NEXT GREAT WAR

Greymouth Evening Star, 18 April 1936, Page 4

NEXT GREAT WAR

LUDEND(J R FF ’ S OUTLINE. General Ludendorff, who. as Quar-termaster-General. was German Chief of Staff in the Great War. has published a book entitled “The Totalitarian War” says a writer in the “Manchester Guardian.” This book merits attention, not only because Ludendorff is a master of military science, mu. also because he has been .restored to favour in Germany and again has a great influence. His military doctrines are much the same as those that are officially held and encouraged in Germany. His book is being widely read, and, so far, no disagreement with its main thesis appears to have been expressed. , .. According to General Ludendorff the conceptions of Clausewitz, based as thev were on the lessons of the Frederican and Napoleonic campaigns, are out of date. War in those days was a struggle between armies rather than between nations. Clausewitz did conceive of the “totalitarian war. but rather as an abstraction or as an ideal, and not as something that would ever he a practical reality. He regarded war as an instrument of policy—he demanded that, although foreign policy must to some extent adapt itsell to military necessities, war must remain subordinate to policy as a whole. Ludendorff argues that this doctrine was fatal to Germany in the Great War because it led to constant friction between the political leaders and the High Command, and by promoting the supremacy of the former paralysed the latter, lie gives the submarine campaign as an example. Had it. so he argues, been conducted as the High Command wished the delays and hesitations of the civilians would have been avoided and the campaign would have been successful.

Ludendorff regards war not as a means to an end but as an end in itself —as the supreme act of national .-ell-assertion; not as a method but rather as a biological phenomenon necessary for the conservation of the “race.” He accepts the Nazi “racial” doctrine and speaks of the next war as the “racial war”—“de volkische Krieg.”

Such a war knows no limited aims: it is a lil’e-and-death struggle. It does not consist merely of actual hostilities between armies—the “theatre of operations” extends to the entire territories of all belligerents. The fight is waged against the souls as well as against the bodies of the whole population of the enemy's country, propaganda playing as big a part as poison gas. Wall's the consummation of all national endeavour and absorbs all the material resources and all the physical and mental energies of a people. SUPREME REALITY. War. according to Ludendorff, is the supreme reality in the life of a nation. All else, even in times of peace-—which are but a preparation for times of war —must be subordinated to this reality. War is not an instrument of policy; a policy is ru instrument of war.

A nation’s primary need is internal cohesion, for without it the army, which is an organic part of the nation, is without cohesion. This cohesion requires a fundamental conformity of •reliefs. These convictions must have a religious character, but they must not. be Christian. According to Ludendorff, Christianity is an imported product “alien to the German race and a source of weakness.” He regards Shintoism as greatly superior to Christianity, and demands that Germany should adopt a “religion of the German race (which, in fact, is what the Nazi Dictatorship is trying to impose). Ludendorff approves of coercive measures to secure conformity, and the extermination of all political and religious non-conformity that he demands is actually being tarried out by the dictatorship. He has no use for religion except in so far as it promotes warlike qualities. The political, economic, financial, and' religious structure of a nation musl be determined by military needs alone. Stocks of such raw materials as can be obtained only abroad must be accumulated in peace-time so that enough may be available for war. He believes in big armies—an “army can never be numerically strongenough.” All men who are physically fit must be available tor active service at the outbreak of war. He thinks that recruits can be taught the use of modern weapons in one year. He demands that the spirit of subordination would be promoted, together with initiative and strength of character.

Tie condemns declaration of war not only as superfluous but as prejudicial to victory. It was, he says, “a bad mistake” to declare war on Russia and France in 1914. As soon as a State has decided to go to war it must at once secure the command of the air. so as to hinder the concentration of hostile armies. The industrial centres of the enemy must be bombed. But the air arm is not decisive. Only a vigorous offensive of the land forces can decide a war.

In case of invasion by the enemy the civilian population must take part in the lighting and harass the enemy’s rear.

It is the commander-in-chief who must decide general policy, both at home and abroad in war-time. He must also be in control of the economic resources of the nation. The German law of May 21, 1935, confers upon the Minister of War most of the powers .which Ludendorff demands. “A nation, when it asserts its right to live by waging a totalitarian war.” he writes, “is not worthy of a great commander unless it places itself entirely at his disposal.”