“THE ROCK”

Greymouth Evening Star, 23 February 1937, Page 12

“THE ROCK”

BRITAIN AND GIBRALTAR. The civil war in Spain and its attendant international repercussions have focussed attention on the grip the British Empire has upon the western entrance of the Mediterranean (writes Lieutenant-Commander Kenneth Edwards, R.N., in the “Sydpey Morning Herald”). The grip is vital to the British Empire. Although at one period of the Great War British trade to the East was diverted round the Cape of Good Hope, owing to the submarine menace in the Mediterranean, the Foreign Secretary, Mr Eden, has lately made it clear that the Mediterranean trade route is considered one of the vital arteries of the Empire. For two and one-third centuries,, the 6ock of Gibraltar has guarded the western aproaches to the Meidterranean as a sentry of the British Empire. During that time it has withstood assaults both by land and sea. There are many people to-day who hold that the development of weapons of offence has converted the great rock fortress of Gibraltar from a state of impregnability into an anachronism. Recently a British Admiral expressed the view that the British Empire would be better off if Gibraltar were given up in exchange for Ceuta, on the southern side of the Straits. Although the defences of Gibraltar were allowed to remain without improvement or modernisation for several years after the Great War, a vast amount of work has been done in the direction of modernisation during the past two years. The Mediterranean crisis, following the Italo-Ethiopian dispute, focussed attention upon Gibraltar as well as upon the Eastern Mediterranean. During the crisis there were many rumours at Gibraltar of impending attacks upon the Rock, and these had the effect of rousing the authorities to a realisation that the j defences had been allowed to fall behind' the development of offensive weapons.

THE PROBLEM,

The problem of maintaining the impregnability of Gibraltar was studied both scientifically' and practically. As a result, new guns were mounted in positions where their destruction by an enemy would bo virtually impossible, and from which they would be able to command arcs of tire to give the greatest possible defensive value. It has been said that the growth of air power has robbed Gibraltar of its impregnability. But, in fact, it must be conceded that the Rock would be one of the most difficult places in the world to attack successfully from the air. The configuration of the Rock produces strange wind currents and air pockets. Any Fleet Air Arm pilot I who has flown over Gibraltar will tell I you that he did not relish the experience. These meteorological conditions would make accurate bombing! extremely difficult, if not impossible. Add to this the height of the Rock itself. It would be virtually impossible to drop bombs upon the knife edge of the Rock. Yet here, as well as in other positions upon the slopes, anti-aircraft guns would have an advantage over aircraft. A raiding squadron of aircraft ap-

proaching from the east would have to fly higher because the anti-aircraft guns would have the advantage of themselves having a height above sea level of nearly 1400 feet. If raids were delivered from the north, south, or west, the height at which many of the guns are placed would rob approaching aircraft of a proportion of their apparent speed, and so simplify the gunnery problem. Add to these facts that very frequently the Rock is capped with cloud, and one appreciates the fact that the air menace to Gibraltar is exaggerated. Gibraltar has been criticised because of its lack of an aerodrome. The establishment of an aerodrome on Windmill Flats, above Europa Point, has been under consideration for some time. North of the Rock, there is a large area of flat ground at present occupied by barracks, a rifle range, a racecourse, and sports ground. A portion of this ground could be used as an aerodrome.

If Gibraltar were attacked from the mainland of Spain, one is forced to the conclusion that modern weapons would be of advantage to the defenders rather than the attackers. The Rock is connected to the mainland by a flat and narrow isthmus wlijich, with the Rock rising sheer for 1200 feet behind it, could’ be held by a handful of men with modern equipment against all the troops which could attack in the space available. Moreover, attacking troops would have to operate from the mainland which, for some distance, is rolling downland.

Bombardment could, of course, be I carried out at long range from the neighbourhood of Tarifa. But one can hardly suppose that such bombardment would be allowed to proceed unmolested, and' the gunnery problem involved would be considerable. Bombardment from the heavy guns of Ceuta is again impracticable; Ceuta lies slightly to the east of south from Gibraltar, and the ridge of the Rock ( runs practicaly north and south. Thus 1 the guns of Ceuta, in order to bombard the town and harbour of Gibraltar, would have to lob their shells over the southern part of the Rock itself, and would be deprived of spotting, except by such aircraft as the defenders of Gibraltar allowed to) hover above. The range would be in j the neighbourhood of eighteen miles, j Ihider such conditions, accuratei bombardment is not. to be expected. Moreover, long range guns mounted on the knife edge of the Rock would be in a very much better position to bombard Ceuta while themselves being virtually immune, for to register hits upon a high knife edge of rock when the "overs” cannot he spotted 1 presents a well nigh insoluble gunnery problem. J

ATTACK FROM THE SEA. Attack upon Gibraltar from the sea I would obviously be almost impossible, I so long as Great Britain retained her sea power. On the western side the defences have lately been thoroughly ' modernised, and a complete system of boom defence is in existence. Apart irom the isthmus and the western side of Gibraltar, where the harbour and the main defences lie, landing is possible only at one point—Catalan Bay, on the east shore. This bay is so small that only a smalil landing could take place. And, having landed, any lorce would be faced with the ch» { ™

o£ two alternatives—to try to storm

the face of the Rock, made almost unscalable by the steep concrete water catchments, or to follow the narrow road to the isthmus. This is a narrow cliff road which could be made impassable at a moment’s notice. It is impossible to make one’s way south from Catalan Bay to Europa Point, and so round to the western side. Bombardment from the sea could never reduce the Rock, and could never be systematically carried out, so long as the British Navy was in being. In considering the proposal of exchanging Ceuta for Gibarltar, it is esesntial to remember two facts. The actual Straits of Gibraltar are too deep to be mined, but at the Mediterranean entrance to the Straits, the water shoals towards Ceuta, so that mines can be laid to the south of the centre of the Straits. This would accentuate, in time of war, one of the chief reasons why the north side of the Straits is of greater importance than the south side. This is that the main trade route lies well to the north of the centre of the Straits. Shipping from the Atlantic normally passes fairly close to Tarifa. and thence heads for a point a few miles south of Cape Gata, the south-eastern point of Spain. Thus it passes within two or three miles of Gibraltar and more than ten miles from Ceuta.

The conclusion is that, so long as 1 sea power is retained by the British 1 Empire, Gibraltar is as impregnable ; to-day as it was two hundred years | ago, and possibly more so. And if 31 the British Empire is robbed of its 3 sea power Gibraltar will have become i of practically no account.