A PACIFIC WAR ?

Greymouth Evening Star, 16 May 1934, Page 10

A PACIFIC WAR ?

HONG KONG VULNERABLE. In the event of war between Britain and Japan, it is said that Hong Kong would be much more vulnerable to Japanese attack, than Japan would be to attack from Singapore. “Singapore (writes the “Naval and Military Record”) would be too remote lor an operational base in the event of a conflict with Japan, but it is admirably sited as a defensive base lor dealing with any possible descent upon the'Australian continent. We need scarcely repeat that we are discussing this matter in a purely academic spirit, and without the least believing that Britain and Japan, are ever likely to be at open enmity. So long as military organisations continue to exist, so long does speculative discussion regarding them remain a legitimate subject to the student of war.

“We believe it is the general view of the United States Naval Staff that should America and Japan ever come to blows, the Philippines would be lost at the outset. If they wore not lost at the outset they probably would not be lost at all, and this should be equally true of Hong Kong. In their swoop upon Port Arthur the Japanese demonstrated their belief in the principle of starting a war without waiting to declare it. The general idea appears to be that this same principle will be followed in connection with any future great war. But we can hardly be expected to suppose that even a bolt from the blue will be launched without any sort of preliminary admonitions. The period of inevitability may be very short, but some such period there must surely always be.’

Fortunately, the defensibility of Heng Kong is considered to have been greatly increased by the lease of the adjacent. Kowloon territory. “The principal naval bases in the Far East," says the “Record,” “are Hong Kong and Singapore (British), Manila (U.S.A.>, and Vladivostok (Russian). Whether we should be able to hold Hong Kong in the event of a struggle with Japan is an oft-debated question. That. Japan would at once make a vigorous effort to take the place is an elementary deduction from any strategical contemplation, since with Hong Kong in her hands sea communications would be placed beyond serious menace-

“But we are not so sure that Hong Kong would prove such an easy nut. to crack as Captain Bernard Acworth in his new book invites us to believe. The foresight of the military authorities who got from China a long lease of the Kowloon territory right back to the hills, 27 miles inland, was very ■agacious, and, although our normal strength on this strip of land could not. hope to resist an expeditionary force if it landed, yet Hong Kong should be able to make any such landing no easy matter. On the other hand, were this mainland territory not in our ban'!:-, Hong Kong would he very much more vulnerable than il now AUSTRALIAN FLEET. Should ciuisers of Hie Australian Squadron, when detached and placed with the British Heel for training purposes, be sent to the Mediterranean or

attached to the British Asiatic Squadron? ~ With regard to this question, the •‘Record” hails the forthcoming visit of tlm cruiser Sussex to Australia as the signal for a renewal oi the policy of interchanging ships between he Australian and the British fleets, the “Record” suggests that it won,hl be nioic lilting to attach an Austm-aHan cruiser to the China command than to (be Mediterranean station, “because ;n the event of war in the I’acihc the Australian Squadron would at once I ecotne a unit of the Far-Eastern Heel for strategical purposes.” From the viewpoint of naval strategy, it is stated. this portion of the Pacific is obviously of special interest. Before the advent of Germany as a. great naval Power concentrated (he British Navy on the North Sea, the Admiralty policy was to maintain prei cmdorahl naval power in variou seas throughout the world. It was the

Kaiser who concentrated the British Navy. But a return to the old scattered disposition of British naval force might, not. be necessary even it the force existed (which it does not). “Changed conditions have brought their own adjustment. Naval force can nowadays concentrate so swiftly that it. is no longer necessary, even •were it. feasible, to. maintain in any part of the world a strength adequate to meeting any potential enemy. Perhaps the really important, question now is as to how far our most important naval base would be able to held out until strong forces designed to operate from anyone of them were able to arrive.'