DAMAGES FOR CONSTABLE

Greymouth Evening Star, 27 June 1934, Page 11

DAMAGES FOR CONSTABLE

STOPPED RUNAWAY HORSES LONDON, May 1. The action to decide a London police constable’s right to damages for injuries received in stopping runaway horses was decided in his favour yesterday, when he was awarded £350 damages, with costs. The case was heard by Mr. Justice Finlay in the King’s Bench Division. Plaintiff was Police-constable Thomas John Haynes, who on August 24, 1932, was on duty in the chargeroom in Rotherhithe police-station when, hearing the sound of galloping horses, he ran into the street, and stopped two runaway horses. His case was that his injuries were received in the execution of his duty, and on account of the negligence of the defendants in leaving the horses unattended and not properly secured.

The defendants, Messrs G. Harwood and Son, of Rotherhithe New-road, S.E. denied negligence, and maintained that in attempting to stop the horses, the policeman undertook the risk voluntarily.

Evidence was given that police regulations did not state that, it was the duty of police officers to stop runaway horses, though they contained directions as to how it should be done. It was said to be a matter fori the discretion of an officer according to the circumstances as thej r arose. P.-c. Haynes was decorated for his gallantry in the matter by the King and received a. Carnegie watch. It was agreed that if he established his claim damages should be £350.

DEFENDANTS NEGLIGENT Giving judgment, Mr. Justice Finlay said he was satisfied that, shortly after the van drawn by the horses started on its course, the four wheels were running free, so that the wheel-chain was ineffective, and was not fixed in position. That was negligence, as the chain was inadequate for the purpose. Defendants had failed to show that they were not negligent in leaving the van in a crowded street with children about when the horses ran away.

“I think, in this case, that the injuries which the officer received were the natural and probable consequences of the defendants’ act, and there is no material at all for saying that he was guilty of contributory negligence. “I do attach some weight to the fact that the plaintiff is a policeman. If he were a policeman on point-duty, I should think that the case would have been reasonably clear, for theie is a perfectly plain duty on a policeman on point-duty to regulate traffic to stop runaway horses if he can. “Here, it is true, the duty was perhaps less clear, because this policeman was not at the time controlling traffic. , , , “As the police owe a general duty to the public to preserve life and property, it seems to me that the policeman did owe a duty to intervene. “But it is not really within the true meaning of the doctrine that he agiced to take the risk, knowing all the circumstances. What he does is to act pursuant to a higher duty and, in so doing, he incidentally incurred the risk. , , “The plaintiff - did a very brave act for which lie has been very deservedly rewarded.

“I think that, when lie did that brave thing, he was acting in pursuance of a public duty. The plaintiff is accordingly entitled to succeed.” Judgment was accordingly entered as above. A stay of execution was granted pending notice of appeal.