PACT WITH SOVIET

Evening Star, Issue 23860, 15 April 1941, Page 5

PACT WITH SOVIET

JAPAN'S FUTURE INTENTIONS

MDRE AGGRESSIVE SOUTHWARD POiICY BACK DOOR PROTECTED IN EVENT OF WAR TOKIO, April 14. Political observers anticipate that Japan will now feel free to adopt a more aggressive southward policy, with a resultant deterioration of Japanese relations with the United States. It is believed that Japan’s next step following the Soviet neutrality pact will be to make very strong efforts to settle the Chinese war through Soviet mediation. The fifth year of tiro war begins in July, and it is expected that Japan will request Russia to exert pressure on General Chiang Kai-shek to amalgamate with Mr Wang Chingwei under liberal terms. “ Japan signed the Tripartite Pact to prevent the spread of the war throughout the world, ’I said the Japanese Prime Minister, Prince Konoye, “ but the fulfilment of larger Japanese purposes required a fundamental adjustment of Russian-Japanese relations. I believe this pact will greatly contribute to the promotion of world peace and will also serve as a basis for a rapid and concrete solution of the various questions between Russia and Japan.” The ‘ Nichi Nichi ’ says that in substance the pact bears the character of a non-aggression pact. The ‘ Asahi ’ says: “ Japan and Russia revealed a policy towards the maintenco of Far Eastern peace.” The ‘ Yomiuri ’ says: “ It is a great shock to the world when United States entry into the European war is imminent, and it is a poignant blow to Chungking.” The Domei Agency, commenting on the pact, says it guarantees Japan’s northern back door in the event of her involvement in a war in the Pacific. DIPLOMATIC VICTORY. The Japanese army organ, * Tairiku Shimpao,’ termed the pact with the Soviet a diplomatic victory, enabling Russia eventually to move toward India. “ The Soviets realise that in order to complete the economic block they must have access to the tropics.” The ‘ Nichi Nichi’s ’ evening edition says the pact offers a new turning point for the disposal of the China affair. It is asserted that the treaty eliminates Japan’s dual strategy versus the United States and Russia, which has been Japan’s, biggest misgiving in connection with tho so-called Pacific crisis, thereby permitting Japan to concentrate on her southward programme. This feature constitutes the treaty’s mast important meaning. It is said that the treaty completely shuts out the United States approach towards tho Soviet. BRITISH COMMENT SOVIET MORE FAVOURED PARTY (British Official Wireless.) RUGBY, April 13. Competent commentators draw distinctions between tho pact signed recently between the Soviet and Yugoslavia and that between the Soviet and Japan. Wherelas in the case of Yugoslavia tho pact provides that if one party is attacked by a third Power the other would maintain a policy of friendship, the pact with Japan merely stipulates for neutrality in such an event. it is noted, however, that Japan has underlined in this pact a clause which was added to the Tripartite Pact for her benefit, specifically exempting her from any obligation to undertake hostilities against the Soviet. Although future events may give importance to this pact, in existing circumstances it makes but little difference. The Soviet seems to be the more favoured party, and commentators sum up the situation by remarking that Mr Matsuoka seems to have had to wait a long time for very little.

AMERICAN POLICY UNCHANGED MR HULL'S COMMENT WASHINGTON, April 11. (Received April 15, at 1.30 p.ra.) Mr Cordell Hull declared that the Russo-Japanese pact could be overestimated, and that tho policy of the American Government remained unchanged. CHINESE OPINION SOVIET AID EXPECTED TO CONTINUE CHUNKING, April 14. Informed circles express the opinion that tho Soviet recognition of Manchukuio is likely to ovoko Chungking protests, but they are generally confident that the treaty will not decrease Soviet aid to China. Tho army organ, ‘ Stingpao,’ says; “Tho pact does not produce any unfavourable influence for China, however useful it is for the pur,purpose of producing a certain psychological effect in Soviet-Japanese relations.” The ‘ Takungpao ’ predicted that the pact foreshadows an immediate Japanese push southward and a consequent large Pacific war. Chinese and American circles in Shanghai fear that tho Moscow j>acb will accentuate Japan’s “ positive policy ” and increase tho likelihood of a collision with the Western Powers, especially the United States. The American-owned 1 Post Mercury ’ said: “ Japan has not purchased real security through the pact. She has bought false security. In reality, it is worse than none at all because she will never be sure that Russia will not move to Manchuria as. soon as Japan is too exhausted to fight.” The Foreign Office is studying the Soviet-Japanese treaty with a view to determining whether it violates the Sinn-Soviet non-aggression agreement, Article 2 of which states . . . “ Also refrain from any action or entering into any agreement which may bo used bv an aggressor to the disadvantage of the party subjected to aggression.” Military observers expressed tho opinion that the pact would enable Japan to withdraw from Manchuria four out. of nine divisions garrisoned there. They said that for guerillas to make further withdrawals from North China and Inner Mongolia would he inadvisable.