RUSSO-POLAND

Greymouth Evening Star, 13 August 1920, Page 7

RUSSO-POLAND

BRITISH PREMIER EXPLAINS. ADVICE TO POLAND. (Australian and N.Z. Cable Association.) LONDON, August 11. In the House of Commons, Mr Lloyd George made a statement before a crowded House in regard to the Polish situation. M. Krassin and M. Kameneff (Russian envoys) were present in the strangers' gallery. .Mr Lloyd George expressed himself as hopeful of peace, but in view of the House rising at the cm! of the week, he proposed to indicate the Government's intentions in ccitnin contingencies. He expressed the opinion that the Polish attack was unjustified. He considered the Soviet Government was entitled to take into account in imposing peace conditions that the Poles had not only attacked Russia, but he asserted did so, despite Anglo-French warnings. The Sox iet was entitled to demand guarantees against a repetition of similar attacks. But nothing ■ could justify -reprisals or punishment, which would destroy the Poles' national existence. It had i'urthermoie to be considered that the independence of Poland was an essential part in the structure of European peace. To partition Poland again would not only be a

crime but a peril. These contingencies must be considered as the basis of the British policy. Dealing with the Hythe Conference, he said the conference first agreed that the sole purpose of the Allied policy was to secure peace on a basis of the independence of an ethnographical Poland, and decided to advise Poland to endeavour to negotiate an armistice and a peace, so long a; the independence of ethnographical Poland were recognised. If the Tbles negotiate peace at the Minsk Conference, the Allies did not propose to upset the arrangements. A different situation would aj-ise if the Soviet insisted on terms that were in absolute conflict with the independence of Poland as a free nation. Mr Lloyd George pointed out that unless they abandoned the whole basis of the League of Nations, they could not remain disinterested when the life of a member of the League was jeopardised. The League Covenant contemplated economic pressure as a means of assistance as distinct from a great war and conscription. They were morally bound to support an Allied nation whose national existence was challenged,especially where an additional danger

arose of a great and aggressive Soviet Empire, coterininus with Germany. The Allies would take no action except for the purpose of securing Poland's existence and independence. After references to the difficulties with which Poland was faced in her renaissance, and to blunders from inexperienced statesmanship, the speaker emphasised that the Poles must accept the direction of a people who, after, four years' experience in a great war, had made it clear to Poland that the Allies were sending her no troops. Fuither, it would be unnecessary to send troops if the Polish resources were thoroughly organised. If the Bolsheviks imposed conditions inconsistent with Poland's national freedom and existence, the Allies would put their stores at the Poles' disposal and help to equip them for their own defence. They would supply the necessary military advice and guidance, and would, exercise economic pressure upon Soviet Russia to release her strangle-hold upon the life of Poland.

Mr Ben Tiilett, interrupting, asked what would be the position of America? Mr Lloyd Geoge replied that whatever the American opinion might be in regard to the League of Nations, he was sure there would be no difference of opinion in the general attitude of their Government towards Polish independence. The Premier added that the Government would give General Wrangel further substantial support from the large stores at their disposal, which hitherto they had not allowed to reach him. This was a point whereon they insisted. In the event of the Minsk negotiations breaking down, and if they were compelled to take steps to cut off Russia from the outside world, there would be an end to any trade negotiations.