COMMENT and REFLECTIONS

Evening Star, Issue 23729, 9 November 1940, Page 11

COMMENT and REFLECTIONS

Churchill’s speech this week weighing the ivar situation ivas one of measured optimism, which did not seek to disguise that for, perhaps, a long time yet we shall be riding out of trouble, through trouble, and into trouble again, and that finis will bo scrawled across many thousands of young lives before we can convince the self-called Herrenvolk (lords of the earth) that they are not by ordination of Nature the masters of their fellow-men. In the battle for Britain we have gone a considerable way to abate this ill-founded self-confidence, and quench the ardour of the Nazi airmen for demonstrating it; and, in accomplishing this feat of “ debunking,” British bitterness and resentment have given way to a new sense of power, and a grim determination to use it without ruth. It is possible, as an American journalist suggests, that between now and November 25 the invasion will be attempted; but the prophecy is based on very slender and speculative evidence, and Hitler s “ masterpiece ” is so long overdue, and so well prepared for that we cannot see his craftiness being overcome even by the overweening conceit that has ballooned his earlier exploits. Britain’s newest danger will be, as Churchill forecasts, a burgeoning of the attack upon our sea-borne traffic in the - new year when a combination of U-boats and Italian submarines will probably be used in a desperate attempt to make our shipping losses (even at present appreciable) so crucial as to imperil our existence. Even with the accession of the 50 American destroyers our strength in this naval category is at fairly low ebb for the innumerable tasks that are relegated to these flotillas, and we have to count as possible at least the crotvning infamy of France being inveigled into handing over her considerable destroyer fleet to the enemy.

But the week is not by any means debit. On the credit side ice have several important items, not the least of them the return of Roosevelt as U.S. President. This is a blow to the Axis partners, for it signifies acceptance by a great majority of the American nation of tlie President’s foreign policy and his attitude of helpfulness to Britain—carried so far indeed, that he has not hesitated summarily to cut through red tape, and face formal rebuke on Britain’s behalf. The other credit items are the unexpected check to the Italians on the mountain frontiers of Greece, and the prompt seizure by the British fleet of Crete as soon as Mussolini’s cohorts crossed the Albanian border. This puts us astraddle the Eastern Mediterranean With a much wider strategic radius for air and fleet operations. Whatever happens to Greece this advantage cannot be wrested from us unless the Italian navy risks. engagement and defeats us. Our sea power effectively neutralises Italy’s land power. We control the Aegean; better still, as one strategist says, the possession of Crete blankets the Dodecanese Islands (Italian), and enables our fleet and air arm to sally into the lonian Sea towards Corfu and the entrance to the Adriatic—the enemy’s direct line of communication with Albania. More than that, forces from Crete could raid Mussolini’s Libyan life-line, and protect British units harassing the Italians in the Western Desert.

The situation there is still very stagnant. It would seem that Graziani has decided that a mechanised dash to the Nile is impossible, and plans to move slowly in short stages along the coastal road, halting at each stage to bring up supplies for the next. Even so, in the coverless desert these supply trains will he subject to continuous raiding from the air, and shelling from the sea; and a flanking movement in large mechanised formation is out of the question since tanks, leaving the main road, would have to contend with sand a.ndl'the risk of being swalloived in M wddis,” or work' in rock teeth tltqt are verliable traps. In fact, the advance would be so slow as to nullify most of the advantages of a mechanised thrust. Many commentators cotisider that the real danger to Egypt is from the air, not from the Western Desert, They argue that the slackening of the air assault on Britain may in part derive from the diversion of large numbers of German bombers to the Libyan front, and that these will essay duplication of the /Poland tactics by blitzkrieg bombing of the crowded Egyptian centres near the Nile Delta, interrupting our communications, and''throwing our forces into disarray. The facts remain that the record of Italian aggressiveness here is meagre, and that there ' ! is an atmosphere almost of apology in Signor Gayda’s explanations of the immobility in this sector. If a full-scale attack is to be undertaken in the Balkans, timed with the Egypt j campaign, it is because Germany is running short of oil and 'q,ims to take the route through Syria to replenish her stocks. A recent estimate was that Germany had been compelled to cult her expenditure of petrol to below peacetime consumption, wjiich is far short of war necessities. Therefore, if we can prevent her obtaining supplies east of Rumania, her hour of collapse! may be near. It is true that the disintegration of the fine French army in Syria lays that important route to the oilwells open to attack; but no Italian expeditionary force could be landed there while control of the Eastern Mediterranean j-csts indisputably with the British Navy; and, apart from a coastal landing, a German thrust •across Turkish territory would be impossible unless by consent, or by attaining complete control of Turkey, an eventuality that would throw the whole of the Middle East strategic situation into the melting pot. English journals of criticism contain much to show that Germany's hold on the conquered territories is by no means secure—that ruthless exploitation is releasing them from the bewildered shock that at first made the invader’s task easy. Germany is on the horns of a dilemma. She cannot conciliate the conquered peoples while she exploits them, and she cannot sustain her war effort without the most ruthless exploitation of them; and under the scourge of German exactions and domination, depression and fatalistic acceptance are giving place to a more positive, if still passive, resistance, that bodes ill for the conqueror when his cause begins to fail.