The Franklin Times PUBLISHED EVERY MONDAY, WEDNESDAY AND FRIDAY AFTERNOON. MONDAY, MARCH 14, 1938. WAR RISK: THE MONEY FRONT.

Franklin Times, Volume XXVII, Issue 31, 14 March 1938, Page 4

The Franklin Times PUBLISHED EVERY MONDAY, WEDNESDAY AND FRIDAY AFTERNOON.

MONDAY, MARCH 14, 1938. WAR RISK: THE MONEY FRONT.

* Office and Worlcs: ROULSTON STREET, PUKEKOH?), Phone No. 2. p -°* Box i<i ‘ ••We nothing extenuate nor augru set down in malice.”

“THE earlier estimate of 1500 million pounds sterling for defence,” says the . British Prime Minister, “will now be . insufficient.” There is an emphasis on the word “now r .” Something has happened to make the earlier estimate too small. What is that something? Is it merely that costs have risen, and that the time-losing differences between manufacturers and Government departments like the Air Ministry, which is accused of muddle, have caused leeway whioh must be recovered by increased expenditure? Or is it something even graver—for instance, a fear that the three aligned military autocracies (Germany, Italy, Japan) cannot be deterred from waging major war in two Continents —in Europe as well as in Asia? To make the British Empire safe against attack in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Pacific —should the three States of the anti-Gommunist Pact take simultaneous action —might well make even fifteen hundred millions sterling look too small.

Mr Chamberlain prefixes his quoted statement with the words “I can say with certainty.” His whole statement appears to have been worded with deliberation, and to be intended as a warning. “This is not the time to sit idle while the boat drifts towards a cataract.” Instead of idleness, he is trying to open conversations with Rome and Berlin, and is at the same time intensifying and accelerating British re-armament. There is another significant sentence: “Quarrels in a limited area are a matter of deep concern if they should be the starting point of a general conflagration.” Comparing the present situation in Europe with the pre-War situation, one finds major war breaking out like a bombshell in early August, 1914. Within a few' days a wholesale conflagration arose. The approach today is quite different. The war in Spain has been carefully kept alive as a slow-burning fuse by Italy and Germany; and that Italy will abandon this practice, as a result of British conversations, is still by no means certain. Olive branch or no olive branch, it remains a fact that “quarrels in a limited area” are active or latent in Europe today, and that they threaten to be a piecemeal approach to the general war that in 1914 came in one big flash. The Spanish smoulder had no parallel in 1914, and fighting in Spain by Italian troops whose leaders are reported as decorated by Italy for their services is certainly without precedent. “Quarrels in a limited area” can cover (1) the domestic near-war in Austria between the “peacefully penetrating” Nazis and the non-Nazis; (2) the war of speeches between FieldMarshal Goering (who said provocatively that the German air force would do its duty to prevent “unjust treatment” of Germans living in other countries) and Gzecho-slovakia’s Premier and President; and (3) the long-drawn-out Spanish war. Here, in three distinctly marked stages, is presented the Dictatorship piecemeal approach to general war. Austria is a potential Spain, and the stage there is set. Nazi Germany has its choice between a slow war in Austria and a lightning stroke at Czechoslovakia; which latter plan would represent a

departure from the 1936-38 policy and a return to the methods of 1914. But the resistance in Belgium to the German advance in 1914 still has its mean- j Ing. As recently as February 24 the > Chief of the Czechoslovakian General Staff stated: “The General Staff is aware of the possibility of war against the Republic without a formal declaration of war. . . • The army defence works and the armament industry are highly perfected. An enemy will do v/ell to think twice whether a surprise attack lias any prospect of quick success.” Not less firm is the recent cabled statement of the President (Dr. Benes), who said that “the relationship of the Czechoslovakian Government with German parties was an internal issue which could never be the subject of direct official negotiation and discussion with a foreign Power. in other words, the Czechoslovakian Premier (Dr. Hodza) will never go cap in hand to Herr Hitler in Germany—as Dr. Schusehnigg, Austrian Chancellor, was constrained to do —and come back with t a plan to Nazify his Cabinet.

Dr. Benes also said: “We will cordially welcome successful AngloGerman and Anglo-Italian talks, as that would greatly ease Central European difficulties.” They English Labour propagandists who are using the Eden incident to work up popular feeling against the Chamberlain Government will receive no help from the statement of Dr. Benes; nor will they be helped by Mr Chamberlain’s determination to accelerate re-armament while offering conversations to an Italy who may or may not respond. “Our desire for peace,” said the Prime Minister, “does not signify willingness to purchase peace today at the price of peace tomorrow.” While Britain has no commitments in the Danube region, she is not without interest and interests there: “It is not my intention to embark on meddlesome interference with other people’s affairs, but the Government, if necessary, will raise Its voice on behalf of peaceable discus--1 sion instead of the use of force or threats of force.” This utterance must be bracketed with that of FieldMarshal Goering quoted above, delivered in Germany on “National Air Day.”

In the British Empire, and in the Anti-Comintern Pact, East and West meet. The emphasis placed onj this pact in Japan, Germany, and Italy is sufficient admission that each of the three countries is supposed to pull the chestnuts . out of the fire for the others. Japan has invaded China, and quite clearly it is in Japan’s interests that Italy should continue to be a Mediterranean thorn in the side of Britain. If the thorn were withdrawn, by conversations or otherwise, Japan’s interests, in the matter of imposing her will on China, would not be served. Japan desires no Western interference. To what extent Signor Mussolini wishes to run with Britain, and to what extent he wishes to run with Japan and Germany, is still an unknown factor. But that the AngloItalian policy of London represents a too great reliance on an unknown factor is sufficiently denied in Mr Chamberlain’s speech. Italian obliquity and Japanese secret shipbuilding were not left out of the reckoning when the speech was drafted and the re-arma-ment was made.

With Japan waging war direct but undeclared, with Italy making indirect war, and with Germany threatening air-raids, the situation appears to be at least as menacing as in 1914. It is a situation to be met by offers of peace, backed by an adequate defence. Mr Chamberlain promises both. . What more can his Government do?—Evening Post.^ (The above was written prior to the German coup in Austria on Saturday).