JAPANESE POLITICS

Evening Star, Issue 25577, 1 September 1945, Page 10

JAPANESE POLITICS

AN OUTLINE FOR REFORM? [Written by H.S.K.-K., for the ' Evening Star.'] The military measures taken by the Allies in the war agaiust Japan might appear stronger than those Germany had to meet, but the political treatment of the Japanese Government is very lenient in contrast. 'The Emperor and his advisers are used to implement Allied poLicy, ho demands regarding internal reorganisation have yet been made, and to all intents the pre-war governmental system has been allowed

to survive. From utterances of Allied statesmen can be discerned a belief that the " democratic tendencies" of the Japanese people will triumph over the militarist clique who led them astray. How far is such a trust in the essential democratic sentiment of the Japanese and in their institutions justified?

The particular aspect of. the wide term " democracy "interesting us most at present is that bound up -with pacific intentions. When Japan emerged from the feudal age after Commander Perry, of the U.S. navy, broke„down the barriers to'European penetration,-a westernisation of Japanese life took place. Behind the scenes. . however, a. small group of military leaders, drawn largely from the old feudal clans, wielded such power in foreign affairs that the Constitution and Parliament were no moro than a sham. These leaders have been bent on conquest and have drawn the country into an [mperiaList policy of expansion. Wars with China in 1891. with Russia in 1905, the first World War, intervention against Russia in 1918, the;seizure of Manchuria in 1931. the "China incident " from 1937 onwards, have all helped to extend Japanese domination over the Asiatic mainland.

This aggressive policy has been justified by three main arguments, chief among them that Japan has'a surplus population for which outlets must be found.- Yet, even though she is relatively densely populated, and though the people on the whole are extremely poor, emigration to the conquered parts of the Empire has been' practically negligible. The Japanese preferred to stay ih their own country, and pressure of population is ' then no valid reason for Japan's policies. Japan further put forward the excuse that she needed raw materials and food, especially rice, iron, and coal. This is true and holds equally for most other industrial nations. The question, however, is whether a country should buy its raw materials or annex them. The third point is more intangible, being concerned with the cultural mission all Japanese hare been taught it is their duty to discharge. It boils down to a policy of " Asia for the Asiatics." a counterpart to the Monroe Doctrine which reserves America to the United States. Rut whereas the United States has over .half of the population of the whole Continent and so justifies its leadership in its own eyes, the population of Japan only

accounts for roughly 6 per cent, of Asia, and it is too much to ask the 90-odd per cent, who are non-Japanese to bow* to her wishes. Bound up with these civilising asipirations is the desire to control all of Asia by economic means, a perfectly understandable desire were it not for the like desires of other States. The economic control that had been established before this war benefited-only a few family groups and brought no advantages to the mass of the people. The expansionist policy pursued by ,the ruling clique of Japan has then not benefited the Japanese nation as a whole, and one must therefore inquire how this clique gained the adherence ot the nation to its policies. Japan's political institutions resemble superficially those of Western democracy. There is a Parliament composed of two Houses, the delegates to. the Lower House being elected by universal manhood suffrage. The two great parties in this House arc the Minseito, which gained 179 seats at the last elections, in 1937, and the Seiyuikai, wth 176 seats. The former party represented mainly the industrial and urban electors; the latter was supported by the agrarian population. A moderate Socialist Party—the Shakai Taishuto—obtained 35 seats at the same elections, and - two Fascist Parties were represented by 23. delegates. The Upper House had appointed and elected members, representing the aristocracy and the large financial interests or the i country. So far, the analogy with Western democracy is obvious, but the power of this Parliament was practically nil. Even though legislation had to pass both Houses, the Government was not responsible to Parliament, but to the Emperor alone. The policies of State, were also not determined by Parliament, but were decided by a council which was completely beyond its control. Parliamentary institutions were, then, a. veneer for the ruling clique .under the Emperor, and developments showed that democratic institutions were readily surrendered by the people pledged to uphold them. In 1932, a purely militarist government, nominated by the army, took office. The subsequent elections did actually go against them •. nevertheless, not being responsible to parliament, this government stayed on and manifested its Fascist leanings by signing the anti-Comintern pact in 1936, thus joining the Axis. The control of the Government was consolidated, before the "China incident " broke out., in the hands of a small Cabinet directing all interal policies. By November, 1937, an imperial General Headquarters, consisting oniy of the Emperor; advised by the chiefs* of staff, gave the fighting services sole control. German " advisers " now arrived in Japan in increasing numbers, and advocated the complete suppression of all parties save a Fascist one. In 1940 their advice was taken, the parties were either dissolved by decree or agreed to leave the political-field voluntarily, and a totalitarian body under Prince Kohoye gave a show of support to a Government that did not even need it. Trade unions followed the example and dissolved themselves; hitherto mildly independent newspapers went out of circulation; and the various Christian denominations were united into one single Japanese Christian Church. Its property became vested in Japanese hands, while foreign support of missions was prohibited, with the result that most missionaries had to leave the country. The culmination of all these changes lay in the appointment of General Tojo, in October, 1941, as Premier with dictatorial powers. - ' The history of Japanese politics does not inspire confidence in the adoption of a democratic, peaceful policy for the future. Observers have, however, pointed, out in pre-war times that the middle classes were developing strong liberal sentiments, and From the number and extent of strikes it becomes clear that a demand for economic and political, democracy was made by the vast mass of workers. These demands can only be made effective, and liberalism can only come to the fore. if the parliamentary system is ■changed in three crucial aspects. The appointed Upper House must be so reformed that it cannot block legislation passed by the elected Lower House, in which the real power will then be concentrated. The Government, instead of being responsible to the Emperor, must be made dependent solely on Parliament. Finaliy, the legislative power of the Emperor must be abolished to safeguard against future cliques using him for further aggressive adventures.. The Allied leaders, believing in the democratic and peaceful tendencies of the Japanese people, must use their power to ensure these reforms in order that such tendencies may have free play.