ROMMEL SUPERSEDED

Evening Star, Issue 25674, 24 December 1945, Page 7

ROMMEL SUPERSEDED

Hitler-Mussolini Letters—No. 13

Danger in North Africa TUNISIA MUST BE HELD In the middle of March, 1943, Hitler disclosed to Mussolini the reasons that prompted his dismissal of Rommel from command of Axis forces in North Africa, and points out that the fate of Italy’s African possessions depends upon the protection of supply and personnel convoys to that theatre of war, This, he insists, will mean revamping the whole convoy system.

From the Fuhrer’e Gen. H.Q. March 14, • 1943. “ DUOE.— “I received your, letters with great joy. The stabilisation Of the Eastern front, which I hope to be well- on its way already, will allow me, oh Duce, if your health and other occupations permit it, to-meet you personally, perhaps within a very brief period of time. “I believe this is absolutely necessary, because the .arguments are so vast and so. absorbing that it is virtually impossible to deal with them exhaustively by letter. Besides, I feel » very personal desire to meet with you personally after having overcome one of. the gravest crises of this war, a crisis , which has'subjected my assistants to an exceptional trial, “ But, as I mentioned above, I believe that the East front has been finally consolidated, and will be bolstered even more in the'.com- ' ing weeks, and that the initiative will return completely in our hands now that we have begun to take the offensive, “Among the matters of. major importance which command my attention now there is, oh Duce, in a prominent position the conservation ana-—as you justly expressed it in your letter—the possible, expansion of our hold in North Africa. In Relation to this problem,.oh Duce, I wish to take the following stand:— . ; “ ; (1) Marshal Rommel presented himself - to my general headquarters, and I have, for the moment,- retired him for reasons of health, because —according to physicians and my own personal impression—he urgently needs rest and care. . . “In his place I shall entrust the command of the North Afrioan group of armies to: General Arnira (Colonelgeneral Jurgen von Arnim), • “I-wish, however, to talk over .the definitive revamping of the African command personally with you. In any case* I beg you,Duce, to maintain'absolute secrecy ou the retirement of Marshal' Rommel and on the temporary command changes in Africa. “ Actually, even in Germany such shifts in command are not, .as a mat.ter: of principle, made public; and, if they are, it happens only after many months. In this case, particularly, I .consider the divulgation of the news -especially harmful.to j “ I beg of you, therefore., Duce,' to impart strict, orders to this effect to your commands. For, no matter how posterity will judge him, Marshal Rommel has been, in each command entrusted to him, a leader loved by his soldiers —particularly German soldiers. And for his enemies he has been, and still is, an enemy to be feared. f “ What is more tragic is; that this man, who is one of the most valorous : among my officers and possesses excep- • tional qualities of leadership and courage, should! have fallen down on the problem of supply, which can he solved only by the maximum development of maritime transportation. " , THE BRIDGEHEAD VITAL . “2. I toid Marshal Rommel precisely the same thing you, oh Duce, wrote me in. your letter: The Tunisian bridgehead must be held at any cost. Its extension must not, therefore, be contracted to such an extent as to further aggravate the problem of transportation and place us, finally, in'the predicament of having to abandon it. “ On the other hand, however, i cannot abstain from adhering to the viewpoint that this will be possible only if the problem of supply and transportation is faced and solved in a really radical manner. The decisive factor, Duce, is not so much the air arm, but the organisation of the protection of the convoys. The average which Germany alone must furnish,, including that of the Baltic Sea, amounts to from four to four and one-half million tons monthly.. Of these between three and three and a-half million tons travel along the Atlantic coasts and in part along the Channel itself to reach the northern tip of Norway. “ It would be completely impossible, in face of British Air Force superiority, to protect this 4,000-mile route by aircraft alone. If our losses in tonnage amount to only 3 per cent, monthly it is due to the perfect organisation of

[This series will be ccficluded on Thursday with a letter from Mussolini, in which lie urges a separate peace with Russia. All bombast is gone 'and there is left only deep apprehension of the future.} (World Copyright Reserved.)

convoy protection. It is, for example, impossible to protect a ship against night attacks from the air. “ Furthermore, I consider the 80,000 tons monthly estimate of supplies turned out by this supreme command absolutely inadequate. The land forces in Norway alone receive in normal times between 140,000 and 150,000 tons a month. And in this total are not included extraordinary shipments for the construction of fortfications, supplementary supplies of munitions, etc. / “The transportation of 150,000 to even 200,000 tons monthly across the Sicily Canal (Straits of Messina) is without doubt easier than the task to which we are subjected up here where the adversary is by far stronger in the air and on the sea and, with his island, in the narrowest part of the Channel, is scarcely 39 kilometres (24 miles) from our o,wn coast. PROBLEM SOLVED IN NORTH “ From Narvik to Lulea, though the the , Baltic is continuously infested by Russian aircraft and submarines, we transport each year between six and seven million tons of mineral alone to the German ports. All these problems, Duce, are solved only thanks tp the exceptional convoy organisation, / “ In general, the decisive factor in convoys, specially as far as torpedo planes are concerned, is to provide adequate protection in the form, of naval vessels, which are properly armed and, more Important still, absolutely expertly manned. “The solution of this problem) Duce, is of sttch paramount importance that upon it depends the fate of your African possessions, and at the same time constitutes a decisive factor for the victorious conclusion of this war. ■ “ Since, 1 were this problem not to find a solution, the German soldiers will certainly know how to fight and, if necessary, even die honourably I must stress the fact that the position will not thus be saved. It is for this reason that I have sent you, Duce, the best navy officer the German fleet has ever possessed, Grand Admiral (Karl) Doenitz, to submit to you proposals which I beg you, Duce, to examine only from the point of view of the absolute necessity to use every means available to solve this intricate problem. ! “ (3) On the basis of papers at my disposal, the report of Marshal Rommel, and from conversations with several of my most capable officers of the General Staff, I have examined thoroughly what line of conduct it is worth while for .us to assume with the Eighth Army iu every eventuality. HOW TO HIT THE EIGHTH ARMY

“ The advantage of the Mareth Line position, is based .on the fact that, given favourable conditions, it provides the best, possible jumping-off point for offensive action. . The disadvantage is due to the undoubted possibility that we might be outflanked from the west.

“If the adversary—and it is in keeping with British technique of war —breaks through after a powerful artillery preparation, the sector near the coast, which is between 12 and 15 kilometres wide, and simultaneously ■ develops a successful envelopment from the west,, it can result, first of all, in 1 the immediate loss of all non-mobile units.

.“ According to my calculations, the position of Gabes and Schott must in any case be prepared as a strongly articulated unit, and the defence must be organised in such a way that the less' mobile units'will not be isolated from the Schott. In this way an attempted envelopment from the west—though possible—can' always be repelled immediately by counter-offensive action.

‘‘.To my way of thinking, the entire, defensive sector must, however, be supplied and defended by every man—that is, to the last man. “ I have already given, Duce, to Marshal Kesselring the order—parallel with the revamping of/convoy traffic —to hit the Eighth Army (Field-Marshal Sir Bernard S. Montgomery’s famous Eighth) with his entire aviation from time to time. At any rat®, all we can > procure in the way of reinforcements will be placed at your disposal.