” on the general aspects. It is probably impossible to write generally on this fighting-and maintain impartiality: General Edmonds avoids the bitter controversial topics raised by Mr. Lloyd George over Haig’s command, but he leaves no doubt on which side His sympathies lie. Nor is he uncritical of either Eoch or Petain, or of Erench troops when they were at fault. But he is always unbane and polite in his criticism; and he is chary of advancing general propositions about war. But, despite all liis compliments to the British armies, he is doubtful whether we could count, on similar success in the future in •he same conditions.

One hardly likes to contemplate what might have happened had the Germans pushed up masses of cavalry or mechanised forces to exploit Hu'ir nearly success. In future, it Would seem that improvised armies will havi little chance, even if there is time to create them, against an enemy who is in possession id' aeroplanes, armoured cars, tanks, and mechanised troops to exploit a gap. or even, judging from more recent events in Abyssinia, of aeroplanes alone. lie concludes the book on a similar note, and complains of the drawbacks in a national system which forbids adequate preparation for war: "It is." h< writes, "a system benevolent Io our enemies: for it entails the certainty of grievous cost of the best blood of the Empire, heavy financial burden on the times which follow. Hid Hie inevitable danger of defeat from which recovery might never be allowed." Apparently he still believes in spite ot Ludendorff's failure in HHS that the problem of attack is not insoluble. and that wars will never be allowed to last as long as the last. But if the horns of tie dilemma ; conscription and defeat, there is surely a way' of avoiding being impaled on either.