COMMENT AND REFLECTIONS

Evening Star, Issue 24096, 17 January 1942, Page 7

COMMENT AND REFLECTIONS

The slow but continuous withdrawal of the Imperial forces in Malaya and the fresh J apanese gains in Dutch Borneo recorded this week constitute a source of anxiety that we cannot expect to escape during the treacherous and dangerous interval of sparring for time to readjust our dispositions and restore the strategic situation. No fresh gain sufficient to prevent such restoration has yet accrued to our eastern enemy, and we take some comfort from the contrary fact that in the same period plain disaster has befallen our western enemies in their Russian and Libyan projects. Nevertheless, it is the fate of Malaya and the East Indies, and particularly of Singapore, that will count most heavily in this phase of the war, the latter being the very cornerstone of the strategical plan by which Britain and the United States expected to close summarily the door upon Japanese incursion southwards. Singapore was the chief hinge of that shutter, Hongkong and the Philippines the other hinges. As the Americans say, that strategy has gone haywire, and it is Japan which has slammed the door upon us, holding us virtually prisoner. A new strategy on the big scale cannot be devised in a week, nor indeed in a month when wo have no security of position; and while wo cannot doubt that the most vigorous exercise of the now undivided and well-guided strength of the Allies is being devoted to the task of redressing the, deplorable debacle, and that we are at last meeting the enemy without pne arm tied by the inadequacy of officialdom and the hesitancy of divided command, at the same time there must be for a time an element of improvisation in the steps we can take. Perhaps happily so, since improvisation sometimes produces the very qualities we have lacked—namely, boldness and celerity, and Wavell’s career has been' built upon such qualities. We can hope that behind the vagueness and mystery that at present shroud our military and naval movements something big and decisive is developing to halt an enemy whose numbers and fanatical valour have proved so formidable. Colonel’ Knox has said flatly that a major naval action is not to be expected at the moment, which may mean.exactly that or something quite different, since it is not a common practice to reveal plans to the enemy. At any rate, it w r ould be unwise to assume from that statement, and from a further unofficial one postulating a possible retirement upon Darwin as a pied-a-terre for counteroffensive, that the intention is merely to delay the enemy in Malaya, and to abandon Singapore when we can no longer remain with safety. Interest no less than honour forbids relinquishment to the enemy of that vital base' upon which so many millions have been lavished, and Darwin would obviously prove a very poor, substitute, both strategically and in point of equipment. We can take for granted that Singapore will be defended to the last man. There was direct evidence during the week of the arrival of considerable air reinforcement, with fighters in sufficient strength to drive off marauders over the base, while indirect evidence that land forces and equipment have been augmented is to be assumed from the fact that such have been provided in Burma. We must hope that the air reinforcement will prove sufficient to give us predominance, for there can be no doubt that ait power is going to be the deciding factor. The loss of the northern bases has been crippling to the operations of our land forces hitherto, but this disadvantage will be obviated in the south, where the war zone will be within reach of our bombers and fighters—-if we have them at effective strength. Meanwhile, screening the preparation for a stand to give battle, our forces in mid-Malaya are executing a skilful manoeuvre of withdrawal, doing as much injury as -possible to the enemy with the least damage to themselves ; adopting the Russian tactics in this respect as also in taking care to leave nothing of value to him. It is, of course, distressing to learn of the destruction of millions of pounds’ worth of rubber and processing material, petroleum products, copra, coal, power stations, bridges, railways, and the like, but it is as necessary to deny an enemy the fruits of his victory as to delay Ills advance. Our real battle position is established along the short line of the southern end of the peninsula, where our communications will be assured, while those of the enemy will be rendered precarious by the miles of wrecked railways and highways behind him. If there is any validity in the story cabled by a New York correspondent on the spot, it is here that the Japanese march on Singapore will be halted and turned.

We must hope that it will be so. If not, and should Singapore’s role be reduced from that of base for offensive operations to that of fortress, let us also hope that considerable reserves have been kept to defend the island and the Johore approaches. Many writers have been severely critical of America’s failure before the Japanese attacked to send its fleet westward to Singapore because of fear of angering Japan; one foresaw that once Japan made an assault upon that key position it would be too late to get the fleet there, adding that this might go down in history as another blunder of the democracies in trying to avert inevitable conflict, and so giving the aggressor the initial advantage.

Still that situation has not developed yet, and in the meantime it is possible that the Japanese,.after their easy successes, are just a little over-conscious of their prowess. If the “ stolen plan ” story of mid-week has any basis in fact, the leaders of the “ little men " would appear to be afflicted l with something of the megalomania of Hitler, and like him may find their endowment far short of their pretensions. Their dream of Pacific dominance clear to the shores of the United States is certainly not convertible into reality, but it does provide us with a pattern of their mentality, and should coalesce our effort into implacable war.

Closolv as these events touch us, they should not distract attention from the amazing developments on the Russian front in the past week, where Hitler’s cause is foundering in the most important sector of the world war. Churchill’s prophecy—“ Ho has made one of the outstanding blunders of history ” —is coming to realisation daily, and Hitler cannot be blind to the ominous parallel of his situation to-day and that of Napoleon a century before him. On all four fronts—the Crimea, the Ukraine, Moscow, and Petrograd—the initiative has been so completley wrested from Germany that it will be impossible for the latter to regain it; on two of them the enemy’s retreat is in actual danger of interception. Whatever may happen in the future phases of the war. we can never forget that it is Russia that has smashed Hitler; it is Russian readiness and steadfastness and Russian skill that

have set the board for the final throw. Hitler may attempt diversion iii the Mediterranean to assist Rommel’s harried African division; he may stage_ a gigantic attack to reduce Malta, which; has been a dagger in his side ever sines' he attempted to reinforce his Libyan campaign; but the events of the week, . and particularly his desperate dilemma in Russia, justify the assumption tha& his power is too diminished for th®. undertaking of a major operation anywhere, least of all against England, so long as Russia’s ever-increasing* pressure pins his divisions to thab front. Moreover, there are certain symptoms that the. hostility between the Nazi Party and the German armyj leaders is approaching a crisis. Th® elimination or such" a man as Brauschitsch, followed by the resignation 25 leading generals, copveys perhapsthe first hint of a climax to the always, existent cleavage between the Nazi, Party and the army command, a situa-, tion now precipitated by Hitler’s complete failure to seal the Russian cam-* paign into which he thrust an unwilling army.