GERMANY’S TRANSPORT PROBLEMS

Evening Star, Issue 23908, 11 June 1941, Page 9

GERMANY’S TRANSPORT PROBLEMS

NEGLECTED RAILWAYS THE BATTLE C.' MKHUKICATIOKS Ihe Rattle ol the Atlantic may be a serious problem fur Britain, but (formally has to lace a co.o-.sal struggle on the battlefield of Knrope in the fight to maintain her communications. I he mere existence of a blockade which deprives Germany of the main use of Hamburg and Bremen and closes the Kiifstern Mediterranean, throws considerable strain on the transport sys-tem,-and the effects are many-sided and cumulative.

-Germany s transport system, already heavily taxed a year ago. is having to lace great.y-inereased tasks to-day, and reports rea-hing Britain show chaotic conditions on the railways of the Reich and occupied territories ” For the time being we shall have to reckon with the fact that the rolling stock on the I’eieli railways is insufficient to meet the steadily-increasing demand.” < Berlin ‘ I>okalanz : pger.’ quoting Somerlatter. official of the Reach Ministry of Transport, May 11. 1940.1 The new tasks consist of:—(1) Supplying Italy’s vital necessities; (2) supplying the needs not locally served of the army which sprawls from the Arctic to North Africa; (A) supplying raw material for tho industries and agriculture of occupied territories in order that they may contribute to Germany’s war effort and to feeding Greater Europe. MEETING THE PROBLEM. All these tasks must be met by the inland transport systems of Knrope, and these roads, railways, and waterways are Germany's , responsibility—a formidable programme to tax the resources of even the most efficient machine. Moreover, the carrying of goods over land and not by sea is a most expensive means of transport. “In normal times a tanker carrying 6,000 tons of oil might sail from Constanza to Hamburg. To carry the same quantity overland means that 12 trains, each of 30 to 35 wagons, must travel a distance of over 1,200 miles. That is to say, to carry the cargo of one ship, the railways must haul an equivalent to 72 Royal Scots from Kuston to Glasgow. (Ministry of Economic Warfare statement, May 9, 1941.) The needs of Germany’s mechanised army and considerations of prestige dictated concentration on road building in the Reich at the expense of the railways. This was bound to have serious consequences when economy of petrol became of primary importance. German railways have been relatively neglected since 1933. As long ago as the winter of 1938 an official announcement was made that £175.000,000 (3.500,000,000 riu.) were to be spent on renewing deficiencies in rolling stock on the railways of the Greater Reich. “None of the chief forms of transport have any reserves of rolling stock or other supplies and none of them can hope to see their requirements fulfilled during tho war.” In an article entitled ‘ New Indications ' in ‘ Das Reich,’ February 9, 1941.) To-day Germany has so forced her economy that she has little opportunity to divert her productive resources from the immediate demands of the war machine in order to improve her transport. Inland waterways become, therefore, of relative importance, but her shortage of barge space in making itself felt. The shortage is further increased by the need for repairing “invasion barges,” which are constantly bombed b ythe R.A.F. “ New construction in 1940 has proved insufficient to compensate for losses due to wear and tear in inland water vessels engaged on the Oder. It is, therefore, necessary to revolutionise the boat-building yards engaged in this work. The increased intensity of the traffic on the Oder has accentuated the shortage of harbour facilities.” (‘Breslauer Neneste Nachrichten,’ February 21, 1941.) ATTEMPTED SOLUTION BY PLUNDER. Germanv has tried to ease her problem by tho wholesale plunder of rolling stock from occupied countries. “ The transport difficulties of last winter will nolTvoccnr again this year, because trucks and locomotives are constantly being delivered from occupied countries.” cMagdeburgische Zeitung,’ December 2, 1940.) This is a short-sighted policy, for occupied • territories. if thev are to work for Germany, must themselves bo provided with sufficient transport. OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE. The R.A.F. contrives to make Germany’s already heavy transport problems almost insuperable. Frequent references to the “ marshalling yards at Hamm.” to the “ rail centres.” Cologne, Mannheim, Osnabrueck. and Gelsenkirchen, to the Dortmund-Ems Canal, and the “ inland ports,” Duisborg, Ruhrort, and Ludwigshaven. testify to the great attention which the R.A.F. is paying Germany’s lines of communications.

Sabotage in occupied countries adds to Nazi embarrassment. “ Since the outbreak of war it has been found necessary to arm the employees of the German railways, particularly in the eastern and western occupied territories. It is now announced that all railway employees throughout the Reich are to be given new uniforms of more military pattern, with revolvers or sidearms. Higher officials will wear daggers.”' (‘ Bremer Nachrichten,’ April 27, 1941.) “There have been a number of derailments during the past few weeks on the Bergen-Oslo railway line. On February 13 a large German

military train was derailed by a loose rail being placed across the track.” (‘ Dagensnyhetcr,’ Stockholm, February 13, 1941.) FUTURE PROSPECTS. The outlook for Germany in the battle of communications is a gloomy one. As the (R.A.F. grows in striking power and resistance in occupied territories gains courage and strength from persistent onslaughts on Germany’s war machine, so will the Nazi transport difficulties grow. The outlook for Britain in the Battle of the Atlantic is far more encouraging. The sinking of the Bismarck, Germany’s _ newest and most powerful battleship, moans a considerable simplification of the problem, while active and increasing help from the United States combines with [British naval superiority to ensure our victory. “ Our patrols are helping now to ensure the delivery of needed supplies to Britain. All additional measures will bo taken. The delivery of supplies is imperative. It can be done. It must be done. It shall o bdone.” (President Roosevelt, May 27, 1941.)