THE WAY TO PEACE

Greymouth Evening Star, 19 March 1934, Page 3

THE WAY TO PEACE

TWO ROUGH ROADS A study of history reveals that, after every great war, plans have been set on foot to reform the international system in some way which will pievent so great a calamity from ever overtaking mankind again. Unfortunately it also reveals that, as soon as the memory of the last war begins to fade, there is a slackening of the moral and political effort to ensure that war shall not recur, states the Economist” editorially. - . For example, the post-Napoleonic .peace movement died away in -the eighteen-twenties, with the result that the peace which followed 1815 was followed in its turn by a fresh crop of wars and revolutions which fiLed the years 1848 to 1871. . Clearly, in. our generation meitia is likely to produce the same catastrophe again unless we summon up the moral and mental energy to counteract it- and we are well aware that, this time, the penalty of failure will be immeasurably greater in proportion to the stupendous increase in our command for destructive as well as tor constructive purposes—over the forces of Nature. . If therefore, we are going to make a serious attempt this year to set our feel on the road to social recovery, it is imperative that we should face the present position of international affairs and consider what action to take in the light of it. One plain fact is that the post-war era” is now at an end, and that out reprieve from the operation of the old fatal system of international relations is ending with it—unless we take active steps now to change the course on which we are in danger of drifting. During the past fifteen years the Balance of Power, which is the traditional system of relations between parochial sovereign States, has been suspended in two separate ways: first, through the unilateral disarmament of the Powers who were on the losing side in the late war; and, secondly, through the partial success of our efforts to build up an alternative system of collective security on a basis of a reduction of armaments all round combined with co-operation in keeping the peace. The unilateral disarmament of the vanquished was intended as an interim measure to give time for putting the new collective system on a permanent effective working basis and our failure to make the collective system work before Germany recovered from the temporary prostration of defeat is the explanation of the crisis which, in the international field, has certainly not yet reached its culmination —whatever the present phase of the .business cycle may be. In these circumstances some people in this country are looking forward — not, indeed, with a Japanese or German exaltation, but with an . AngloSaxon complacency—to a relapse into the ancient regime of the Balance of Power between competitive national armaments as Hie next chapter of the world’s political history. CAN LOOK AFTER ITSELF The complacency shows .itself In a belief that England can look .after itself (perhaps, with the help of the Dominions?) quite comfortably in such circumstances, and in a conviction ap acquiescence in the return of

the old armed balance of power is decidedly preferable to assuming any further responsibilities or taking any further risks for the sake of making the new collective system of security effective after all.

The first thing that strikes an observer of this English school of thought is that, on the question of what to do next, it is sharply divided against itself. There is one wing, which, on the assumption that the League and Disarmament are done with, is preaching the traditional English policy of studied isolation from the affairs of the Continent, and another wing which is advocating—as an alternative substitute for the Covenant and the Disarmament Convention —a naval and military alliance between the United Kingdom and France. Neither of these policies, however, will stand examination. The policy of isolation is manifestly visionary. At no time during the four centuries for which the modern European balance of power has existed has it actually been possible for this country to keep out of any general war on the European Continent. Our isolation has only availed against minor conflicts which did not threaten to bring the whole Continent under some single Power’s dominion. And if this is true of the past, it is a fortiori true now that the strategic insularity of Great Britain has been undermined to our disadvantage by the invention of the submarine and at 'the same time transcend, equally to our disadvantage, by the invention of the aeroplane.

To-day England can be bombed and blockaded simultaneously from air and submarine bases on the Continent; and at the present moment Great Britain is strategically, and therefore also politically, as much a part of Europe as Canada is of North Ahierica. We can no more disentangle our fortunes from those of France and Germany than Canada can disentangle hers from those of the United States and Japan. These are facts which cannot be conjured away, however embarrassing they may be. The policy of isolation is moonshine. .

THE PROPOSED ALLIANCE On this showing, the alternative policy of throwing in our lot with France is at first sight more specious. Though the Dominions would jib at it, they cannot deny us the right to look after our own vital interests in Europe—just as Canada, for instance, claims to have the last word in her own relations with the United States. And, of course, if a Franco-British alliance did really .make another European war impossible, then this unpopular means would be actually producing the result which the Dominions, as well as we ourselves, desire, ; But can we convince ourselves that a Franco-British alliance would rule out war in Europe by balance of forces invincibly . weighted against any possible antagonist or group of antagonists—even supposing that the unilateral disarmament of Germany were to lapse? Certainly the combination would be a formidable one for Germany to face! fbr France would retain her alliances in Eastern Europe and the benevolent .neutrality of Russia (who is almost as much afraid as Poland .of a militant Germany), while England’s solidarity with France would deter Italy from throwing in her lot with Germany.’ At first sight it looks as if ’ this would surroupd Germany with an iron

ring on which she would never venture to break her sword, even if she; were fully re-armed and filled with the martial spirit. Yet history shows that, in any division of Powers into two opposing armed camps, there .is an invincible tendency for the strengths of these two camps to approximate to equality until eventually they are near enough, for one or other side to venture upon war. However heavily we inay weight one scale for the moment, we cannot guarrantee that this distribution of weights will remain permanent; and there is every likelihood that the futility of the attempt will be proved, when it is too late to try a better policy, by yet another outbreak Of hostilities. . . In short, both the policies which are now being put before us as alternatives to thorough-going support of the collective system merely lead by different routes to the same ultimate disaster. And. this being so, it is

surely worth our.while to incur heavy responsibilities and even to ,ru£ risks if-.by so .doing we ; can save the collective system from , shipwreck. .There is, Jittle doubt, that, if the collective system is to be saved, all ;the States Slipporting it; will .have to.be prepared to make much greater sacrifices on its behalf than, they have ,been ready tomake hitherto. But if it is a choice between two rough rqads, one ending in salvation and the .other in perdition, no one who realised whither they were leading would hesitate for one moment which to take.