The Evening Star TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 1946. HOW MANY GERMANIES?

Evening Star, Issue 25893, 10 September 1946, Page 6

The Evening Star TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 1946. HOW MANY GERMANIES?

Mr Byrnes’s plan for a single economic Germany, to be administered as soon as possible by a German National Council, or provisional Government, under Allied supervision, does not come as a new pronouncement. It has been foreshadowed for a, long time past, but it is expressed now in such. unequivocal terms as to leave, one may hope, its .phief opponent, Russia, no alternative but to face the issue. For a year past there have been four Germanies, represented by the British, American, French, and Russian zones,, with no common policy between them. That has been bad for the country’s economic recovery, since not one of the zones forms a natural economic entity, and bad for the Western Allies. Britain and America have had to find, between them, hundreds of millions of pounds to keep Germany on her feet, and that is not a charge that should continue. The Russian zone comes nearest of the four to being self-suffic-ing. Britain controls the industrial Ruhr, but the Ruhr miners cannot work as they should because they are underfed, and' the food is in the American zone, which is agricultural rather than industrial. At the same time the American zone needs coal, which is in the Ruhr.

The Potsdam Agreement laid down that there should bo “ common policies,” based,on treatment of Germany as “one economic unit,” which means centralisation, but the Russians have blocked common policies except in the domain of reparations—one of seven domains that were intended to be covered. The reparations policy'that was agreed on gave to Russia not only reparations in her zone, but 26 per cent, of those from the western zones. Three months ago America laid down that no more reparations would be shipped from her area unless common policy''' was extended to the other six requirements—trade, industry, agriculture, finance, and so forth. The position has since been at a deadlock. Russia professes to be not opposed to central administration, but has continued to make obstacles for common policies. Franco would prefer a decision on Germany’s western . boundaries to precede central' administration. Other factors affect the problem, and extend it, A year . has passed since the guns ceased firing, and, if the Germans are to have any hope for the future or incentive to do anything for themselves, it is essential that they should know what their future may be expected to be, So Mr Byrnes. has proposed that a German National Council, not hand-picked by other Governments, but elected by themselves, subject to the Allies’ approval, should be responsible first of all for the country's economic control, and then for the drafting of a Constitution, to be submitted to the people for ratification. , . . _ The Allies will remain m Germany to see that militarism is not revived there. Mr Byrnes was emphatic that Americans “ intend to continue our interest in the affairs of Europe and the world. We intend to support the United Nations with all our powers and resources,” That should be satisfactory to Russia, because it completes assurance that Germany will not be allowed to become an aggressor again. But the American plan, which largely appeals to Britain, provides little prospect ot a Communised Germany, and to that extent may be less welcome to Moscow. And, in view of all the delays and difficulties that have been experienced in framing even the outlines of smaller settlements, it is early yet to lay down what the treaty may be expected to be America would give France the Saar, at the price of some reparations, but be satisfied with control of the Ruhr’s industries. It will not be easy to get agreement on these questions. For the rest, a challenge has been given to Russia to forgo, or give reasons for. obstructiveness, which it will be difficult for that country to iernore The signs are that tlu> Biitish :uid American zones will soon be fuse:, economically. When that happens there should be additional incentive to the Russians to join in with a common scheme.