The Evening Star MONDAY, DECEMBER 31, 1945. MOSCOW REACTIONS.

Evening Star, Issue 25679, 31 December 1945, Page 4

The Evening Star MONDAY, DECEMBER 31, 1945. MOSCOW REACTIONS.

The outcome of the Moscow Conference has been received in Great Britain as “ hopeful,” but no disposition has been shown to apply any more enthusiastic description to it. In a number of other countries “ hopeful ” would be too cheerful a word to accord. “ Building peace is not as easy as declaring war,” said Mr Bovin. But there is a process that is halfway between the two in ease, and that is the process of applying doubts, criticisms, suspicions, and fears to each successive step in the construction of -peace. It is remarkable bow many nations liave been disappointed by this latest agreement. Mr Byrnes, no doubt, would agree with Mr ißevin that “we have done a very good, day’s work.’ The most favourable view was taken by him of the actual achievements of the earlier conference, before its deliberations were suspended. A proportion of Mr Byrnes’s American colleagues, however, are less satisfied with the outcome of this one. High circles within the Truman Administration, we are told, describe it as a Munich pact with Russia, which might be taken as the extreme alike of condemnation and of suspicion. It was obvious that America would not be pleased with the changes made in control of Japan, though it would have .been’ utterly unreasonable to expect that Moscow would be content to leave those high matters, touching closely on some of her greatest interests, entirely in United States hands. When any nation can trust another to that degree the United Nations Organisation formed to preserve world', peace will liave a smooth path before it. Nevertheless America has got her way in a much more delicate matter. As Washington reads the agreement, no American atomic secret will be disclosed to any other nation, including Russia, until a system of security through inspection and control has been made effective. And that safeguard has been assured without depriving (Russia of her. relief that. a weapoii more destructive than any other will not continue: indefinitely to be the exclusive possession of any Power that might have differences with her in the future, however profound may bo the causes that exist for friendly relations now. There is the risk, of course, that Russia does not read the treaty in the same way as America and that her satisfaction will be modified when she learns how Washington reads it, hut that chance is inseparable from treaties. It will .extend to more matters than the atomic bomb. Its importance will only be diminished as the “ Big Three ” learn to trust one another, and the best value of the Moscow Conference may well be that it has increased 1 the disposition to that trust. Congress presumably will endorse the agreement, and if all goes well with its application the way will be smooth, as compared with earlier ways, for the Foreign Ministers when next they meet. The Big Three will learn to co-operate because they have no option in the matter. It will he longer, however, before they satisfy anyone else, and the objections to this agreement -felt by those who will not apply it but have, it applied to them come from every side. Italy is sore at being subjected to the same procedure of peace-making as-the other ex-enemy Powers, despite her eighteen months of. co-belligerency. She will get -benefit for that, no doubt, when reparations are discussed; iio more could be expected fairly. The French think too much has been conceded to Russian viewpoints. The Persians are dejected because their fears and troubles have not been considered yet to any useful purpose, and Koreans are affronted at the prospect of a period of tutelage preceding the self-govern-ment, of which the present generation has had no experience,. and which was exercised badly when it was last enjoyed. (But the Big Three will do well enough at this stage if their peacemaking—or preparations for peacemaking, which is what it more often amounts to—goes smoothly among themselves.-.