COUNCIL v. DOCTOR

Greymouth Evening Star, 9 April 1927, Page 5

COUNCIL v. DOCTOR

APPLICATION DISMISSED.

WELLINGTON, April 7.

An application was made in the Supreme Court to-day, before Mr Justice Reed, by the New’ Zealand Medical Council, to have Dr George Oscar Jacobsen, of Wellington, struck off the register of medical practitioners on the grounds of infamous professional conduct, it being alleged that on June 30th.. 1926, he gave the name and address of Mrs Nevill. 150 Queen’s Drive, Lyall Eay, to a pregnant woman, as a person who might be able to procure an abortion. - Evidence was given by a woman as to receiving a scrap of paper with the above name and address on it from Dr Jacobsen, but she admitted that there was nothing on the paper to indicate that it had come from him. She admitted also that she consulted Dr Jacobsen because she thought he might know of some such woman, and she stated that she was not disappointed that the doctor himself had not done anything for her beyond giving her a prescription for medicine, which detectives admitted was later proved to be a tonic and not for the purposes of procuring abortion. She admitted in cross-examination that the word “abortion” was never used in the interview with Dr Jacobsen, nor did he say: ‘Go to Mrs Nevill. She will put you right.” Witness said, however, that Dr Jacobsen stated that Mrs Nevill might be able to do something. Dr Jacobsen, in evidence, denied advising the woman, whom he did not recollect calling on him, but was willing to assume he had seen, to go to a woman who might procure an abortion. On the contrary, he advised her against that when she suggested it. He denied giving her Mrs Nevill’s address, or that he had ever acted in conjunction or concert with Mi's Nevill, although he had attended professionally the daughter, son, and grandchild of Mrs Nevill. In delivering judgment, His Honor remarked that the question was one purely of fact. “I think,” he said, “that the principles which apply to the proving of a criminal charge are equally applicable here. That is, that the onus is upon the Council of proving its case and of proving it with all that particularity and certainty which must be required in a criminal charge. That proof must not leave any reasonable doubt in the mind at all. The ease really resolves itself into the girl’s word as against that of the doctor. I can find no corroboration. There are suspicious circumstances surrounding the case. These have been answered by reasonable explanations, and outside these suspicious circumstances there is absolutely no corroboration. As a reasonable precaution I do not think the Court would be justified in .exercising its extreme power without seeing that there is some corroboration of the girl’s statement.”

“The result may be very, far-reach-ing,” explained his Honor. “It may affect the whole or any of the members of the medical profession. A girl might go to the most respectable and responsible member of the profession in this town and be examined. She might then, getting no hint or suggestion from that doctor, find her way to an abortionist. As was suggested, it is quite possible on her discovering that she was committing a serious crime, it might be the very first thing that suggested itself to her to say the doctor had advised her to do it. It is a very small step from saying that in the' first instance to coming into the box afterwards and swearing it.” “I am satisfied,” concluded his Honor, “that 1 would not be doing my duty in the matter if I held on uncorroborated evidence like this that the motion has been proved. The application was accordingly dismissed, and costs were granted to the successful party.