WITH HAIG IN FRANCE

Greymouth Evening Star, 6 November 1931, Page 10

WITH HAIG IN FRANCE

INTERESTING REVELATIONS.

Scarcely any man living was so well placed as Gem John Charteris to know, aud to reveal, the inner secrets of G.H.Q- For he was at Lord Haig s side throughout four years of war, and was Chief of the British Intelligence during 1916 and 1917- Thus his book “At G.H.Q,” has a rich promise of interest —which it fulfils (writes Captain Liddell Hart in the London Daily Telegraph”). Its historical value is not so easy to determine. And that is the author s fautt For while it is compiled in diary form, we learn that the author did not keep one, and that the book is a mosaic of contemporary notes and letters “amplified” by subsequent re-r collections. There is no indication as to where these later additions occur. ± . Nevertheless, if some entries suggest later knowledge, the bulk have a contemporary ring. For they show the unquenchable optimism as to Germany’s ebbing strength, and that single-minded faith in our prpspects of single-handed success in Flanders mud, which seem so curious in historical retrospect, contributed to the author’s replacement by a Chief of Intelligence with less rose-coloured spectacles. Yet’ according to General Charteris Haig was more bold in assumption than himself. The revelation has certainly a measure of surprise. So has the suggestion that the War Office, under the Robertson regime, was inclined to be “discouraging” at times, “by disparaging our successes." Haig returned from a visit to London on June 27, 1917, and told, of a Cabinet meeting, when “they all, headed by the P.M-, wanted to stop offensive operations for" this year and save up our men and resources for 1918. ..” This discussion was abruptly ended by a bombshell from the "Navy, who told the Cabinet that it ‘could not keep going unless the Germans were turned blit of the Belgian coast!’ No one really believed'this rather amazing view, but it had sufficient weight to make the Cabinet agree to our attack going on. “D. H.' (Haig) gave the definite opinion that if the fighting was kept up at its present intensity for six moptlis, Germany would be at the end of her available man-power. This is going rather farther than the paper I wrote for D-H. ...” Ou August 21, after the offensive had been hampered by the mild for several weeks, Haig still held that Germany’s decline was imniinent, and the prospects of clearing the coast still very hopeful “if we are favoured With a fine autqmn.” The Armies were not so favoured by weather, nor could they hope for a surprise.' Yet the (Offensive was launched and pursued against this weight of the principles and conditions of war alike- Qn October 10, we are told, Haig “(vas stijl frying to find soßie grounds for hope that we might still win through here this year, but there is none." This contrast betiyeen hope reasonable calculation should be remembered wlien reading the author’s many opprobirious comments on the politicians as the source of all ills. The book sheds light both ou Haig’s stealing qualities in a crisis, his pp(ver of calming and invigorating nerveshaken subordinates, and on the strength of his antipathies.

SIR JOHN FRENCH. En route to France in 1914 there is a note: “D. H. unburdened himself to-day. He is greatly concerned about the composition of British G.H.Q. He thinks French quite unfit for high command in time of crisis. . . He does not think Murray will dare to do anything but agree with everything French suggests. In any case, he thinks French would not listen to Murray, but will rely on (Henry) Wilson, which is far worse. D. H. thinks Wilson is a politician, and not a soldier, and ‘politician’ with Douglas Haig is synonymous with

crooked dealing. . •” It is said that Haig would have preferred the B-E.F. to’ help the French armies, not directly, but “from a flank position based on the Channel ports, from which we could effectively threaten 4 the flank of the Gennan Army-” ' Ijistory certainly tends to support this view. Wlien the tide of the war turned on the Marne we read “Actually, our own troops, though the men were very keen, moved absurdly slowly, and D. H. spent the day going from one divisional H.Q. to another to try to urge them forward- The cavalry were the worst of all, for they were right- behind the infantry. This was gall • and wormwood to him, for he had always been first and foremost a cavalry officer.” There is an inspiring picture of Haig’s influence at First Ypres, and a sidelight on Foch’s manner. “When I was shown into his H.Q. he was gazing moodily towards tjie north, and took no notice for some, time .... it exhausted my patienpe .... He shook himself with a start as if awakening from a day-dreain, and said?‘Ah, pardon, I was thinking what we should do on the hear of a suggestion that Kitchener doing no such thing, but was, I suppose; trying to hearten me, and through me D-H.”

FRENCH GENERAL??. Haig’s reaction was different, and became increasingly caustic. “D.H. sent a telegram to Sir J. French, urging that Foch had better go himself and inspire the French to attack- It was no good issuing orders, however energetic, if nothing was done to ensure that they were carried out. He has very little use for French generals; he thinks them very ignorant of the practical "side of war, and that they will not face facts.” ~ '■

A breach between G.H.Q. and Haig’s ardmy developed over "the ‘‘disgraceful” dispatch about Neuye Chapplie“lt reads as if the whole operation had been planned by G.H.,Q.”W e then her of a suggestion' that Kitchener might come put ‘“as C.-in-C. ’of the Allied Ajmies.” “At G.jj.Q. itself things are very unsatisfactory. Sir J. French seems altogether in 'Wilson’s pocket.” After Loos the explosion came-' • * • v - •*-••• T ... “P- H. sept home the whole story of the reserves.' 'He is very bitter, and says‘French remains irh-' pervious to all the teaching of the battips we have fought. Sir J. French is played out . . Thus Haig came to command, Lloyd

George early came out on a visit. “D. H. alone seemed quite impervious to his allurements. ... D. H. dislikes him- They have nothing in common. ' . . . It is not go much distrust of him personally, as of politicians as a class.” Asquith and Haldane were alone although Haig thought Bqnar La'Vr “fin’honest, feeble man.” This feelipg ' inevitably aggravated the dissensions wihch developed after the Somme, as the Cabinet became appalled at the losses. Churchill is quoted as saying “if French had re-

mained I would have run the war for him!” , In all his trials Haig found his consolation in religion. A good sermon always “much comforted” him, and he seemed ‘.‘to derive an extraordinary amount of moral strength frojn thbse sermons/’ “He is as certain as Gough was in 1914 that God is on our side. So no doubt is Hindenburg, if all we hear of him is true!”